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In a recent editorial, the San Francisco Examiner observed that, 
''The notion that an unmarried relationship is the equivalent of mar-
riage is an attack upon social norms, the destruction of which con-
cerns a great many people in the nation and, we assume, in San 
Francisco."1 Shortly thereafter, San Francisco's Board of Supervi-
sors approved an unprecedented ordinance authorizing the payment 
of spousal benefits to unmarried partners who share "the common 
necessaries of life" with city employees.2 At the Baltimore session of 
the 1980 White House Conference on the Family, one delegate asked 
the conference to define the family as "two or more persons who 
share resources, responsibility for decisions, values and goals, and 
have commitment to one another over time." This proposal lost by 
only two votes among 761 delegates.3 As these incidents suggest, in 
today's national dialogue on American family life, we are having 
increasing difficulty even agreeing about what a "family" is. 
The way family relationships are defined has significant legal 
consequences because our laws bestow great benefits upon families. 
Consider, for example, marital interests in real property; privileged 
communications between husband and wife; inheritance rights be-
longing to family survivors under intestate succession laws; and 
wrongful death rights in tort law. The Supreme Court has also es-
tablished several categories of extraordinary constitutional protec-
tion for marriage, child-parent relationships, and related interests.4 
These benefits arise from the law's recognition that family relation-
ships are extremely important to individuals. In addition, the law 
reflects strong social and even political interests in sustaining formal 
family ties.5 
The relationships historically protected by American law are llin-
ited to those that arise from kinship, adoption, or heterosexual mar-
I. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 21, 1982, at BIO, col. I. 
2. And Now, Gay Family Rights?, TIME, Dec. 13, 1982, at 74. Mayor Diane Feinstein ve-
toed the ordinance. San Francisco Chron., Dec. 10, 1982, at I, col. 4. 
3. All in the Family, TIME, June 16, 1980, at 31. 
4. See Part II infra. 
5. These interests are discussed in Part I i'!fra. 
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riage.6 Thus, unmarried couples are not regarded as families for the 
many purposes addressed by state and federal laws.7 American legal 
institutions - particularly the judiciary - have begun over the last 
several years to recognize a few exceptions that would once have 
been denied by a very rigid legal and social policy of reinforcing 
formal family relationships.8 Generally, however, the law remains 
quite certain about what a family is for the most fundamental 
purposes. 
There is nonetheless a growing sense of uncertainty about the 
place of the formal family in our hierarchy of national values. Some 
of this ambiguity has been generated by reading an unwarranted 
amount of individualistic sentiment into recent social science re-
search9 and legal literature10 during a period of some cultural tur-
6. No state today would knowingly issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple. See 
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United 
States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979). See generally Note, The Legality of Homosexual 
Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973) (discussing the constitutionality of restricting licenses to 
heterosexual couples). Isolated reports do exist that some homosexuals have nevertheless mar-
ried formally. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. 
REV. 663, 677 (1976). 
7. Even the celebrated Marvin case was based on the theory ofan implied contract. Appli-
cation of California's community property laws and Family Law Act was explicitly rejected in 
the case. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977). The 
California Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the rehabilitative award to Michelle Marvin 
because it was neither consensual in nature nor supported by any recognized obligation in law. 
Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981). 
8. See Part III C infra. 
9. Between 1960 and 1978, the divorce ratio increased 157 percent. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 338, 
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 3 (1979). The number of unmarried couples 
increased an estimated 157.4 percent between 1970 and 1980, with the actual number increas-
ing from 523,000 to 1,346,000. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, summarized in The American Family 
Bent-hut Nol Broken, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1980, at 48, 50. The illegitimacy 
ratio tripled in the two decades prior to 1975, Carlson, Families, Sex, and the Liberal Agenda, 
58 Pua. INT. 62, 66 (1980), so that by 1977, 15.5% of all children - and 51.7% of all black 
children - born in the United States were illegitimate. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 
367 n.14 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). Such statistics have drawn expressions of alarm from 
some family sociologists. See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, The Calamitous .Decline of the American 
Family, Wash. Post., Jan. 2, 1977, at Cl, col. 1 (Outlook). 
There have also been changes in sexual attitudes and practices. Some regard the changes 
as a "sexual revolution." See Carlson,supra. The degree of perceived change in cohabitation 
norms was cited in the Marvin case: 
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that 
we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently 
been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this 
occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institu-
tion of marriage . . . • 
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1977). 
Curiously, there seems to be little empirical basis for recent changes in attitudes toward 
traditional values. "No new theories or research findings have provoked the current question-
ing of family life"; rather, "the social upheavals of the past decade" have led to skepticism 
concerning all kinds of American institutions, traditions, and authority patterns. A. SKOL-
NICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT Preface at i (1973). Some sociologists link increases in 
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moil. The emerging uneasiness seems to arise not in spite of the 
sexual freedom to the women's movement, in part because recent changes in attitude and 
behavior appear to be far greater among women than among men. See, e.g., L. ScANZONI & J. 
SCANZONI, MEN, WOMEN AND CHANGE 85-89 (2d ed. 1981). Whatever the causes, the devel-
opments of recent years have persuaded some family life scholars that, "The nuclear family is 
crumbling - to be replaced, I think, by the free floating couple .... " E. SHORTER, THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 280 (1975); see also J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MAR-
RIAGE 269-89 (1972). 
On the other hand, there is a growing body of social science research showing that many 
family commitments are stronger than ever. While recent divorce rates have been unquestion-
ably high, other statistics indicate that remarriage rates have risen equally high, with a greater 
proportion of Americans marrying than ever before. See M. BANE, HERE TO STAY 34-36 
(1976). The proportion of children living with at least one parent, rather than living in foster 
or institutional care, has also increased. Id. at 12. The social significance of the increase in 
unmarried cohabitation may be reduced by noting that the percentage of all couples who are 
married dropped only from 98.8% to 97.2% between 1970 and 1980. This calculation is based 
on U.S. Dept. of Commerce data summarized in The American Family Bent-but Not Broken, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1980, at 48, SO. Thus, "[t]he number of persons engaged 
in pursuing 'alternative life-styles,' although much larger than it used to be, is too small pro-
portionately to be accurately recorded in a national census or in a community survey ...• " 
T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, R. HILL, & M. WILLIAMSON, MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES! 
FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 335 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MIDDLETOWN 
FAMILIES]. 
Sociologist Joseph Featherstone has summarized available studies which suggest that even 
the changes in structure, function, and roles being accommodated by the contemporary family 
deal with such phenomena as working mothers, families where fathers raise the children, and 
couples choosing to remain childless, Featherstone, Family Matters, 49 HARV. EDUC. REV. 20, 
23 (1979), not with free-floating unmarried couples or communal marriages. The social scien-
tists updating the classic longitudinal study of American family life in the representative city of 
Middletown found that the gap between current rhetoric and empirical data demonstrates the 
continuing survival of "the myth of the declining family," which took root in the 1930s and 
"has flourished mightily ever since and now seems nearly as indestructible as the American 
family itself." MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra, at 328. Much of the current strain on family 
life that does exist is due primarily to "poverty and inequality," Featherstone, supra, at 38, 
suggesting that a national policy debate concerning the relationship of economic programs to 
family stability is likely to continue. Compare, e.g., K. KENISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN (1977), 
with Lasch,Reviewof All Our Children, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 24, 1977, at 15-
18, and Carlson, supra. 
As for the sexual revolution, recent empirical data indicate that pornography and informa-
tion about sexuality are far more widely distributed today than in earlier generations. The 
incidence of premarital sex (especially among females) has also increased. However, extramar-
ital sex does not seem to have increased significantly. For a brief summary of recent research 
in the context of comparisons with the 1920s, see MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra, at 161-94. 
Even the premarital sex that occurs "is brief, infrequent, and limited to one partner (or a few) 
whom [adolescents] hope to marry." Id. at 168. Indeed, given such "powerful [contemporary] 
inducements . . . to avoid marriage" as welfare programs that provide a "bounty for children 
born out of wedlock" and "the promotion of adolescent sexuality" by governmentally spon-
sored programs on sex education and contraception, "the persistence of marriage • . . in the 
United States ... is as impressive as the large increase in the number of unmarried adults 
during the past decade." Id. at 334-35. In seeking to reconcile "the public's current interest in 
the subject of extramarital sex with its continuing disapproval of it," sex researcher Morton 
Hunt concluded that the contemporary climate has resulted in more "open discussion" and 
"an unconcealed appetite for vicarious experience. At the same time most people continue to 
disapprove of such behavior because they believe that when it becomes a reality rather than a 
fantasy, it undermines and endangers the most important human relationship in their lives." 
M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s, at 256 (1974). Thus, the Middletown researchers 
concluded, "[S]urely the mass media have exaggerated the scope of the changes [in sexual 
norms]. Monogamic heterosexual marriage is still the nearly universal norm, and most 
nonmarital sexual behavior involves the possibility of eventual marriage." MIDDLETOWN 
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family's legally protected status, but, in part, because of that status. 
In this time of fully flowered egalitarianism, the very existence of a 
legal preference increases the number who want to qualify for it. 
Thus, some legal scholars and a few lower court cases assume that 
the constitutional principles are now in place to remove the signifi-
cant legal distinctions between married and unmarried persons, 
along with establishing a right of sexual privacy for consenting un-
married adults. 
For example, Kenneth Karst has argued that there should be a 
constitutional right that would give any "intimate association" be-
tween two persons the same protection as the law now gives to rela-
tionships based on marriage and kinship. 11 Also, the New York 
Court of Appeals recently extended the constitutional right of pri-
vacy to protect the right of unmarried adults to seek "sexual gratifi-
cation." 12 While sexual privacy may at first seem unrelated to the 
issue of family forms, this case was a key factor in the subsequent 
decision of a lower New York court to allow one adult male to adopt 
another. 13 On a variation of the privacy theory, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has given constitutional protection to sex acts per-
FAMILIES, supra, at 168. Anthropologist David Schneider concurs: "[S]exual intercourse is 
legitimate and proper only between husband and wife and each has the exclusive right to the 
sexual activity of the other. These are the tenets of American culture." D. SCHNEIDER, AMER-
ICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 38 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted). 
10. For summaries of the relevant literature, see Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger 
Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83; Developments in the Law- the Consti-
tution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. 
Grey's piece includes an appendix summarizing all of the law review literature between 1965 
and 1979 that addressed the relationship between constitutional privacy and legal prohibitions 
of consensual adult sex. Comparing this literature with a review of the Supreme Court's work, 
Grey concludes that nearly all the commentators have consistently "read ... the libertarian 
tradition into the privacy cases with almost no encouragement from the Court." Grey, supra, 
at 98. 
While some commentators have possibly been influenced to interpret the Court in this way 
by their own preferences for the resulting outcomes, others have read excessive breadth into 
the cases as a way of stressing their disagreement with the results. To infer from the cases that 
marriage is now merely "some sort of relationship between two individuals," Clark, The New 
Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441,450 (1976), or that "Equal Protection" now "requires the 
equal treatment of the married and the unmarried in all respects," Noonan, The Family and the 
Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255, 273 (1973), is such an overreaction. See Part II 
i'!fra. Unfortunately, overreactions can become self-fulfilling prophecies, as the courts may be 
influenced as much by commentary on important cases as they are by the cases themselves, 
especially given the ambiguity the Court has created with its use of due process substitutes and 
individual rights terminology. See note 15 i'!fra. 
11. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
12. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
13. In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1981). Con-
tra, In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous II, 111 Misc. 2d 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1981) 
(family court in different New York county from Adult Anonymous I disallows adoption be-
tween adult males because no child-parent relationship would be created). 
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formed in a public lounge between dancing performers and lounge 
patrons. 14 Litigants in such cases, aided by the confusing language 
of some Supreme Court decisions, 15 see privacy as an individual 
right which is independent of the relationships it may protect. 
The use of individual rights analysis, as typically understood, can 
be inappropriate and even harmful in the-context of family relation-
ships. For example, contemporary legal writers take for granted that 
the "right to marry" is grounded "in respect for freedom of choice in 
intimate personal relationships,"16 since "choice of domestic com-
panionship constitutes the kind of intimate personal decision" 17 that 
is at the heart of the Court's evolving privacy doctrines. 18 Thus, the 
right to marry cases are seen by these writers as part of a constitu-
tional doctrine based essentially on individual autonomy. With that 
premise firmly in place, any legal restraint on freely entering or leav-
ing marital relationships is suspect in their eyes. With the scales be-
tween individual and social interests thereby tipped heavily toward 
the individual side, few, if any, attempts at state regulation would 
14. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91,415 A.2d 47 (1980) (statute prohibiting deviate 
sex acts between unmarried persons has no rational basis and violates equal protection by 
discriminating against the unmarried). 
15. In its family privacy cases, the Court has often used individualistic civil rights theories 
and rhetoric in stating a rationale for its conclusions, even though a close reading of the cases 
reveals an instinctive awareness of the negative impact of full blown individual rights theories 
on family relationships. The Court has also sent out mixed signals because of its unfortunate 
determination to rationalize important decisions under a bewildering array of individualistic 
disguises for substantive due process. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), established the right of married couples to 
use contraceptives without threat of criminal prosecution. The challenged statute was, as Jus-
tice Stewart conceded in dissent, "an uncommonly silly law," 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting): so silly, in fact, that a majority of the Court could not help reaching the conclu-
sion that the law was unconstitutional, even though the absence of clear textual support forced 
the Court to search for a rationale in six different amendments, as well as the metaphysically 
tantalizing "penumbras" emanating from explicit guarantees in the Bill of Rights. A few years 
later, Justice Stewart, concurring in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), shed some light on the 
predicament the Court had faced in Griswold. He explained that the Justices had explicitly 
rejected substantive due process in an 8-1 decision only two years before Griswold. 410 U.S. at 
167 (Stewart, J., concurring);see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Therefore, he said, 
the Griswold Court "understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision." 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). 
The Court has continued to do its best to avoid the development of a consistent and under-
standable test for its family-related cases. As a result, the cases are loaded with references in 
dicta to such limitless possibilities as "zones of privacy," "individual autonomy," and "free-
dom of personal choice." In 1977, Justice Powell bravely declared that substantive due process 
based on traditional values had indeed been the basis for virtually all of the Court's family 
privacy decisions, but by then the conceptual turf had been so muddied that this flash of can-
dor was not very enlightening. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
16. See, e.g., JJevelopments, supra note 10, at 1311. 
17. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection far Personal L!lestyles, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 563, 569 (1977). 
18. But see Part II F infra. 
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withstand scrutiny.19 
The fundamental error in this method of analysis was identified 
many years ago in a valuable article20 by Roscoe Pound: "It is im-
portant to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations 
from the social interest in the family and marriage as social institu-
tions."21 He defined "social interest" as: 
[O]n the one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the family as 
a social institution and on the other hand a social interest in the protec-
tion of dependent persons, in securing to all individuals a moral and 
social life and in the rearing and training of sound and well-bred citi-
zens for the future. 22 
For Pound, it was elementary that individual and social interests 
must be compared "on the same plane," lest the very decision to 
categorize one claim as "individual" and the other as "social" cause 
us to "decide the question in advance in our very way of putting 
it."23 Moreover, from Pound's viewpoint: 
When the legal system recognizes certain individual rights, it does so 
because it has been decided that society as a whole will benefit by satis-
fying the individual claims in question; for example, when the legal 
system guarantees the individual freedom of speech, it advances soci-
ety's interest in facilitating social, political, and cultural progress. This 
interest . . . is more important than society's interest in preserving ex-
isting institutions.24 
In recent years, however, individual interests, carried on a tidal 
wave of constitutional law, have taken on such overpowering signifi-
cance that it is difficult for the contemporary mind to see any inter-
ests other than individual ones. Thus it has been observed that while 
the Court's early marriage cases "turned on the importance of mar-
riage to society," its more recent cases "tum on the importance of the 
relationship to the individual."25 
19. For instance, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the constitutional right of 
privacy requires the allowance of divorce by mutual consent without a waiting period. Ferrer 
v. Commonwealth, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2744 (1978). Even those sympathetic to facilitating 
divorce have argued elsewhere that counseling requirements and mandatory separation peri-
ods are justified in the interest of preventing "hasty decisions about divorce" if states are to 
prevent marriages from being "trivially or inconsequentially undone." Developments, supra 
note 10, at 1312 (quoting Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 576). 
20. Henry Foster called it "perhaps the best known essay in the history of family law." 
Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493, 493. 
21. Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 177 (1916) 
(emphasis added). 
22. Id at 182. 
23. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943). 
24. Auerbach, Comment, in Is LAW DEAD? 208 (E. Rostow ed. 1971) (replying to Dwor-
kin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAW DEAD? 168 (E. Rostow ed. 1971)). 
25. Developments, supra note 10, at 1248-49. 
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Ideas about individual rights derive from the original theory of 
the Constitution, which deals with the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the State. Domestic relations, however, have tradition-
ally been matters of state law, not federal constitutional law,26 in 
part because the regulation of those relationships is not simply a 
matter of the State vs. the individual. for instance, many people 
besides a dissatisfied spouse are affected by the dissolution of a mar-
riage. 27 The most obvious examples are the other spouse, any chil-
dren of the marriage, and the kinship network affected by the 
marriage. Moreover, regulation of marital status has always been a 
fundamental element in helping human society induce the behavior 
needed for social as well as individual survival.28 In addition, the 
law's ultimate goal in supporting family ties is the sustaining of 
ongoing relationships, not merely the crude determining of who is 
right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses.29 
All this is not to say that the individual interest in marriage is less 
significant than the social interest. It is only to say that the individ-
ual and the social interests are so intertwined in family cases that 
meaningful analysis of the competing interests is rendered impossi-
26. [D]omestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive 
province of the States. . . . In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878), the Court 
said: ''The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the mar-
riage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be 
dissolved .... " 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
27. A decree of divorce is not a matter in which the only interested parties are the State 
as a sort of"grantor," and a divorce petitioner ... in the role of"grantee." Both spouses 
are obviously interested in the proceedings, since it will affect their marital status and ve9' 
likely their property rights. Where a married couple has minor children, a decree of di-
vorce would usually include provisions for their custody and support. 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1975). 
28. The marital commitment has meant, as a cultural construct of our society, that love 
and family transcend mere legJI obligations. That commitment thus becomes, paradoxically, 
an "uncoercive way to transform individuals ... into voluntary participants in the nurture of 
society .... The family is effective because it is steeped in the blood, sexuality, flesh, and flow 
of our unconscious lives, where true changes in character and commitment can take root." G. 
GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 73 (1973). To achieve this result, "Society has had to invest mar-
riage with all the ceremonial sanctity of religion and law. This did not happen as a way to 
promote intimacy and companionship. It happened to ensure civilized society." Id. at 73-74. 
29. Robert Burt has observed that "direct, prolonged conflict" may at times characterize 
intra-family relationships, yet "the contemporary Court's general jurisprudence" fails "to ap-
preciate the importance of such conflict in forging communal bonds." Burt, The Constilutio11 of 
tlte Family, 1919 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 394-95. His criticism is directed at "[b]oth the liberal and 
conservative blocs on the Court" because of their failure "to see their proper institutional role 
in leading fundamentally alienated combatants toward the pursuit of mutual accommoda-
tion." Id. at 387. Only a "sense of mutual allegiance" can "legitimate bonds of authority and 
community" amid the social alienation of modern society. Id. at 395. The marital commit-
ment is one of the most fruitful sources of that kind of mutual allegiance, not only because of 
its power to deal with conflict over time, but because of its larger effect on society's necessary 
and legitimate "bonds of authority and community." Id. 
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ble by current civil liberties approaches that always give the individ.: 
ual interest a procedurally exalted priority over the social interest. 
Great need exists for a method of constitutional analysis that will 
allow for explicit consideration of the social interest in domestic 
relations. 
Today's lopsided competition between the individual and social 
interests has made the law a party to the contemporary haze that 
clouds our vision of what a family is or should be. In that sense, 
recent legal developments have contributed to the crisis Stanley 
Hauerwas has identified regarding American family life today - our 
inability to define "what kind of family should exist" and our inabil-
ity to articulate ''why we should think of [the family] as our most 
basic moral institution."30 
In response to those two questions, this Article considers 
whether, as a constitutional matter, the courts should recognize 
claims by unrelated individuals or groups who seek the same legal 
protection as that given to formal relationships based on legal mar-
riage or kinship. Part I sets forth some of the significant functions 
performed by formal families. The social and political policies that 
encourage the performance of these functions help explain why the 
formal family continues to merit constitutional protection not af-
forded informal relationships. They also illuminate why we have 
historically thought of the family as our most fundamental moral 
and social institution. I will argue that the failure to distinguish be-
tween a formal family and an informal relationship overlooks and 
finally undermines the family's ability to perform these functions. 
Part II summarizes the Supreme Court's relevant decisions in this 
area. This summary will show that marriage and kinship are still the 
touchstones of constitutional adjudication in family-related cases, in-
cluding those dealing with sexual privacy. The Court has limited 
some traditional policies, but has done so only in an effort to remedy 
exceptional inequities. Even the exceptional cases have been treated 
in such a way that constitutional protection has not been extended to 
relationships between unmarried adults. These decisions are thus 
consistent with the policies that originally gave rise to the protection 
of interests in marriage, childrearing, and kinship. 
Part III will suggest a method of constitutional analysis that ex-
plains why these cases reached appropriate results. This analytical 
framework will enable the weighing of individual and social interest 
"on the same plane," lest the analytical approach to an apparent 
30. Hauerwas, The Moral Meaning of the Family, 107 COMMONWEAL 432,432 (1980). 
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constitutional problem cause us to "decide the question in advance 
in our very way of putting it."31 This model will also clarify the 
analysis used in determining which legal interests should be included 
within the constitutionally protected categories that require strict ju-
dicial scrutiny. An inquiry of this kind helps to determine the theory 
on which interests arising from marriage and kinship are entitled to 
extraordinary constitutional protection while other interests that ap-
pear to have some functional similarity are excluded. One of the 
most serious errors made by some lower court judges attempting to 
apply a constitutional right of privacy has been to assume, as a first 
analytical step, that any "private" conduct is part of due process lib-
erty. These courts have then focused "on what they viewed as the 
state's lack of interest in preventing private . . . behavior, rather 
than on the nature of the activity involved."32 Whether an affirma-
tive right is at stake, however, depends, in the first instance, on "the 
nature of the activity involved."33 
I. MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, AND THE PURPOSES 
OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
Perhaps because family life is so much a part of the unspecifiable 
bedrock of society, there has been a puzzling inattention in both le-
gal and other literature to the broad social policies underlying the 
preference historically given by the law to family relationships. This 
contrasts remarkably with the voluminous scholarly work on indi-
vidual rights. Domestic patterns universally accepted before the 
dawn of law and government have hardly seemed to require full-
dress justification. Thus, the case law and other commentary on our 
traditional assumptions seldom go beyond platitudes and cliches. 
The objectives of a democratic society based on established patterns 
of marriage and kinship should not be terribly mysterious; serious 
scholars, however, have seldom felt a need to document them. For 
instance, a stable environment is crucial to the developmental needs 
of children. Yet contemporary literature advocating ( or, for that 
matter, condemning) open marriages and informal cohabitation 
rarely treats this issue. The unarticulated policy roots of family law 
are also related to the political ends of democracy, because it is pri-
marily through family bonds that both children and parents learn 
the attitudes and skills that sustain an open society. A brief exami-
3 I. Pound, supra note 23, at 2. 
32. Note, On Privacy: Conslilulional Prorecrionsfor Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. Re.v. 
670, 724 (1973). 
33. Id. 
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nation of such issues suggests that the cultural patterns of American 
family life have contributed enormously to the ultimate purposes of 
a democratic society by providing the stability and the structure that 
are essential to sustaining individual liberty over the long term. 
A. The Needs of Children 
In their "Bill of Rights for Children," Henry Foster and Doris 
Freed stated that: "A child has a moral right and should have a legal 
right ... [t]o receive parental love and affection, discipline.and gui-
dance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment which en-
ables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult."34 This 
declaration was not a new idea. It was at the foundation of the juve-
nile court movement since the tum of the century. Earlier, Jeremy 
Bentham wrote that "[t]he feebleness of infancy demands a contin-
ual protection," because "[t]he complete development of its physical 
powers takes many years; that of its intellectual faculties is still 
slower."35 John Locke believed that parents owed an obligation to 
''Nature" to "nourish and educate" their children until their "under-
standing be fit to take the government of [their] will."36 In this way, 
the young were to be prepared to enter the individual tradition as 
mature and ratipnal beings. Thus, said Locke, "we see how natural 
freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both 
founded on the same principle."37 
This most basic of children's "rights" - the right to be prepared 
by parents for the responsibilities of adult life - has remained es-
sentially a moral, rather than a legal, duty of parents, primarily be-
cause the law is powerless to enforce such broad affirmative 
obligations. Despite the natural limits on what parents can be 
"made" to do, the conditions that optimize "a home environment 
which enables [a child] to develop into a mature and responsible 
adult"38 are clearly encouraged by cultural patterns and reinforced 
by legal expectations that create a sense of permanency and stable 
expectations in child-parent relations. By giving priority to perma-
nent, relational interests within families, the Supreme Court has re-
inforced the law's insistence on the conditions that maximize 
stability. 
Empirical studies establish beyond question "the need of every 
34. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972). 
35. l J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (Boston 1840). 
36. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§§ 56, 59 (1690). 
37. Id § 61. 
38. Foster & Freed, supra note 34, at 347. 
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child for unbroken continuity of affectionate and stimulating rela-
tionships with an adult."39 More broadly, "[c]ontinuity of relation-
ships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a 
child's normal development."40 The child's need for these forms of 
stability is so great that disruptions of the child-parent relationship 
by the state, even when there appears to be inadequate parental care, 
frequently do more harm than good.41 Recent data from a variety of 
fields and sources confirm " [i]n study after study" how "vital the 
family is in the crucial areas of individual motivation, personality 
structure, and creativeness."42 
Findings such as these have begun to raise substantial doubts 
about the value of the dominant governmental service strategies of 
the past twenty years, whose planners have assumed that many fam-
ily functions could be better performed by outside agencies. The 
1977 report of the Carnegie Council on Children, for example, re-
jected the proposition that education could ensure equal economic 
opportunities and argued generally that public policies related to 
children should give higher priority to the qualitative influence of 
parents and home life.43 The integrated totality of family functions 
in a natural family appears somehow to be greater than the sum of 
the individual functions. American society, for all its recent experi-
ments, today seems further from finding real substitutes for the per-
formance of the family role than it was in the pre-Great Society 
days. The social experiments of other countries seem no more 
fruitful. 44 
39. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 6 
(2d ed. 1979). 
40. Id. at 31-32. 
41. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Beha!f of "Neglected" Children: A Searcl,for 
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975). 
42. R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 84 (1975). 
43. See generally K. KENISTON, supra note 9. 
44. Legislation in Sweden has attempted to be "as far as possible . . . neutral in its rela-
tionship to various forms of cohabitation and different moral ideas," though the law has tried 
to ensure that "marriage has ••. a centered place in family law .... " To this point, how-
ever, it is still not clear "[w]hether the Swedish attempt to free sexual unions from the bonds of 
governmental regulation and to treat them purely as affairs of free individual love will be . • . 
successful." M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 156-57 (1972). 
Russia has retreated considerably from its earlier attempts to implement the Marxist de-
mand that existing family forms be changed because they perpetuated capitalistic property 
ideas. For Engels and Marx, marriage and legitimacy were counterproductive; children were 
to be brought into collectives rather than parental homes. In 1926, the conclusion and termi-
nation of Russian marriages were made purely private transactions. By 1944, however, new 
state regulation of marriage, divorce, and illegitimacy was introduced, partly through consid-
erations of population policy, but also because: 
The strengthening of the family .•• had become necessary because of the communist 
state's interest in the welfare of the nation's offspring as well as its fear that the national 
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Yet recent sociological theories have emphasized (as they did in 
the 192O's) "marriage to the exclusion of the family. . . . Child 
rearing once again presents itself as no more than a by-product of 
marriage."45 This emphasis reflects the general influence of atomis-
tic individualism that ranks personal interaction between marital 
partners higher than "socialization, child training, or transmission of 
culture .... "46 Such a tendency views "children's rights" in simi-
lar terms, stressing children's own individualistic right to "control 
their own lives." 
This point of view contradicts that fundamental children's right 
- "[t]o receive parental love and affection, discipline and gui-
dance"47 in a way that educates the young toward maturity. Homer 
Clark has observed that "much of the discussion of the desirability 
of contemporary nonmarital unions ignores the interests of the chil-
dren of such unions,'' who are, among other things, "handicapped in 
seeking support.''48 To "abandon children to their rights"49 not only 
ignores the real needs of children, but also creates within adults a 
false expectation that they, too, can be - or should be - "liberated" 
from the arduous demands of a parental and community commit-
ment to childrearing. The Supreme Court has given high priority to 
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, but 
that very liberty has received constitutional protection in no small 
part because it also reflects the social responsibility of the parents. 
"[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations."50 
Not all formal families are stable, nor do all necessarily provide 
wholesome continuity for their children, as the prevailing levels of 
child abuse and divorce amply demonstrate. But the commitments 
inherent in formal families do increase the likelihood of stability and 
continuity for children. Those factors are so essential to child <level-
strength and vigor might be sapped by the laxity of morals, sexual and otherwise. The 
J)Ublic institutions for child care had been developed vigorously. To a considerable extent 
they freed women for work outside the home, but they were far from totally replacing the 
home as classical Marxist theory had expected them rapidly to do. 
Id at 231. 
45. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 142 (1977). 
46. Id at 150. 
47. Foster & Freed, supra note 34, at 347. 
48. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note IO, at 451. 
49. The phrase is Albert Solnit's. It is discussed within the context of the children's rights 
movement in Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations 
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 651. 
50. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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opment that they alone may justify the legal incentives and prefer-
ences traditionally given to permanent kinship units based on 
marriage. The same factors can justify the denial of legal protection 
to unstable social patterns that threaten children's developmental 
environment. 
B. Socialization and Public Virtue: Obedience to the 
Unenforceable 
In the historical movement of society from Status to Contract,51 
"[t]he individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of 
which civil laws take account."52 The individualism of Contract as-
sumes that each person acts primarily in his own interest. Under 
Status, however, it was assumed that people would act for the good 
of the order in which they held membership and from which they 
derived their status. The commitments of close kinship and mar-
riage represent the last modern vestiges of Status as a source of duty. 
Much of what family members - especially marital partners -
"owe" one another cannot be enforced in a court of law;53 yet the 
sense of family duty has an uncanny power to produce obedience to 
the unenforceable in ways that defy Adam Smith's assumption that 
self-interest is man's dominant value. In this way, the family tradi-
tion is a prerequisite to a successful individual tradition. Through 
the commitments of marriage and kinship both children and parents 
experience the need for and the value of authority, responsibility, 
and duty in their most pristine forms. 
A sense of voluntary duty is the lifeblood of a free society, for 
"only with a public-spirited, self-sacrificing people could the author-
ity of a popularly elected ruler be obeyed, but more by the virtue of 
the people than by the terror of his power."54 Those who formulated 
our constitutional system understood the importance of "public vir-
tue," but they knew it could not be coerced by the State without 
51. See text at notes 504-05, infra. 
52. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163 (1st Am. ed. 1870). 
53. When a marriage is threatened with collapse, for example, the law directly assists only 
the person who wishes to dissolve the marriage. A spouse who wishes to continue it can find 
little comfort in the law, not only because divorce lawyers usually have little interest in marital 
continuity, but because !he law is generally powerless to enforce affirmative obligations, 
Therefore, society upholds the sanctity of the marital commitment primarily as a matter of 
cultural norms, supported by a legal, albeit unenforceable, obligation. Such expressions of 
societal norms serve primarily to encourage couples to take their marital obligations seriously 
and to comply voluntarily with society's expectations. 
54. Horwitz, John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Edu-
cation, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 131 (R. Horwitz ed. 1979) 
(quoting G. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 68 (1969)), 
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doing violence to the inalienable individual rights on which the sys-
tem was premised.55 At a more profound level, John Locke under-
stood that no civic virtue could exist unless it had been individually 
learned and voluntarily assumed. Thus, Locke's educational philos-
ophy would not suppress natural passions and instincts in teaching a 
child: ''What is wanted is not suppression, but redirection: 'For 
where there is no Desire, there will be no Industry.' "56 
Because this essential social - even political - ingredient could 
not be a coercive State function, American society has "relied to a 
considerable extent on the family not only to nurture the young but 
also to instill the habits required by citizenship in a self-governing 
community. We have relied on the family to teach us to care for 
others, [and] to moderate ... self-interest ... .''57 This connection 
between home and society has made it clear since the early days of 
the Republic that it was more important to keep pure the headwaters 
of humanity than simply to worry about downstream pollution.58 
With this perspective, the family in a democratic society not only 
provides emotional companionship, but is also a principal source of 
moral and civic duty. Citizenship, after all, is also more a matter of 
Status than Contract. 
Something about the combined permanence, authority, and love 
that characterize the formal family uniquely makes possible the per-
formance of this teaching enterprise: 
[T]he best argument for the indispensability of the family [is] that 
children grow up best under ... conditions of "intense emotional in-
volvement" [with their parents] .... Without struggling with the am-
bivalent emotions aroused by the union of love and discipline in his 
parents, the child never masters his inner rage or his fear of authority. 
It is for this reason that children need parents, not professional nurses 
and counselors. 59 
Christopher Lasch noted that this process, whereby the child brings 
his self-oriented impulses into some kind of harmony with loving, 
yet inevitably demanding, parental authority was the focus of 
55. See generally Horwitz, supra note 54. 
56. Id at 148 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING 
EDUCATION§ 126 (London 1705)). 
57. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
222 (1976). 
58. This metaphor is Neal A. Maxwell's. 
59. C. LASCH,supra note 45, at 123. Consider also the observation of Berger and Neuhaus: 
"Our preference for the parents over the experts is more than a matter of democratic convic-
tion - • • . virtually all parents love their children. Very few experts love, or can love, most of 
the children in their care. • • • In addition, the parent, unlike the expert, has a long-term, 
open-ended commitment to the individual child." P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER 
PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PuBLIC POLICY 20-21 (1977). 
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Freud's attention. Through analyzing that process, "Freudian the-
ory, wrongly accused of biological determinism, attempts to explain 
how the cultural heritage is acquired and internalized by each gener-
ation; it analyzed the psychic consequences of this process, showing, 
among other things, how these consequences differ in men and wo-
men."60 A child who moves successfully through this most essential 
of socializing experiences learns to deal with his father figure in ways 
that enable him to succeed his "father" rather than to eliminate him. 
In other words, the child productively comes to terms with the whole 
concept of authority. As a result, the child is able "to internalize 
moral standards in the form of a conscience."61 Without such an 
experience, the child never does grow up. "Psychologically he re-
mains in important ways a child, surrounded by authorities with 
whom he does not identify and whose authority he does not regard 
as legitimate."62 
The process of learning to live in an organized but free society 
involves more than merely sustaining a capitalist economy. The ba-
sic process of cultural transmission, without which the traditions and 
the fundamental values of the society are not passed on, depends 
upon the family. Only in the master-apprentice relationship of par-
ent and child, committed to one another by the bonds of kinship, can 
the skills, normative standards, and virtues that maintain our cul-
tural bedrock be transmitted.63 
60. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 79. 
61. Id at 186. 
62. Id at 125. This view of Freud is broader than the interpretation that "we have to 
restrict sexual activity in order to get people to work." J. BERNARD, supra note 9, at 276. As a 
result, its validity is p.ot disturbed by Herbert Marcuse's contention that "the inevitable decline 
in the need for work in modem societies renders Freud's identification of civilization with 
sexual repression no longer valid." Id at 277. 
63. Some see a disturbing decline in this element of the family's role, quite apart from fears 
about changes in family structure or alternative lifestyles. For instance, the thesis of Lasch's 
Haven in a Heartless World is that the family has, through the interaction of various social 
forces, lost the authority and the integrated set of functions without which there is no basic 
socialization process. 
[T]he so-called functions of the family form an integrated system. It is inaccurate to speak 
of a variety of functions, some of which decline while others take on added importance, 
The only function of the family that matters is socialization; and when protection, work, 
and instruction in work have all been removed from the home, the child no longer identi-
fies with his parents or internalizes their authority in the same way as before, if indeed he 
internalizes their authority at all. 
C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 130. As a result, 
Society itself has taken over socialization or subjected family socialization to increasingly 
effective control. Having thereby weakened the capacity for self-direction and self-con-
trol, it has undermined one of the principal sources of social cohesion, only to create new 
ones more constricting than the old, and ultimately more devastating in their impact on 
personal and political freedom. 
Id at 189. 
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C. The Family in the .Democratic Structure 
Today's mass society seems very personal, even e:hummy, if 
"Good Morning America" is our symbol: all 200-plus million of us 
in one big living room, chatting with our talk show hosts. Perhaps 
we no longer need Edmund Burke's advice: "To be attached to the 
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the 
first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections."64 Yet mod-
em civilization is paradoxically soaked through with a sense of ano-
mie and alienation, heightened by feelings of helplessness against 
ever increasing concentrations of power in such "megastructures" as 
the business conglomerate, the boundless government bureaucracy, 
and the national labor union.65 In the midst of it all, we long for 
identification with some "little platoon" that will create a sense of 
personal meaning and personal value for our lives. Thus, increased 
attention is being given to both the personal and the public policy 
significance of such "mediating" structures as neighborhoods, fami-
lies, churches, schools, and voluntary associations: 
Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political 
order becomes detached from the values and realities of individual life. 
Deprived of its moral foundation, the political order is "delegiti-
mated." When that happens, the political order must be secured by 
coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy 
disappears. 
The attractiveness of totalitarianism . . . is that it overcomes the 
dichotomy of private and public existence by imposing on life one 
comprehensive order of meaning.66 
An inherent connection thus links the pattern of domestic regulation 
to the structure of political freedom. 
Mediating structures are "the value-generating and value-main-
taining agencies in society."67 Therefore, when these structures are 
inactive, society must look to the megastructures - notably the State 
- as a source of values. The totalitarian State gladly and aggres-
sively assumes that role. The democratic State, on the other hand, 
makes no claim to be a source of personal meaning and values, nor 
would we allow it to. That role contradicts the assumptions on 
which our entire political system rests. It might appear that our 
membership in such organizations as labor unions and consumer 
groups would restore a sense of the Status we have lost as society has 
64. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 4. 
65. See generally id. 
66. Id. at 3. 
61. Id. at 6. 
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moved from Status to Contract. But those groups are organized pri-
marily around shared economic and political interests. Even when 
they succeed, such groups do not claim to provide sources of mean-
ing and values, or even personal identification. 
A recent analysis of the concept of mediating structures identifies 
the family as "the major institution within the private sphere, and 
thus for many people the most valuable thing in their lives. Here 
they make their moral commitments, invest their emotions, [and] 
plan for the future . . . ."68 The family's role in providing emo-
tional and spiritual comfort, as well as human fulfillment, has long 
been a dominant theme in sociological literature. 
There is, however, an even more political meaning to the formal 
family's place as a mediating structure in our system. Our system is 
committed to pluralism and diversity as political values, because 
those values maximize the opportunity for individual choice and 
control. The pluralism we seek differs from anarchy, because anar-
chy destroys the order that makes pluralistic choices possible over 
the long term.69 The balance we have struck seeks "to sustain as 
many particularities as possible, in the hope that most people will 
accept, discover, or devise one that fits."70 In maintaining that bal-
ance, our system presupposes "a social system of family units, not 
just of isolated individuals."71 Those family units do "not simply co-
exist with our constitutional system"; rather, they are "an integral 
part of it," because: 
In democratic theory as well as in practice, it is in the family that chil-
dren are expected to learn the values and beliefs that democratic insti-
tutions later draw on to determine group directions. The immensely 
important powei: of deciding about matters of early socialization has 
been allocated. to the family, not to the govemment.72 
Monolithic control of the value transmission system is "a hallmark 
of totalitarianism";73 thus, "for obvious reasons, the state nursery is 
the paradigm for a totalitarian society."74 An essential element in 
68. Id at 19. 
69. See note 464 infra and accompanying text. 
70. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 44. 
71. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U. 
L. REV. 765, 772 (1973). 
72. Id at 773; see also D. MURPHEY, BURKEAN CONSERVATISM AND CLASSICAL LJBER· 
ALISM 270 (1979) (Modem Social and Political Philosophies Series) (As "millions of separate 
families . . • raise their • . • children to reflect a variety of experiences and viewpoints," the 
family becomes "both a centrifugal and a centripetal force - and both aspects are 
necessary."). 
73. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 44. 
74. D. MURPHEY, supra note 72, at 145. 
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maintaining a system of limited government is to deny state control 
over childrearing, simply because childrearing has such power. 
Even if the system remains democratic, massive state involvement 
with childrearing would invest the government "with the capacity to 
influence powerfully, through socialization, the future outcomes of 
democratic political processes."75 That people "would remain le-
gally free to believe and speak as they wished would not diminish 
the immense impact of centralizing the processes through which val-
ues and beliefs are instilled in the people who will later participate in 
group decision making."76 
Similarly, diversity and limited government are assured through 
a private property system that is often related to family control.77 
The familiar family function of providing social services for the sick, 
the young, and the disabled not only provides the psychological nur-
turing of personalized care, but also prevents the state from assum-
ing the economic leverage and political power that would 
accompany total state responsibility for welfare functions. 
Many informal "welfare" functions are provided by surprisingly 
durable kinship networks, even in today's highly mobile society. 
The kinship link in Moore v. City of East Cleveland18 justified the 
Court's extension of substantive due process to include a household 
bound by extended family ties. Justice Powell's definition of "lib-
erty" was obviously influenced by the presence of permanent, rela-
tional interests that sustain significant social interests as well as 
individual ones: 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds 
uniting the members of the nuclear family. . . . Out of choice, neces-
sity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close 
relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfac-
tions of a common home. . . . Especially in times of adversity . . . 
the broader family has tended to come together for mutual s~stenance 
and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.79 
Empirical data bear out Powell's conclusion. Despite the decline 
75. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 773. 
76. Id. 
77. While still generally true, this proposition is less significant than it once was. See gener-
ally M. GLENDON, THE New FAMILY AND THE New PROPERTY (1981). The effects of the 
diminished relationship between family ties and property interests have a way of validating the 
larger argument being made in this section of the text, however. For as property-related his-
torical trends have "delivered [the individual] from family constraints and responsibilities," 
the more recent trends "have Jocked him into the cold embrace of public and private bureau-
crats." Id. at 139. 
78. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
79. 431 U.S. at 504-05 (plurality opinion). 
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in the performance of some traditional functions, "the amount of 
social care that families provide for their elderly and handicapped 
members far exceeds the amount of social care provided by the 
state."80 The sociologists in the recently updated Middletown pro-
ject found that "most . . . families were linked to clusters of other 
families by bonds of kinship obligation and affection which often 
were far stronger than the ties connecting them to friends;co-work-
ers, or fellow members of organizations."81 The researchers con-
cluded, "the single most important fact about the nuclear family in 
contemporary Middletown is that it is not isolated" from kinship 
networks.82 From the standpoint of social structuring, 
the kin groups organized on the basis of marriage and descent provide 
the substance which integrates people into the larger social struc-
ture. . . . The moral sentiments established in the interaction of par-
ents and their children are extended and elaborated to produce 
consensus and loyalties which bind social groups (and possibly socie-
ties) into a cohesive whole.83 
Stable kinship groups thus contribute significantly to the achieve-
ment of general social and political stability. 
Impermanent relationships that perform some intimate or associ-
ational "functions"84 cannot claim the same position as marriage 
and kinship in ensuring a political structure that limits government, 
stabilizes social patterns, and protects pluralistic liberty through the 
power of its own relational permanency. 85 Social scientists may 
never succeed in verifying this conclusion empirically; the obstacles 
to meaningful comparative research appear insurmountable. 86 But 
80. Zimmerman, Reassessing the E:ffect of Public Policy on Family Functioning, 59 Soc. 
CASEWORK 451, 452 (1978). 
81. MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra note 9, at 355. 
82. Id at 340. 
83. B. FARBER, FAMILY AND KINSHIP IN MODERN SOCIETY 8-9 (1973) (footnote omitted). 
84. Functional equivalency is a concept advanced by some who argue that informal as-
sociations may involve precisely the same economic, psychological, and social functions as 
formal ones; hence, the concept is a basic premise for those who argue that there should be 
"family" style legal protection for an infinite variety of relationships. 
85. Informal kinship networks sometimes provide stability, continuity, and pluralistic 
value transmission. This is especially true among certain minority groups, where customary 
practices not legally formalized can be very influential. See, e.g., C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 
(1974). 
86. Some of the methodological problems are obvious. Selecting the same populations 
belonging to formal and informal domestic living arrangements, for example, poses an inher-
ent challenge. Are the socioeconomic factors associated with marriage (age, education, in-
come, etc.) independent variables to be controlled, or dependent variables through which the 
beneficial effects of formal family structures are mediated? More fundamentally, how are the 
informal "families" to be defined and selected in the first place? Social scientists must grapple 
with the same problems of clarity and generality that plague the attempt to confer legal status 
on informal arrangements. See Part I D i,!fra. These difficulties suggest the problematic nn-
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the structure of formal family relationships both reflects and fosters 
the enduring personal commitments essential to social mediation 
and political pluralism. 87 
Moreover, the structural power of the formal family is not totally 
dependent on its key function of value transmission in childrearing. 
Marriage alone plays a critical role in the democratic structure by 
interposing a significant legal entity between the individual and the 
State: 
[T]he marriage bond . . . is the fundamental connecting link in Chris-
tian society. Break it, and you will have to go back to the overwhelm-
ing dominance of the State, which existed before the Christian era. 
The Roman State was all-powerful, the Roman Fathers represented 
the State, the Roman family was the father's estate, held more or less 
in fee for the State itself. It was the same in Greece, with not so much 
feeling for the permanence of property, but rather a dazzling splash of 
the moment's possessions. . . . 
But, in either case, the family was the man, as representing the 
State. There are States where the family is the woman: or there have 
been. There are States where the family hardly exists, priest States 
where the priestly control is everything, even functioning as family 
control. Then there is the Soviet State, where again family is not sup-
posed to exist . . . . 
Now the question is, do we want to go back, or forward, to any of 
these forms of State Control? . . . 
. . . [P]erhaps the greatest contribution to the social life of man 
made by Christianity is - marriage. . . . Christianity established the 
little autonomy of the family within the greater rule of the State. 
Christianity made marriage . . . not to be violated by the State. It is 
marriage, perhaps, which has given man the best of his freedom, given 
him his little kingdom of his own within the big kingdom of the State, 
given him his foothold of independence on which to stand and resist an 
unjust State. Man and wife, a king and queen with one or two sub-
jects, and a few square yards of territory of their own: this, really, is 
marriage. It is a true freedom . . . . 88 
ture of reliance on empirical studies to confirm or refute the assumptions which must be made, 
one way or another, in formulating a legal regime to govern domestic relationships. 
87. See text accompanying notes 102-06 iefra. 
88. D. LAWRENCE, APROPOS OF LADY CHATIERLY'S LOVER 35-36 (1973) (emphasis in 
original). 
Sociologist Talcott Parsons has also observed: 
[I]n a peculiar sense which is not equally applicable to other systems the marriage bond is, 
in our society, the main structural keystone of the kinship system. This results from the 
structural isolation of the conjugal family and the fact that the married couple are not 
supported by comparably strong kinship ties to other adults . . . In the American kinship 
system this kind of institutionalized support of the role of marriage partner through its 
interlocking with other kinship roles [as is characteristic of other societies] is, if not en-
tirely lacking, at least very much weaker. A functionally equivalent substitute in motiva-
tion to conformity with the expectations of the role is clearly needed. It may hence be 
suggested that the institutional [i.e., state] sanction placed on the proper subjective senti-
ments of spouses . . . has this significance. 
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The political implications of social mediation (or its failure) thus of-
fer a powerful justification for the special legal status of formal 
families. 
D. Marriage and Minority Status as Sources of Objective 
Jurisprudence 
Legal philosopher Lon Fuller listed "the generality of law" as the 
first of the principles he thought were necessary to create a true sys-
tem of law. For Fuller, "the first and most obvious" route to "disas-
ter" in creating and maintaining a legal system "lies in a failure to 
achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc 
basis."89 Justice Rehnquist made a similar point in dissenting from 
the Court's use of the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine, which 
would require individualized determinations in certain equal protec-
tion cases: 
Hundreds of years ago in England, before Parliament came to be 
thought of as a body having general lawmaking power, controversies 
were determined on an individualized basis without benefit of any gen-
eral law. Most students of government consider the shift from this sort 
of determination, made on an ad hoc basis by the King's representa-
tive, to a relatively uniform body of rules enacted by a body exercising 
legislative authority, to have been a significant step forward in the 
achievement of a civilized political society.90 
Individualized determinations are necessary in such particularized 
litigation as custody determinations or procedural due process hear-
ings. They may also be justified when highly protected constitu-
tional interests are infringed.91 But the entire concept of 
"government by laws rather than government by men"92 is 
threatened if subjective determinations become the rule. There is an 
obvious administrative burden inherent in the proliferation of indi-
vidual adjudication in derogation of legislative or judicial classifica-
tion. Of perhaps greater significance is the power given the "King's 
representative" to make arbitrary judgments. The basis of Herbert 
Wechsler's criticism of Supreme Court opinions that "lack . . . rea-
soned generality" was that generality "will assure the Court's 'neu-
Parsons, The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States, 45 AM. ANTHROPOLOOIST 22, 
30-31 (1943) (emphasis in original). 
89. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1964), 
90. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
91. Procedural due process may well perform this function. See also the arguable relation• 
ship between intermediate scrutiny and some doctrine or irrebuttable presumptions in L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092-97 (1978). 
92. MAss. CoNsT., pt. l, art. XXX (1780). 
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trality . . . ' "93 
Classifications based on marriage and minority status are among 
the best examples of the law's use of clear objective categories to 
achieve generality and reliable expectations that stabilize not only 
the determination of legal rights and duties, but also the entire so-
cial, economic, and political structure. Locke and Mill described the 
concept of minority status not as an arbitrary discrimination based 
on age, but as a rational discrimination based cm capacity, designed 
both to protect children and to encourage the development of their 
mature capacities.94 The concept has long stood as a key link be-
tween the family tradition and the individual tradition, with implica-
tions throughout the cultural system. 95 Minority status has been 
incorporated into a multitude of laws "seeking to protect minors 
from the consequences of decisions they are not yet prepared to 
make."96 Objectivity has always been achieved in these laws 
through the use of "chronological age . . . even though it is perfectly 
obvious that such a yardstick is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in 
particular cases."97 
The significant place of marriage in the democratic political 
structure98 reflects the extent to which marriage has become "an 
enormously important element in the rise of stable political systems 
and dynamic economies."99 
As Professor Hayek has rightly pointed out, the rise of the West is due 
in great part to its ability to define the law with certitude, and to up-
hold it against all comers - for legal certainty is the basis of invest-
ment and capital formation. At the heart of any stable law of property 
is a clear and universal legal doctrine of marriage, legitimacy and 
inheritance. 100 
The development of marriage law throughout the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries "created the stable, sure and enlightened legal 
structure on which the Industrial Revolution was based, and without 
which it could not have taken place."10• 
The formal commitment of marriage is also the basis of stable 
93. L. FULLER, supra note 89, at 48 n.5 (discussing H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961)). 
94. See Hafen, supra note 49, at 612-13. 
95. See generally id. 
96. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104-05 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
97. 428 U.S. at 104-05. 
98. See Part I C supra. 
99. Johnson, The Family as an Emblem ef Freedom, 2 (Am. Fam. Inst., 1980) (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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expectations in personal relationships. The willingness to marry per-
mits important legal and personal assumptions to arise about one's 
intentions. 102 Marriage, like adoption, carries with it a commitment 
toward permanence that places it in a different category of relational 
interests than if it were temporary. A 'Justifiable expectation . . . 
that [the] relationship will continue indefinitely"103 permits parties to 
invest themselves in the relationship with a reasonable belief that the 
likelihood of future benefits warrants the attendant risks and incon-
venience. There is a clear analogy between the motivational factors 
that influence human investment and those that influence economic 
investments. Jeremy Bentham believed that private ownership of 
property is more likely to maximize social utility than is collective 
ownership because "the human motivations which result in produc-
tion are . . . such that they will not operate in the absence of secure 
expectations about future enjoyment of product." The will to labor 
and the will to invest "depend on rules which assure [people] that 
they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the 
product as the price of their labor or their risk of savings." 104 
Legal marriage is more likely than is unmarried cohabitation to 
encourage such personal willingness to labor and "invest" in rela-
tionships with other people, whether child or adult. That is perhaps 
one reason why marriage has been given constitutional protection 
and cohabitation has not. By definition, those who enter into "non-
binding commitments" rather than marriage are registering a non-
committal intention. Christopher Lasch believes the current interest 
in these open-ended relationships reflects "the psychic needs of the 
late twentieth century," because it "condemns all expectations, stan-
dards, and codes of conduct as 'unrealistic.' " While some claim 
they must be "equals" to enter satisfactory interpersonal relation-
ships, "equality in this connection means simply an absence of 
demands." 105 
The absence of demands - even the absence of definition - for 
unmarried relationships makes it impossible to identify, much less 
enforce, an appropriate set of rights and duties in the relationship 
through objective legal rules. One study of cohabiting couples found 
102. Note, for example, the assumptions made by a unanimous Supreme Court about an 
unwed father's willingness to assume responsibility for his child in Qui/loin v. Walcoll, dis-
cussed in text at note 149 in.fro. 
103. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 860 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
104. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1212 (1967). 
105. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 140-41. 
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that each couple had a different view of the nature of their relation-
ship, affected by whether they considered it a trial marriage, a substi-
tute marriage, or a temporary involvement. Another key variable 
was the "current quality" of the relationship. That people are living 
together conveys no reliable assumptions about the nature of their 
expectations - economic, social, psychological, or otherwise. Thus, 
future researchers were warned against the hazard of treating un-
married cohabitants as a homogeneous group for any research 
purpose. 106 
The natural boundary created by the objective nature of legal 
marriage - the boundary recognized by the Court for purposes of 
constitutional protection - is significant for several reasons. Once 
these limits are breached, there is no realistic boundary in sight that 
will confine constitutional privacy according to any meaningful stan-
dards. A boundary based on the degree of commitment to a rela-
tionship or individuals' expectations regarding a relationship's 
permanence would require intolerable inquiries into the most private 
realm of these individuals' lives. Yet without such inquiries, ex-
tending protection to any informal relationship would require ex-
tending protection to "casual sexual intimacies," which one advocate 
of a broad right of intimate association acknowledges as "an Ameri-
can disease" that is "the exact antithesis of the intimacy that involves 
caring." 107 Even if inquiries were permitted, the prospect of evaluat-
ing the variables in each relationship is so discouraging that no rela-
tionships would be likely to receive very broad legal protection, 
thereby undercutting both the individual and the social interest in a 
constitutional "right to marry." 
The claims arising from such an unlimited spectrum of relation-
ships would necessarily be contractual in nature, with no overtones 
of Status as a source of obligation. The power of family life to de-
velop public virtue and to promote the ends of a democratic society 
would therefore be seriously impaired.108 In that event, the very jus-
tification for granting extraordinary constitutional protection to mar-
riage is also reduced, as "marriage" could essentially be transformed 
into an economic partnership. Absent the advantages discussed in 
the immediately preceding sections, there would be no more reason 
for the Court to give preferred protection to these economic relations 
than it does to any other economic interests under its present sub-
106. Lewis, Spanier, Atkinson & LeHecka, Commitment in Married and Unmarried Cohabi· 
talion, 10 Soc. Focus 367, 371 (1977). 
107. Karst, supra note 11, at 633 & n.45. 
108. See Part I supra. 
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stantive due process posture. 109 Thus a contractual basis for per-
sonal relationships would likely invite more, not less, state 
intervention into the relationship. 
The law's traditional (and present) posture toward regulation of 
an ongoing marriage is to stay out of it, even when a judge could 
obviously resolve the marital differences, because the price for 
resolving the immediate problem in court is likely to be the relation-
ship itself.' 10 The "formal law," whether statutory or contractual, is 
simply unable to regulate intimate relationships and still serve the 
overriding purpose of encouraging and preserving continuity in 
those relationships. 111 If a cohabiting couple were seen as a partner-
ship rather than a marriage, enforcement of individual claims could 
easily receive greater priority than the continuity of the relationship. 
Cohabiting partners would probably experience less judicial inter-
vention in terminating their relationship than is presently true of di-
vorce, but that may be small compensation for the uncertainty they 
could experience in not knowing whether their relationship has been 
terminated in a way that discharges underlying obligations. 
The Court's own work in the family cases provides a sneak pre-
view of what it would be like for judges to determine whether an 
individual relationship is "meaningful" enough to be considered the 
functional equivalent of marriage. The unwed fathers cases112 and 
the minors' abortion cases113 illustrate the problems of subjective de-
terminations in family relations, as they require judicial .findings re-
garding the substantiality of a father-child relationship or the 
"maturity" of a pregnant minor. Homer Clark found the Court's 
foray into the area of illegitimacy to be a mixed blessing, primarily 
because the Court was willing to invalidate discrimination against 
illegitimates in some contexts but not in others. This approach raises 
more questions than previously existed about the "status" of illegiti-
mate children. "[I]t is . . . ·hardly a sensible policy to limit future 
legal responses to social problems by constitutional principles having 
109. See notes 403-04 infra and accompanying text. 
110. (l]ntervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely 
serve as the spark to a smoldering fire. A mandatory court decree supporting the position 
of one parent against the other would hardly be a composing situation for tlie unsuccess-
ful parent to be confronted with daily. One spouse could hardly be expected to entertain 
a tender, affectionate regard for the other spouse who brings him or her under restraint, 
The judicial mind and conscience is repelled by the thought of disruption of the sacred 
marital relationship . . . . 
Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 479-80, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (1959). 
111. See generally Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J, JURIS. 1 (1969). 
112. See Part II B infra. 
113. See notes 235-39 infra and accompanying text. 
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the dual disadvantages of rigidity and uncertainty." 114 
Watching the Court weave and bob its way through the bewilder-
ing thickets of interpersonal relations in these cases gives rise to a 
larger question about the jurisprudence of adjudicating the constitu-
tional issues so recently discovered in the family law domain. Fam-
ily law has always been longer on practice than on theory. With a 
fairly simple theoretical framework, judges in family cases have con-
centrated largely on the intensely practical problems that arise in di-
vorce, custody, neglect, and similar contexts. The introduction of 
high-powered constitutional doctrines into this arena does not alter 
the basic need in most cases to balance conflicting personal interests 
among family members - most of whom are usually entitled to sim-
ilar "constitutional rights." 
Concepts such as marriage and minority status have played a su-
premely important role over the years in staking out broad, clear 
boundaries that give guidance to an arm of the legal system that is 
already overwhelmed with subjective determinations. Given the dif-
ficulties the Supreme Court has had, even with those concepts basi-
cally intact, one can only imagine what would happen from a 
jurisprudential perspective if marriage and minority status were to 
fall by the wayside in the quest for individual fairness. The under-
standable, but misguided, quest for individualized determinations of 
legally recognizable intimate associations is likely to be encouraged 
by excessive zeal for subjective jurisprudence - and vice versa. Up 
to this point, marriage and minority status remain fixed stars in the 
legal system. To the extent that they begin to drift, both as legal and 
as social concepts, to that extent will our jurisprudence drift from a 
system that encourages stable expectations to one that discourages 
them. 
Of course, it would be equally foolish to insist on a system so 
stable that no flexibility is possible. The practical adequacy of the 
present constitutional boundary has been aided by the reforms of 
recent years in the areas of women's rights and divorce. These re-
forms, together with the Court's recognition of certain exceptional 
needs outside married nuclear families, go a long way toward rebut-
ting the criticism that the formal family is too narrow a concept to 
serve as a legal paradigm in a pluralistic society. 115 As described by 
114. Clark, Constitutional Protection of the Illegitimate Child?, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 383, 411 
(1979). 
115. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 
1169, 1238-39 (1974). The author concludes that marriage contracts better provide for flexible 
marriages. Id. at 1249-50. 
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one family scholar, the historical developments of the past century 
have shifted from viewing the family as a rigid, monolithic structure 
toward viewing it as a flexible form that assumes "private motiva-
tions for forming and maintaining marriages" and presupposes "a 
considerable amount of variation in the norms of family which peo-
ple actually follow." This development is related to the pervasive 
democratization of industrial society, which has "extensive marriage 
markets, requiring a tolerance for diverse norms." 116 As a result, 
"married couples can and do arrange the style of their marital lives 
in many different ways," matching the pluralism of contemporary 
society. 117 This means in practice that the circle of legally and so-
cially acceptable family patterns includes working mothers, families 
headed by women, families in which fathers share housework, and 
families without children. In a general way, American families in-
creasingly reflect patterns in which "husband and wife have equal 
status and authority[,] major decisions are by consensus[,] and . . . 
common interests and activities coexist with division of labor and 
individuality of interests." 11s 
These social developments have been reflected in changing legal 
patterns that maximize individual choice in allowing greater - but 
still orderly - access to and exit from legal marriage, both in the 
name of the freedom to marry. In addition, the trend of both statu-
tory and case law has been toward equalizing the economic relation-
ship of husband and wife and toward minimizing sex-based 
stereotypes in decisions related to child custody and other marital 
termination issues.119 It is therefore inaccurate to regard present do-
mestic relations law as oppressively rigid, imposing on unwilling 
couples such unalterable assumptions as nonterminable marriage, 
strict divisions of labor between husband and wife, husbands as the 
sole source of support, or the assumption that each marriage is a first 
marriage that will produce children. 120 
Whether the bonds of marriage lead to personal fulfillment or 
oppression is a question on which sharp differences exist, obviously 
reflecting the variety of marital experiences. Existing law has cre-
ated outlets that permit the legal system to continue giving prefer-
116. B. FARBER, supra note 83, at 52. 
117. Rheinstein, The Transformation ef Marriage and the Law, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 463, 478 
(1973). 
I 18. E. BURGESS, H. LOCKE & M. THOMES, THE FAMILY, FROM INSTITUTION TO COMPAN· 
IONSHIP 4 (1963). 
119. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away ef Marriage, 62 
VA. L. REV. 663, 706-11 (1976). 
120. Bui see Weitzman, supra note 115, at 1170-235. 
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ence to formal relationships in ways that do not exact unbearable 
sacrifices from those for whom the marriage bonds really are bond-
age. At the same time, the policy preference for formal commit-
ments acts to create not only more stable expectations and a more 
objective system of adjudication, it also offers at least some hope that 
Americans may yet discover that the contemporary fascination with 
liberation from personal commitments may not be all that it 
promises. 121 
II. KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HOME FOR 
FAMILY INTERESTS 
The Supreme Court has created impressive protections for family 
relationships, despite the absence of any mention of the family in the 
text of the Constitution. As early as 1888, the Court described mar-
riage as "the most important relation in life"122 and "the foundation 
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither 
civilization nor progress."123 In 1923, the Court gave constitutional 
status to the right of parents to direct the upbringing ofth~ir children 
without undue state interference.124 The Court first recognized the 
constitutional right of privacy in 1965 as an inherent characteristic of 
marriage, which the Court called "intimate to the degree of being 
sacred."125 
Rather than providing authority for some dramatic reordering of 
the intimacies and personal relationships protected by the Constitu-
tion, the fifty or so Supreme Court decisions that now touch on fam-
121. The spirit of emancipation has ... touched deep nerves of truth [but it also re-
flects] ... the blind side of our age, and the cost of the blindness; [and] a perhaps fatal 
stupidity intertwined with our enlightenment. The idea of emancipation, after all, has to 
do with an escape from bonds, not a strengthening of bonds. Emancipation has to do with 
power, not love . . . . I don't think that it's a coincidence . . . that more and more people 
are living alone these days . . . . 
... [There is a] general sense of the transformation of·our society from one that 
strengthens the bonds between people to one that is, at best, indifferent to them; a sense of 
an inevitable fraying of the net of connections between people at many critical intersec-
tions, of which the marital knot is only one. . . . If one examines these points of disinte-
gration separately, one finds they have a common cause - the overriding value placed on 
the idea of individual emancipation and fulfillment, in the light of which, more and more, 
the old bonds are seen not as enriching but as confining. We are coming to look upon life 
as a lone adventure, a great personal odyssey, and there is much in this view which is 
exhilarating and strengthening, but we seem to be carrying it to such an extreme that if 
each of us is an Odysseus, he is an Odysseus with no Telemachus to pursue him, with no 
Ithaca to long for, with no Penelope to return to - an Odysseus on a journey that has 
been rendered pointless by becoming limitless. 
Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 1976, at 21-22 (quoting an anonymous letter). 
122. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
123. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). 
124. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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ily interests effectively define a "family" as persons related by blood, 
marriage, or adoption. Thus, the interests protected by the Court's 
categories of constitutional protection advance the social policies just 
outlined and thereby give principled content to the decisions. 
The Court's work in this area has not been without missteps and 
theoretical confusion; indeed, much of its guidance seems to have 
come more from intuition than from a set of coherent principles. 
The court has also made only occasional efforts to articulate the poli-
cies underlying its preference for kinship and marriage in a way that 
would clearly define the kinds of interests that should be protected. 
However, as shown in Part I, the policies can be identified and then 
more fully articulated. When they are, a rational distinction emerges 
between formal families and unrelated persons. As will be shown in 
Part III, the cases can also be reconciled into a pattern of constitu-
tional analysis that will convey more certain signals to lower courts 
as well as encouraging more sure footing for the Court's work in the 
future. Sure footing is especially important as the Court wanders in 
a wilderness of constitutional interpretation where the lack of an ex-
plicit text and the inherent subjectivity of all perspectives on the sub-
ject matter make the terrain as treacherous as it is significant. 
For the purpose of this descriptive summary, I will group the 
cases into eight categories: (A) ~he illegitimacy cases; (B) the unwed 
fathers' cases; (C) the foster parents case; (D) the right to marry 
cases; (E) the minority status cases; (F) the first amendment cases; 
(G) the contraception and abortion cases; and (H) sexual privacy. 
A. The Illegitimacy Cases 
At the outset, a general observation about relational interests in 
family law is in order, pertaining not only to the illegitimacy cases, 
but to other cases as well. There always has been tension between 
"society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds 
of marriage"126 and society's regard for the child-parent relationship. 
That relationship is, after all, one of kinship. Despite the existence 
over many centuries of legal measures designed to discourage sex 
outside marriage, our society has not been willing to terminate the 
parental rights of an unwed mother on the ground that her conduct 
has made her, per se, an unfit parent. Our attitudes on this subject 
were captured more than a century ago in Nathaniel Hawthorne's 
classic story of the unwed mother, The Scarlet Letter: 
"Hester Prynne," said [Governor Bellingham] " ... there hath 
126. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
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been much question concerning thee, of late. The point has been 
weightily discussed, whether we, that are of authority and influence, do 
well discharge our consciences by trusting an immortal soul, such as 
there is in yonder child, to the guidance of one who hath stumbled and 
fallen, amid the pitfalls of this world . . . ." 
Hester caught hold of Pearl, and drew her forcibly into her arms, 
confronting the old puritan magistrate with · almost a fierce expres-
sion. . . . She felt that she possessed indefeasible rights against the 
world, and was ready to defend them to the death. 
"God gave me the child!" cried she. . . . "Ye shall not take her! I 
will die first!" 
"There is truth in what she says," began [young minister Dimmes-
dale] . . .. "God gave her the child, and gave her, too, an instinctive 
knowledge of its nature and requirements . . . which no other mortal 
being can possess. And, moreover, is there not a quality of awful sacred-
ness in the relation between this mother and this child?" 127 
The recognition of parental rights in such a case arises from the law's 
respect for kinship, which exists despite the law's preference that kin-
ship arise from marriage. 
At the same time, laws discriminating against illegitimate chil-
dren have existed for many years, expressing what one authority has 
called society's "wish to assure that children would be born within 
institutional structures capabfe of raising them - stable families." 128 
. It has nonetheless become increasingly clear, especially during the 
last century, that removal of many of the legal disabilities attaching 
to a child's illegitimate status can respond to the demands of equity 
without violating the principled framework of blood, marriage, and 
adoption. 
In a number of cases since 1968, the Supreme Court has boosted 
the longstanding illegitimacy reform movement by extending "inter-
mediate scrutiny" equal protection doctrines to cover several major 
aspects of an illegitimate child's relational interest with one or both 
of his parents. 129 In all of these cases, the Court has recognized only 
the relationship between a child and an unwed parent, 130 never the 
127. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LE1JER 131-35 (1850) (emphasis added). 
128. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY I (1971). 
129. It is unnecessary to the purpose of this discussion to pursue the problems raised by 
arguably inconsistent outcomes in some of the Court's various illegitimacy cases. A recent 
summary of the cases, and an attempt to reconcile their results, is contained in Comment, 
Equal Protection far Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
142. 
130. One of the illegitimacy cases upheld the right of an unwed mother to sue for the 
wrongful death of her child. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
That case has been criticized for undermining the "legal commitment" undertaken when a 
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relationship between the two parents. 131 Indeed, in one of the cases, 
the Court echoed the policy themes of the preceding section by 
describing the state's interest in encouraging formal marriage and 
the stability of family life as something "no one disputes" because 
the family is regarded as "perhaps the most fundamental social insti-
tution of our society." 132 Decisions to pr9tect illegitimate children 
who live with a parent are not based merely on the "functional 
equivalence" of legitimate child-parent relationships. In holding 
that the benefits of workmen's compensation laws may not be lim-
ited to dependent legitimate children, the Court made clear that its 
ruling "will not expand claimants . . . beyond those in a direct 
blood and dependency relationship with the deceased . . . ." 133 
There is a substantial basis for reliance on the blood tie, because 
"biological relationship is the test that has been used - since time 
immemorial - in our and other cultures for the fixing of support 
and other familial obligations, and it is biological relationship that 
underlies and is traced by legal relationship." 134 
An enormous rise in both the nation's illegitimacy rate and the 
level of related welfare outlays has paralleled the development of the 
case law giving economic protection to illegitimate children. As a 
result, increased economic assistance has also been given to unmar-
ried parents who receive welfare aid intended to benefit their chil-
dren. Welfare aid for illegitimate children may have increased not 
only the illegitimacy rates, but also the number of families choosing 
to function without parental marriages. 135 Thus, while the illegiti-
man and woman marry. Glendon, supra note 119, at 714-15. However, the relationship recog-
nized by the Court was the mother-child relationship, not the father-mother relationship. 
Therefore, the case simply recognized an aspect of the unwed mother's interest in her child 
that had long been upheld in other legal contexts. 
131. In Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979), the Court upheld a Social Security Act 
provision that gave survivors' benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners, but not 
to the unwed mothers of the survivors' children - even when the illegitimate children quali-
fied for benefits. The use of marital status was held to be an acceptable index for determining 
dependency on a wage earner. The indirect effect on the children involved was insufficient to 
require the higher level of scrutiny applied when there is discrimination against illegitimate 
children. Also, the wrongful death claim of an unmarried cohabitant was rejected by a federal 
trial court in Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that she was protected by the theory of the illegitimacy 
cases, noting that the relationship between unmarried cohabitants is not permanent as is the 
child-parent relationship outside marriage, the relationship is more difficult to document, and 
illegitimacy policies directed at adults are more fair than those directed at children. 
132. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977). 
133. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 407 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
134. H. KRAUSE, supra note 128, at 69. 
135. The problem of how to assist needy children without encouraging their parents to 
remain unmarried is therefore a serious one, the implications of which are beyond the scope of 
this Article. Welfare programs that have the effect of offering financial incentives for mothers 
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macy cases are consistent with traditional "kinship" criteria in defin-
ing a constitutionally protected family relationship, the cases have 
been seen as contributing to the "withering of marriage," perhaps 
because of the exploitation of welfare incentives.136 The cases also 
inevitably disturb, to some extent, "a wide variety of laws designed 
to encourage legally recognized and responsible family 
relationships." 137 
Lest more be made of the cases than they warrant, however, it 
may be noted that the constitutional protection they extend is not 
based on some revolutionary view of illegitimate children tanta-
mount to the revolution that would be involved in extending consti-
tutional protection to relationships between unmarried adults. The 
relationship between the unwed mother and her child has always 
created the need for some legal protection. T.l;1e illegitimacy reform 
movement traces its beginnings and some of its progress to a time 
much .earlier than the Supreme Court's involvement. 138 As for the 
fear that imposing legal duties on the parent-child relationship 
outside marriage will discourage formal marriage, Harry Krause 
observes: 
The law's failure to impose a substantial economic burden on the fa-
ther of an illegitimate child may be more likely to encourage illegiti-
macy than marriage! In short, it is most doubtful that there is an 
effective connection between the legislated stigma of illegitimacy and 
the state's ~urpose of encouraging marriage and discouraging 
promiscuity. 1 9 
The policy favoring formal marriage seeks, among other things, 
to maximize the stability of a child's home environment. When a 
child is born outside marriage, the interest in stability is less likely to 
be realized. 140 But by then, enforcement of the "first choice" prefer-
to remain unmarried have been widely denounced. See, e.g., M. BANE,supra note 9, at 135; G. 
GILDER, supra note 28, at 173-74; K. KENISTON, supra note 9, at 99-101. 
136. The post-1968 transformation of the law of illegitimacy in the United States has 
followed the world-wide pattern of approximating the status of the child born outside 
marriage to that of the child born within marriage. The more fully the two statuses are 
approximated, the more legal marriage loses one of its most traditional and important 
effects - distinguishing the legitimate family from all others. . . . The legal institution is 
being drained of some of its content by the increasing number and social acceptance of 
births outside legal marriage. 
Glendon, supra note 119, at 714-15 (footnotes omitted). 
137. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 184 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
138. See generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 128. 
139. H. KRAUSE, supra note 128, at 75 (footnote omitted). 
140. It has been argued that the real basis for the legitimate/illegitimate distinction is not a 
concern for the stability of a child's environment, but is "an effort at social control of female 
behavior." Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their 
Children: An Analysis of the Institution of I/legitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Unfform Par-
entage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 25 (1974) (emphasis omitted). The assumption that "the 
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ence for marriage by withholding entitlements needed by the child 
reduces even further the child's hopes for an adequate environment. 
Enforcement of the preference at that stage is also unlikely to result 
in marriage, partly because of the timing and partly because the en-
forcement pressure is directed at the child, who is the wrong party. 
Society's long term interest in its children may therefore be better 
served, once an illegitimate birth has occurred, by resort to the "sec-
ond choice" policy of allowing entitlements a child clearly needs, 
even though in a less stable environment. 
This same relationship between first and second choice policies 
does not apply to the claims of unmarried cohabitants. In their case, 
enforcement of the preference for marriage is directed at the parties 
under whose control the marriage decision rests. Also, there is no 
harm comparable to what a child suffers because neither adult is de-
pendent in any sense even approaching the dependency of a child. 
Finally, enforcement of the first choice preference for marriage at a 
stage when a relationship has not yet produced children increases the 
likelihood that children born of the relationship will enter a stable 
environment. For reasons such as these, discrimination between 
married and unmarried couples is very different from discrimination 
between legitimate and illegitimate children. 
B. The Unwed Fathers Cases 
In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, 141 the Court sent shock 
waves through the world of adoption services by holding that an un-
wed father had a constitutionally protected parental interest in his 
children following the death of their mother. Stanley had fathered 
three children during an eighteen-year unmarried relationship with 
their mother, but Illinois law did not recognize his claim of a paren-
tal interest. The Court found the law a violation of procedural due 
institution of illegitimacy implements the principle oflegitimacy by coercing women into mar-
riage, which submerges their identities and limits their freedom" presumably sees in the illegit-
imacy cases the early steps toward recognizing "the unit composed of a woman and her 
offspring" as an alternative "first choice" lifestyle form of family life. Recognition of that kind 
of family unit as a matter of"freedom of choice in procreation and personal association," id. at 
28, is not far removed from recognizing a considerable variety of forms of "intimate associa-
tion" as legitimate alternatives to the formal family. See Karst, supra note I I. Advocates for 
this point of view have stated: "[T]he real question ... is whether the state has any valid 
interest in promoting nuclear families and deterring illegitimacy." Wallach & Tenoso, supra, 
at 62 (emphasis in original). This question may find some response in considering the social 
interest in marriage. See Part I supra. Consider also the cases made by Justices Stewart and 
Stevens in describing both the state's and children's interest in promoting the welfare of illegit-
imate children. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394, (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
441 U.S. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
141. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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process because it deprived Stanley of his parental rights without a 
hearing and unfairly discriminated between married and unmarried 
parents. Expansive dicta in the case142 implied that the Court might 
be adopting a major change in attitude toward informal marriages 
and that all unwed fathers might thereafter have all the rights of 
married fathers. 
The facts of Stanley do not support such a broad interpretation. 
Stanley unambiguously acknowledged his children. He had lived 
with and supported them all of their lives.143 The Court seems 
merely to have recognized the kinship ties which also bind unwed 
mothers to their children. Nothing about Stanley or its progeny im-
plies protection for the father-mother relationship. Still, the general 
unavailability of putative fathers when unwed mothers place their 
children for adoption made the matter of paternal consent a perplex-
ing prospect after Stanley. 
The two cases since Stanley, Qui/loin v. Walcott 144 and Caban v. 
Mohammed, 145 make clear that there is no constitutional protection 
for the father who does not admit paternity early enough to establish 
over time a significant relationship with his child. The present atti-
tude toward fathers during a child's infancy resembles the basis for 
the common law's disregard of the putative father - "the fact that 
his identity was often uncertain and that he was stereotyped as irre-
sponsible and unconcerned about his child." 146 Only when a father 
has admitted his paternity, "established a substantial relationship 
with the child,"147 and "shouldered significant responsibility" for his 
child, 148 will his parental interests receive constitutional protection. 
Fathers willing to take such steps do have substantially greater rights 
to withhold consent to adoptions of their children than they enjoyed 
prior to Stanley. 
The Qui/loin case makes a telling point about the difference be-
tween formal marriage and unmarried cohabitation. In that case, 
the Court upheld an adoption objected to by an unwed father (Quil-
loin) who had established a superficial relationship with his child 
142. "Nor has lhe law refused to recognize lhose family relationships unlegitimated by a 
marriage ceremony." 405 U.S. at 651. Given lhe Stanley context, lhis reference is probably to 
lhe kinship tie so long recognized between unwed mothers and lheir children. 
143. 405 U.S. at 650 n.4. 
144. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
145. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
146. Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights: A Focus on "Family", 58 NEB. L. Rev. 
610, 611 (1979) (footnotes omitted). 
147. 441 U.S. at 393. 
148. 434 U.S. at 256. 
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over several years. Quilloin proved that he had been legally obli-
gated to provide child support, an obligation which he had occasion-
ally honored. He also showed that he had visited the child many 
times in the home where the child lived with the mother and the man 
she married within a few years after the child's birth. Quilloin ar-
gued on equal protection grounds that his relationship was function-
ally equivalent to that of a married father who is separated or 
divorced but still provides child support and has visitation rights. 
Speaking through Justice Marshall, the Court unanimously rejected 
Quilloin's argument, noting that he had never had legal custody of 
his child: 
[L]egal custody of children is, of course, a central aspect of the marital 
relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will 
have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the 
period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the State was 
not foreclosed from recognizing this d!fference in the extent of the com-
mitment to the we!fare of the child.149 
The members of the Court must have known that not every "father 
whose marriage has broken apart" will actually "have borne full re-
sponsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the 
marriage." One could easily find a married father who had done less 
for his children than Leon Quilloin did for his child. Yet, regardless 
of what the married father might actually do, the State was permit-
ted to maintain "under any standard of review" a presumptive statu-
tory preference for the married father over the unmarried father so 
significant that it resulted in permanent termination of the unmar-
ried father's rights. 
This harsh difference between the law's treatment of a married 
man and an unmarried man was justified because of what Justice 
Marshall called a "difference in the extent of the commitment to the 
welfare of the child." In other words, a man's unwillingness to 
marry (assuming the woman is willing) raises a very believable pre-
sumption that he is unwilling to make long-term commitments to his 
children - and probably to their mother as well. Under Caban, an 
unmarried father can overcome the presumption of his noncommit-
ment, but only by showing he has shouldered significant responsibil-
ity in caring for the child on a daily basis over a period of years. 150 
This test may suffice as a tool of hindsight, but those concerned 
about the welfare of an illegitimate infant cannot keep the child in-
definitely in limbo, waiting to see what "functional equivalents" of 
149. 434 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). 
150. See 441 U.S. at 393; 441 U.S. at 382. 
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marriage the father will demonstrate if he is given plenty of time. It 
is not difficult to sense the risks to a child in such circumstances, 
knowing as we do how much every child needs a sense of continuity_ 
and stability in the child-parent relationship. 151 Quilloin's waiting 
child is a vivid symbol of the way all persons wait in a noncommittal 
relationship, whether child or adult, at risk in a sea of uncertain 
expectations. 
The marriage commitment enables the courts, as well as those 
most personally involved, to make certain assun.iptions - even 
knowing they will at times be disappointed - about what to expect. 
A man's marriage commitment gives rise to the legitimate presump-
tion that he will make the long-term commitments his children need. 
The state acts reasonably in not extending the same assumption to an 
unwed father. A unanimous Court saw that readily in Qui/loin. In 
circumstances as clear as those suggested by the symbol of the wait-
ing child, the Court did not hesitate to disregard noble phrases asso-
ciated with individual parental liberty in favor of the pedestrian 
presumptions and classifications that have guided legislators and 
family law judges for years in comparing married and unmarried 
couples. This case illustrates that the Court's instincts will restrain 
- more than will its theories - the excesses of having just discov-
ered that dads are people, too. 
The Caban case illustrates the complications that may follow in 
granting constitutional protection for one individual amid a variety 
of family interests and relationships, each of which may claim a pre-
ferred status. Caban was essentially a custody dispute between an 
unwed father and an unwed mother, both of whom had married 
other persons since their two children were born. Both parents 
sought to adopt the children. Choosing neither to recognize any re-
lationship between the parents nor to resolve the ·dispute between 
them, the Court simply declared unconstitutional on sex discrimina-
tion grounds a New York law which permitted an unwed mother, 
but not an unwed father, to veto the proposed adoption of her chil-
dren. The Court thus compared the rights of unwed fathers not with 
those of married fathers, but with the rights of unwed mothers. 152 
Without telling the state how it should resolve the custody issue, the 
Court merely declared that the state could not rely upon a statute 
favoring the mother "in all circumstances."153 The effect of this re-
sult, noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, was that both natural par-
151. See generally J. GOLDSTElN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNlT, supra note 39. 
152. See 441 U.S. at 388. 
153. 441 U.S. at 394. 
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ents "are given a veto," so that "neither may adopt and the children 
will remain illegitimate."154 Perhaps the Court would have regarded 
the "well being of legitimate children" 155 differently if it had been 
asked to consider the interests of the children in their own right 
rather than looking at the state interest in providing for them, espe-
cially in light of the Court's strong precedents establishing a rela-
tively preferred constitutional position for illegitimate children. The 
broad language of Stanley had been written in support of paternal 
interests when there were no countervailing claims from the children 
or their mother; therefore, it was possible to view unwed fathers' 
rights as protecting "the integrity of the family unit." Because pro-
tecting the unwed father's right apparently left the Caban children 
illegitimate, it is less clear how family integrity was protected in that 
case. To invoke civil rights doctrines in domestic relations cases may 
not tell our judges much more than they already know about assess-
ing the relative weight of the individual rights that collide with each 
other in so many family conflicts. 
The unwed father cases also illustrate the inconsistencies that 
arise when legal interests are made to depend on the shifting subjec-
tive factors of each individual circumstance rather than deriving 
from fixed concepts such as marriage or minority status. Suppose 
that just before the Quilloin child was adopted by his stepfather, 
Leon Quilloin had died as the result of a tortious injury. Under the 
doctrines of the illegitimacy cases, the child would probably be enti-
tled to a wrongful death action, even though, as it turned out, Quil-
loin had no parental rights in the adoption proceeding. Next, 
consider the incongruities of New York law as applied to the facts of 
Caban. Shortly before ruling in Caban that the father of an "older" 
illegitimate child had enough of a parental right to block his child's 
adoption by another man, the Court had also upheld the constitu-
154. 441 U.S. at 412. The state court denied Caban's petition to adopt the children solely 
because he was unable to obtain their mother's consent, as required by the statute. 441 U.S. at 
384. Because the statute is no longer valid, the court could find some other basis upon which 
to grant the adoption petition of one party or the other. But if the Supreme Court's decision is 
construed to give the father the same veto power over the mother's petition that she exercised 
over his, the stalemate over adoption leaves the children illegitimate, 
155. Justice Powell's majority opinion recognized that "[t]he State's interest in providing 
for the well being oflegitimate children is an important one[,]" 411 U.S. at 391, but he did not 
believe the gender-based discrimination between fathers and mothers bore a substantial rela-
tion to that interest, at least "(w]hen the adoption of an older child is sought." 441 U.S. at 392. 
Justice Stewart, dissenting, argued that, "Unlike the children of married parents, illegitimate 
children begin life with formidable handicaps. . . . Adoption provides perhaps the most gen-
erally available way of removing these handicaps." 441 U.S. at 395. Speaking for the other 
three dissenters, Justice Stevens wrote, "The state interest in facilitating adoption in appropri-
ate cases is strong - perhaps even 'compelling.'" 441 U.S. at 402. 
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tionality of a New York law requiring an illegitimate child to prove 
paternity before being permitted any inheritance rights. 156 Thus, the 
Caban children had enough of a tie to their father that they could 
not be adopted without the father's consent, but not enough of a tie 
that they would be permitted to inherit from that same father if he 
died without formal proof of paternity. Such inconsistent results are 
unlikely when marriage anchors the nature of the relationships. 
These cases also raise a serious question concerning the Court's 
willingness to make subjective factual judgments .. Justice Powell's 
majority opinion in Caban discusses the special status of older chil-
dren.157 Yet Justice Powell seems unwilling to commit himself on 
such factual questions as how older children are to be distinguished 
from infants and what is a substantial enough relationship between a 
father and child to give rise to a parental right. As the swing man in 
many of the illegitimacy cases, Justice Powell has been similarly pre-
occupied with drawing minute factual distinctions in one case after 
another. In still another family law context, the Court has recently 
favored individualized judicial assessments of "maturity" as a condi-
tion of determining whether an unmarried minor may obtain an 
abortion. 158 Such prospects convey - with a sense of deja vu -
overtones of the courts' dubious role in needing to review endless 
numbers of arguably obscene books and movies. With such rela-
tively fixed categories as marriage and minority status, we have al-
ready been clever enough to devise objective criteria designed not 
only to conserve judicial energy, but also to let society know what 
the law expects without asking judges to review the intimate details 
of endless questions about motives, relationships, and other subjec-
tive imponderables. In other words, there is an important relation-
ship between preserving a system of marriage and a system of 
jurisprudence.159 
C. The Foster Parents Case 
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form (OFFER), 160 the Court addressed the issue of constitutional 
standards for the removal of foster children from the care of foster 
parents. Without definitely deciding whether foster parents have a 
liberty interest sufficient to require the application of procedural due 
156. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
157. See 441 U.S. at 389, 392. 
158. See notes 235-39 iefra and accompanying text. 
159. See Part ID supra. 
160. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
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process standards, the Court unanimously found New York's re-
moval procedures adequate to satisfy whatever interests the foster 
parents may have. The foster parents group had argued that the 
state procedures were inadequate because they did not require an 
automatic preremoval hearing. 
Foster care relationships are yet another unavoidable exception 
to traditional family patterns, necessitated when natural families are 
unable to provide normal care for a variety of reasons. Present state 
policies generally assume that foster care is temporary and that, as a 
result, foster parents should avoid deep emotional involvements. 
The plaintiffs in OFFER represented a different viewpoint, arguing 
that foster relationships lasting more than a year should be charac-
terized by greater emotional involvement because strong psychologi-
cal ties aid the developmental needs of the foster children.t6 t 
Implicitly acknowledging that the extent of psychological commit-
ment in a foster care relationship could be significant, the Court still 
found that the nature of the foster parents' constitutional interest (re-
gardless of the weight of the interest from an emotional viewpoint) 
did not rise to the level of natural parents' interests. The Court 
pointed out that recognition of rights in the foster parents could af-
fect the rights of the child's natural parents.162 Moreover, the foster 
parents' interest originates in a state contract, while the interests of 
natural parents originate in "intrinsic human rights" that are antece-
dent to the state. 163 The Court also considered the "expectations and 
entitlements of the parties" to a foster care arrangement as defined 
by state law, but found there only "the most limited constitutional 
'liberty' in the foster family": 164 expectations in foster relationships 
are by definition temporary. 165 Even so, the Court regarded the fos-
ter family as more than "a mere collection of unrelated individuals" 
161. [The avoidance of emotional child-parent involvement] defeats the very intentions 
of the decision to move from professional institutional care to family care. Where foster 
parents heed the warning given and fulfill their task with the reservations implied in a 
semi-professional attitude they evoke in the child a reduced response as well, too luke-
warm to serve the infant's developmental needs for emotional progress or the older child's 
needs for relatedness and identification. . 
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 39, at 25-26. These authors would also 
prefer to see more effort made to maintain contact between the child and his absent natural 
parents, where possible; but once the "prior tie has been broken, the foster or other temporary 
placements can no longer be considered temporary." Id. at 39. At that point, a relationship 
more like adoption should be considered. Id. Representatives of the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit 
team joined in filing a brief as amicus curiae supporting the district court opinion that was 
overturned by the Supreme Court in OFFER. 
162. See 431 U.S. at 846-47. 
163. 431 U.S. at 845. 
164. 431 U.S. at 846. 
165. See notes 174-77 infra and accompanying text. 
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such as student roommates.166 
OFFER is a potentially significant case, because it arguably bears 
on defining the constitutionally protected "family" in ways that ex-
tend beyond marriage and kinship. The case has thus been con-
strued as a takeoff point for considering "which attributes of the 
family are essential to the attainment of constitutional protec-
tion." 167 In that inquiry, some commentators think OFFER suggests 
that "of all the attributes of the family" (along with biological rela-
tionships, parent-child relationships, cohabitation, and formal com-
mitment), "psychological support and involvement" is the most 
important element in determining the significance of a relationship 
for the individual. 168 Others pursuing that logic think "the question 
presented" in OFFER was "whether the presence of a psychological 
bond between foster parent and foster child creates a 'liberty inter-
est'" requiring due process.169 The assumption that OFFER lends 
theoretical support to a potential right of intimate association outside 
marriage and kinship was also encouraged by some of the language 
in Justice Brennan's majority opinion. 170 Support has also been in-
ferred from the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit "psychological parent" the-
ory171 on which the OFFER plaintiffs relied. One commentator on 
OFFER said this theory "rejects biology as the basis of the parent-
child relationship and instead focuses on the daily transactions oc-
curring between the child and the parent figure." 172 
These interpretations are seriously flawed. The OFFER case 
does not suggest a "functional" analysis of human relationships, try-
ing to identify whether a relationship should enjoy constitutional 
protection according to its psychological characteristics. Despite its 
superficial appeal to fairness based on individualized determina-
tions, this approach overlooks the fundamental distinction between 
the emotional "weight" of an individual interest and the "nature" of 
the interest. Quoting a prior case, Justice Brennan wrote: 
A weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the 
form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due 
166. 431 U.S. at 816 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. l (1974)). 
167. Developments, supra note 10, at 1273. 
168. Id at 1283. 
169. 46 TENN. L. REV. 671, 674 (1979). 
170. "[B]iological relationships are not exclusive determination [sic] of the existence of a 
family," 431 U.S. at 843; "a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult 
and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship," 431 U.S. at 
844; "[t]he scope of [parental] rights extends beyond natural parents," 431 U.S. at 843 n.49; and 
"[t]he legal status of families has never been regarded as controlling," 431 U.S. at 845 n.53. 
171. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 39. 
172. 46 TENN. L. REV. 761, 766 (1979). 
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process. But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in 
the first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the 
interest at stake. 173 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion amplified this point, implying 
that the nature of the foster parents' interest was of a fundamentally 
different character from the nature of the_ interest of natural parents, 
because foster care laws provide "no basis for a justifiable expecta-
tion on the part offoster families that their relationship will continue 
indefinitely." 174 Foster care is, by design, "for a planned period -
either temporary or extended."175 Adoptive placement, on the other 
hand, "implies a permanent substitution of one home for another."176 
Thus, even though adoption is as much a state-created relationship 
as is foster placement, it "is recognized as the legal equivalent of 
biological parenthood."177 In moving from foster care to adoption, 
the change in the parties' legally sanctioned expectations regarding 
the permanency of the relationship fundamentally alters the nature 
of their interest in the relationship, enough to raise it to the level of a 
constitutionally protected parent-child liberty interest. This is true 
regardless of the strength ( or "weight") of the psychological ties in 
the relationship, despite the state's obvious but unenforceable hope 
for the development of nurturing ties. 
This analysis of the nature of an interest or a relationship so sig-
nificant that it warrants extraordinary constitutional protection is 
one of the Court's most important contributions to an understanding 
of the constitutional test that puts marriage, kinship, and adoption in 
a different category from other relationships. 178 The relative perma-
nence of relationships arising from marriage, kinship, or adoption 
creates the 'Justifiable expectation . . . that their relationship will 
continue indefinitely,"179 which gives such relationships a unique na-
ture in terms of both human and legal expectations.180 
173. 431 U.S. at 841 (emphasis in original) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 570-71 (1972)). 
174. 431 U.S. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
175. 431 U.S. at 824 (emphasis in original) (quoting A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE 
SERVICES 355 (1967)). 
176. 431 U.S. at 825 (emphasis in original) (quoting A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE 
SERVICES 355 (1967)). 
177. 431 U.S. at 844 n.51. 
178. See Part III infra. 
179. 431 U.S. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
180. Of course, even using permanency as the variable, there is among people living to-
gether an obviously wide spectrum of relationships, ranging from child-parent ties on one 
extreme to student roommates on the other. Today's divorce rates make clear that marriage is 
not likely to be as permanent as a child-parent relationship, especially since the child-parent 
tie usually survives divorce. Yet, as the Court recognized in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
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Even though "psychological support and involvement" is among 
the most important elements to be hoped for in a family relationship, 
its subjective nature renders it the least susceptible of empirical ver-
ifi.cation and, therefore, the least satisfactory element for use by a 
court (or a society) in establishing meaningful standards. 181 Parties 
to a relationship could never know what expectations, including psy-
chological ones, are reasonable in a relationship that is intimate but 
otherwise undefined. Thus, for purposes of legal classification, it 
makes sense for the Court to rely on expectations of permanence in 
evaluating the "nature" of a relationship. 
Those who see the search for a psychological bond as the key 
element in OFFER misunderstand the case. 182 More accurately, OF-
FER asked whether an impermanent relationship created by the 
state for explicit child care purposes should establish a sufficient 
"liberty" interest to warrant a due process hearing once the relation-
ship has existed for one year. The Court made no attempt to prove 
the existence in each foster family of a psychological bond as a pre-
condition of recognizing the constitutional interest. The Goldstein-
Freud-Solnit "psychological parent" theory is similarly misunder-
stood when it is thought to "rejec[t] biology as the basis of the par-
ent-child relationship." 183 Those writers have clearly limited their 
attention to considerations relating to the psychological relationship 
between a child and an adult only when custody is already at issue 
because natural parent-child ties have already been disrupted. Their 
first choice would also favor child-parent ties established by birth or 
adoption, because "it is only through continuous nurture of the child 
within the privacy of the family" that primary psychological ties can 
be established.184 Therefore, "[s]o long as a child is a member of a 
functioning family, his paramount interest lies in the preservation of 
his family." 185 With foster care, we are dealing again with "second 
choice" policy factors. 
(1978), see text at notes 149-51 supra, the very nature of marriage justifies an expectation of 
greater permanence and more serious commitments than would be reasonably inferable from 
relationships between unmarried persons. This locates marriage toward the permanent end of 
the spectrum. Foster care relationships are somewhere in the middle, since state regulations 
make them less permanent than adoption but more permanent than a group of student room-
mates by virtue of the custodial obligations of foster parents, which continue until altered by 
the state. 
181. See Part ID supra. 
182. See note 169 supra and accompanying texL 
183. See note 172 supra. 
184. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
11 (1979). 
185. Id at 5. 
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A careful review of Justice Brennan's choice of language also 
supports, rather than weakens, the place of marriage, kinship, and 
adoption in legally defining the family. When Justice Brennan wrote 
that biology is not the only basis for a family, his example was mar-
riage.186 When he wrote that loving child-adult relationships exist 
without a blood tie, his example was adQption. 187 When he wrote 
that parental rights may extend beyond natural parents, his exam-
ples were the extended kinship family and legal guardians. 188 When 
he wrote that the legal status of a family is not controlling, his exam-
ple was the kinship tie between the unwed parent and his or her 
child. 189 The Brennan opinion also described marriage as "[t]he ba-
sic foundation of the family in our society." 190 
Marriage, by its legal nature, is to the adult male-female relation-
ship what adoption is to the child-parent relationship. Both create a 
form of kinship. Both have in common the element of state-sanc-
tioned permanence. The relationships in both cases may be legally 
changed by unforeseen contingencies, but the exalted level of consti-
tutional protection given to each relationship arises directly from the 
presumption engaged in both by the parties and the state that there is 
both a "right" and an "expectancy" in "the continuity of the rela-
tionship." For this reason, "informal marriage" is a contradiction in 
terms. A relationship between unmarried adults may be character-
ized by the same deep emotional involvement that may arise in cer-
tain foster care relationships. But in both cases, until there is a 
quality of permanence, there is neither a marriage nor a family. A 
permanent quality can exist in a biological child-parent relationship 
outside marriage, both because of legal sanctions and because of the 
inherently permanent character of biological kinship - even for the 
nonvisiting divorced father. This permanence gives rise to constitu-
tional protection of these relationships. There is, however, no bio-
logical equivalent to marriage; that may be one reason why the 
Court has never given constitutional protection to a relationship be-
tween unmarried adults. Absent a verifiable basis for presuming 
permanent commitments, neither the parties involved nor the state 
can reasonably assume enough about the nature of the relationship 
to warrant the personal investment or the full-blown legal protection 
necessary to sustain family relationships. 
186. 431 U.S. at 843. 
187. 431 U.S. at 844 & n.51. 
188. 431 U.S. at 843 n.49. 
189. 431 U.S. at 845 n.53. 
190. 431 U.S. at 843. 
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Foster care has been around a long time. OFFER is a foster care 
policy case, not a case suggesting a new definition for the family. By 
noting that "a foster family . . . has its source in state law and con-
tractual arrangements," 191 the Court correctly put the nature of the 
foster relationship where it belongs - as a matter of state policy.192 
D. The Right To Marry Cases 
In marriage there is a profound overlapping of individual and 
societal interests of the most significant character. Society's interest 
in marriage appeared so obvious that Justice Holmes considered 
"some form of permanent association between the sexes" to be one 
of the rudimentary characteristics of civilization.193 Lord Patrick 
Devlin considered the social interest so universal that "from time 
immemorial ... in every society" marriage has been the subject of 
social regulation. 194 In one of its most recent opinions developing a 
constitutional "right to marry," the Supreme Court echoed these 
sentiments: 
[M]arriage involves interests of basic importance in our society .... It 
is not surprising, then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many 
aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial imprimatur, indi-
191. 431 U.S. at 845. 
192. In foster care, the state as parens patriae is acting as a parent for a child whose family 
ties have been - temporarily, it is hoped - disrupted. In that role, the state has created and 
defined the nature of the foster parents' interest; without this action by the state, the foster 
parents in the case would have had no basis at all for their claim. The claim that a foster child 
- as distinguished from the foster parents - may deserve procedural due process protection 
before removal from a foster home is another issue, and was probably the basis for the hope 
among the foster parents group that constitutional recognition of the children's interest would 
force a change in foster care policies. The district court in OFFER decided on the basis of the 
children's rights, Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER) v. 
Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), but the Supreme Court did not address the 
case in those terms. The Court did briefly mention the district court's theory, but rejected it on 
the ground that a foster child's removal, even if a "grievous loss," does not give rise to a 
protectable due process interest. 431 U.S. at 840-41. 
The objective of those challenging the New York law was not to establish "psychological 
parenthood" as some kind of general alternative to biological parenthood; rather, their objec-
tive was to force a change in the prevailing assumptions governing foster care policies by 
stressing the importance of close emotional involvement in foster relationships lasting more 
than a year. Whether a state would wish to change its policy in that way is an important issue, 
but it is a child welfare policy problem, not a constitutionally loaded parents' rights issue. 
Even if the Court were to have found a "liberty" interest in the foster parents' role, that inter-
est could only have been a procedural one. Foster parents have no true parental rights, not 
because the state has no authority to establish them (which it does constantly in adoption 
cases), but because the natural parents' permanent rights have not yet been terminated, as they 
are prior to an adoption. 
193. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). 
194. "Whether the union should be monogamous or polygamous, whether it should be 
dissoluble or not, and what obligations the spouses should undertake towards each other are 
not questions which any society has ever left to individuals to settle for themselves." P. DEV-
LIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 61 (1965). 
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viduals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for ex-
ample, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens 
may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state approval. 195 
Established jurisprudence thus clearly recognizes the social - and 
legal - importance of marriage. 
Despite such assumptions about society's interests, the individual 
liberty interest in marriage has emerged most forcefully in recent 
years. Building on what Griswold v. Connecticut 196 established about 
the constitutional sanctity of marriage, 197 Loving v. Virginia 198 struck 
down a state law forbidding interracial marriages. Loving was de-
cided primarily on equal protection grounds in view of the classifica-
tion based on race, but added the Court's first reference to "the 
freedom to marry" as a due process interest. 199 Anticipating the 
powerful legal implications of categorizing marriage as a fundamen-
tal civil right, one family scholar observed that Loving could well 
mean that "the functions of the family for the larger society and the 
need for marital restrictions are irrelevant. . . . It follows that what 
is done or how things are done in any particular family are matters 
of private and not public - or legal - concem."200 The next mar-
riage case, Boddie v. Connecticut,201 acknowledged the state's interest 
in regulating both marriage and divorce, but also established a pro-
cedural right of access to the divorce courts as a basic concomitant of 
the freedom to marry: one cannot legally marry B until becoming 
divorced from A. Boddie thus planted the seeds of a possible consti-
tutional right to a divorce.202 
195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (citations omitted). Justice Black 
added: 
It is not by accident that marriage and divorce have always been considered to be under 
state control. The institution of marriage is of peculiar importance to the people of the 
States. It is within the States that they live and vote and rear their children . . . . The 
States provide for the stability of their social order, for the good morals of all their citi-
zens, and for the needs of children from broken homes. The States, therefore, have partic-
ular interests in the kinds oflaws regulating their citizens when they enter into, mamtain, 
and dissolve marriages. 
401 U.S. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting). 
196. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
197. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions. 
381 U.S. at 486. 
198. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
199. 388 U.S. at 12 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
200. B. FARBER, supra note 83, at 37. 
201. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
202. The right to a divorce is arguably inferable from the right to marry, even though the 
Court ruled in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), using the rational basis test, that a dura-
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The constitutional freedom to marry as a substantive fundamen-
tal riglit sprang full blown from the pen of Justice Marshall in 
Zablocki v. Redhail in 1978.203 Zablocki invalidated a state law 
prohibiting the marriage of persons having unpaid child support ob-
ligations. Marshall heavily loaded his opinion with individual lib-
erty language, even though he noted the state's right to impose 
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship . . . ."204 He spoke also 
of the right "to marry and raise" children "in a traditional family 
setting" as a corollary to the right to procreate, since the state con-
trols legal procreation. 
[I]f appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply 
some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wiscon-
sin allows sexual relations legally to take place.I 1 
11 Wisconsin punishes fornication as a criminal offense.205 
This observation concerning the relationship between the right to 
marry and the right to procreate will warrant further inquiry in dis-
cussing the matter of sexual privacy.206 
In attempting to fashion a test for evaluating the acceptability of 
state regulation of marriage, the Marshall opinion offers little guid-
ance. Though he used fundamental rights terminology in an equal 
protection context, which would normally call for the highest scru-
tiny of legislation, he also stated that only those regulations that in-
terfere "directly and substantially with the right to marry"207 would 
be subject to "rigorous scrutiny."208 Whether a compelling state in-
terest test would then apply remained uncertain, though the applica-
tion of Marshall's test to the Zablocki facts suggests a concern only 
with direct and substantial interferences. The potential for confu-
sion in this framing of the constitutional theory caused considerable 
disturbance to Justices Stewart and Powell, who each concurred sep-
tional residency requirement for divorce does not unconstitutionally burden the right to travel. 
See notes 213-14 infra and accompanying text On the other hand, of course, a constitutional 
right to divorce could completely negate society's interest in the preservation of existing mar-
riages. A major point of this discussion of the right to marry cases (indeed an essential point of 
this Article) is that the social interest in marriage is extremely important in the constitutional 
scheme. In Murrillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 378 (1982), 
the Third Circuit displayed skepticism over a fundamental right to divorce, although it as-
sumed "arguendo" that such a right existed. 681 F.2d at 903 & n.9, 904. 
203. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
204. 434 U.S. at 386. 
205. 434 U.S. at 386 & n.11. 
206. See also note 334 infra and accompanying text. 
207. 434 U.S. at 386. 
208. 434 U.S. at 387. 
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arately, and to Justice Rehnquist, who dissented. All three seemed 
concerned that the majority opinion would undermine not only state 
regulation of marriage in a routine sense, but also the "importance of 
the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values essential to 
organized society."209 Some of the confusion created by Zablocki 
can be resolved by comparing it to Cal!fano v. Jobst ,210 decided the 
same term. Marshall seemed to concentrate more on distinguishing 
Zablocki from Jobst than on defining the right to marry.211 
The implications of classifying the right to marry on the extreme 
individual rights end of the spectrum of constitutional protections do 
not bode well for permitting careful analysis of the relationship be-
tween individual and social interests in this most basic of social insti-
tutions - unless, of course, the Court adopts a test that weighs those 
two interests as part of the process of determining whether a "lib-
erty" interest is present in the first place.212 In the Illeantime, 
Zablocki's rationale has already been applauded as providing indi-
vidual protection not only against "a wide range of state laws limit-
ing the right to marry," but also against laws "restricting other 
nonmarital forms of intimate association."213 Taken still further, 
Zablocki can appear to limit the degree of social interest the state 
can express through its regulation not only of entering marriage, but 
also ofleaving it. Under this reasoning, anything a state might do in 
its traditional role of defining the terms of entering and leaving the 
marital status may constitute an infringement on the terms on which 
one is married. Therefore, ultimately, any distinctions between the 
rights of married and unmarried persons - especially in their choice 
of how to associate intimately with other individuals - might be 
impermissible; the freedom to marry arguably implies the freedom 
not to marry.214 
209. 434 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring). 
210. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
211. In Jobst, a unanimous Court had upheld a provision of the Social Security Act which 
terminated the benefits of a disabled dependent child when the child married someone not 
covered by the Act. Although Jobst arguably involved the freedom to marry, the loss of bene• 
fits was held, under a minimal scrutiny test, to be an indirect hardship resulting from rational 
congressional assumptions about the effect of marriage on dependency. This differs from the 
Zablocki statute which totally prevented marriage by an indigent person who was subject to 
outstanding child support obligations. The Jobst statute only forced a choice between social 
security benefits and marriage. In addition, Jobst was simply a classification based on marital 
status, while Zablocki created an impervious obstacle to entering into marriage. This was the 
view of Justice Stevens in Zablocki. 434 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring). Neither case 
involved the kind of serious state regulation of marriage that would call for a thorough analy-
sis of society's interests in maintaining the marital institution. 
212. This Article proposes such a test. See Part III infra. 
213. Karst, supra note 11, at 671. 
214. This is Professor Karst's position. For example: 
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Despite the individualistic overtones of the Zablocki majority, 
the "right to marry" cases do not disturb the hypothesis that consti-
tutional protection of familial liberties is thus far reserved for inter-
ests involving blood, marriage, and adoption. In removing obstacles 
to marriage, the cases arguably advance the social interest in encour-
aging long-term commitments to the formal family. Their method of 
analysis nevertheless gives some cause for concern, primarily be-
cause it runs a serious risk of distorting the Court's historical recog-
nition of both the social and the individual interests in marriage. 
E. The Children's Rights Cases· 
I have discussed elsewhere215 the historical justification for the 
concept of minority status and the recent children's rights movement 
which challenges that justification. A brief update is in order here, 
in part because these cases illustrate the Court's tendency to retreat 
over time from unnecessarily broad generalizations in its early cases 
affecting family relationships. The children's rights cases also reflect 
the Court's response to the current movement of individualistic egal-
itarianism, which would redefine the family as an assortment of iso-
lated individuals rather than persons bound together by the bonds of 
kinship. 
Most of the Court's children's rights cases have dealt with what 
might be termed "protection rights" rather than "choice riglits" for 
minors. Protection rights include the right not to be imprisoned 
without due process, rights to property, and rights to physical protec-
tion. No minimum intellectual or other capacity is necessary to jus-
tify a claim to those rights. The legal doctrines developed for the 
benefit of children throughout the history of American jurispru-
dence, including the juvenile court movement, primarily fit this cate-
gory. For example, In re Gault,216 the Court's first significant 
[E]asing exit from marriage may reduce the import of the act of marriage as an initial 
statement. But once the act of marriage recedes into the past, the freedom to leave gives 
added meaning to the decision to stay.73 
The freedom of nonassociation, it is often noted, is itself an associational freedom. 
73 . • • Should the wife, then, be able simply to walk away from her expressed commit-
ment to her husband? The freedom of intimate association speaks to such questions not 
by offering answers, but by identifying them as questions of moral rather than legal 
obligation. 
Id. at 638 & n.73 (footnote omitted). Karst's discussion of Zablocki, which does acknowledge 
that minimal age and incest restrictions may still be permissible in marriage regulation, applies 
Zahfocki's "substantive values" to unmarried relationships and concludes: "The extension of 
the freedom of intimate association beyond marriage to associations such as a couple's living 
together can be seen in a similar egalitarian light." Id. at 676. 
215. Hafen, supra note 49. 
216. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
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minors' rights case, found the careless procedures of an Arizona ju-
venile court to violate procedural due process not because the Court 
thought juveniles should always be treated as adults; rather, the 
Court held that minority status alone does not justify disregarding 
due process safeguards. Later cases made it clear that some of the 
characteristics of adult criminal trials are not suitable to the special 
protective needs of juveniles.217 
"Choice rights," on the other hand, represent the legal authority 
to make affirmative binding decisions oflasting consequence - mar-
rying, contracting, exercising religious preferences, or seeking educa-
tion. The right to vote, for instance, which may be the most 
fundamental of citizenship choice rights, has always been subject to 
an age limitation. The right to marry prior to statutory age limits is 
another basic choice right denied to minors.218 
The cases recognizing a choice right for minors are essentially 
limited to those dealing with abortion. Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District219 might possibly be regarded as a choice rights case; it did 
acknowledge that public school students had enough of a first 
amendment right to wear armbands in protest against the govern-
ment's Vietnam policy. However, both the childrearing and the free 
speech rights of the Tinker parents were arguably implicated in the 
case. Also, the Court had decided the year before Tinker that minors 
did not have first amendment rights equal to adults under obscenity 
laws.220 
The teenage contraception case, Carey v. Population Services Jn-
ternational,221 granted minors the right to choose to prevent concep-
tion in the name of the right of privacy, which had been established 
as a minor's right the previous term in an abortion case.222 However, 
the Court's primary concern in Carey was not really with granting 
teenagers a true "right of procreation;" rather, the justices simply did 
not believe that denying access to contraceptives would reduce the 
incidence of premarital sexual activity. Their real fear was that de-
217. E.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right to jury trial would not aid 
juvenile court's factfinding function and might impair need for flexibility and confidentiality). 
218. The right to marry before the age of majority was distinguished from the right to 
obtain an abortion before majority in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) 
(plurality opinion). 
219. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
220. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ("I think a State may permissibly deter-
mine that ... a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is 
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in the judgment)). 
221. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
222. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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nial of access to contraceptives would seriously aggravate the 
problems of "unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease."223 They 
sought to protect minors against such damaging risks.224 The ab-
sence of any attention in Carey to the issue of maturity, which has 
become a major factor in determining which pregnant minors are 
entitled to make their own choice about having an abortion,225 con-
firms the interpretation of Carey as a protection rights case. 
An important relationship exists between the protection-choice 
distinction and the concept of minority status. The denial of choice 
rights during minority is a form of protection against a minor's own 
immaturity and vulnerability to exploitation by those having no re-
sponsibility for the child's welfare. The conferring of the full range 
of choice rights - essentially, adult legal status - requires a dissolu-
tion of the protection rights of childhood. One cannot have the free-
dom to live where and as one chooses and still demand parental 
support; one may not deliberately enter into contracts and yet insist 
that they be voidable. The lifelong effects of binding, childish 
choices can cause permanent damage far more detrimental than the 
temporary limitations on personal freedom inherent in minority sta-
tus. To be protected against that risk requires a restriction on the 
range of choice rights. 
In some of its early cases, the Court spoke in language broad 
enough to create the impression that all of the rights of minors 
should be regarded as "coextensive with those of adults,"226 and that 
"children are autonomous individuals, entitled to the same rights 
and privileges before the law as adults."227 When the Court ren-
dered its first opinion involving a confrontation between the alleged 
constitutional rights of parents and the constitutional rights of their 
minor child, Justice Blackmun tossed off the Court's first, confusing 
mention of a "right of privacy" for minors as if it deserved no com-
223. 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
224. Carey is a classic case of deregulation - in this instance given constitutional recog-
nition - to avoid harming kids in the name of helping them .... 
. . . . The sexually active 15-year-old is given access to birth control not out of recog-
nition of his or her mature judgment. Indeed, the fess equipped a particular individual is 
for the burdens of parenthood, the stronger the argument against denying access to con-
traception when we cannot deny access to sex .... The civil right being vindicated is the 
right not to be gratuitously harmed. 
F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 62-63 (1982). 
225. See notes 235-39 i'!fra. 
226. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (1975). 
227. Brief for State Respondent at 23, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182,532 P.2d 278 (1975), 
discussed in Hafen, supra note 49, at 609. 
514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:463 
ment, let alone an explanation. 228 
In the next child's rights vs. parents' rights case, however, Justice 
Powell wrote the most comprehensive statement the Court has yet 
provided on the difference between the constitutional status of mi-
nors and adults. InBellottiv. Baird (Bellotti Il},229 Powell stated that 
"the peculiar vulnerability of children[,] their inability to make criti-
cal decisions in an informed, mature manner[,] and the importance 
of the parental role in child rearing" together justified "the conclu-
sion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with 
those of adults . . . ."230 Powell's opinion also shed some light on 
the question whether the children's rights cases should be read as 
assimilating children into the tradition of individual liberty, thereby 
removing them from the family tradition which historically placed 
parents between children and the state:231 
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not 
inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former 
is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on 
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be impor-
tant to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make 
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.232 
This analysis, together with the limited range of choice rights con-
ferred in the Court's cases to date, supports traditional assumptions 
about the child-parent relationship. Supervision of the choice rights 
of minors lies at the very heart of the custodial rights of parenthood, 
and forms the rationale for minority status. Without that supervi-
sory role, serious doubt would have been cast on the primary role of 
value transmission ascribed by our culture to parents. The Court has 
also buttressed the parental role in a series of parents' rights cases 
that are summarized elsewhere.233 
Giving constitutional protection to the right of minors to obtain 
abortions without parental consent has become the major exception 
to the Court's overall posture toward granting choice rights to mi-
nors. The Court's willingness to make this exception seems attribu-
228. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) ("Any independent interest 
the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty 
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."). 
229. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
230. 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion). 
231. The individual tradition and the family tradition are compared in Hafen, supra note 
49. 
232. 443 U.S. at 638-39. 
233. Hafen, supra note 49, at 613-29; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). For a 
helpful perspective on the value of adapting legal reasoning to the peculiar needs of adoles-
cents, including their need for parental guidance, see generally F. ZIMRING, Sllpra note 224. 
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table to two factors. First, Justice Powell described the abortion 
decision for a plurality·of the Court in Bellotti II as being in a class 
by itself. He never once used the term "right of privacy," preferring 
instead the very specific "constitutional right to seek an abortion." 
Abortion differs "in important ways from other decisions that may 
be made during minority."234 Abortions for minors are made 
unique primarily because the pregnant minor is herself a prospective 
parent, which pits her own inchoate parental right against the paren-
tal rights of her parents. If she completes her pregnancy, she will 
then be a mother having full responsibility for her child. Her par-
ents will legally have nothing to say about her decision to place the 
child for adoption or to keep it. If she were carrying a tumor rather 
than a child, well established common law rules - with or without a 
parental consent statute - would require parental consent as a con:. 
dition of surgery. The decision to abort a child is fundamentally 
different. Moreover, forcing the creation of an unwanted family un-
dermines the reasons we value family ties in the first instance. Thus, 
the minors' abortion cases actually contribute toward an interpreta-
tion of either due process "liberty" or "privacy" that is narrowly lim-
ited to childrearing decisions. 
Second, the court has also been influenced by its development of 
a "mature minor" rule in the abortion context, which restricts the 
class of minors who may make an unrestricted choice about abortion 
to those found "mature" by a judge. Reliance on individualized de-
terminations of maturity departs from an entire system of age-based 
classifications in the laws relating to minors.235 The Court may have 
been influenced by the now discredited doctrine of irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, 236 or it may have taken with unwarranted seriousness the 
erroneous claim of one of the attorneys in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 
I) 237 that there is a recognized "mature minor" exception to the 
common law doctrine requiring parental consent as a condition to 
medical treatment ofminors.238 Whatever the Court's reasoning, de-
234. 443 U.S. at 642. 
235. In "all state legislation seeking to protect minors from the consequences of decisions 
they are not yet prepared to make . . . chronological age has been the basis for imposition of a 
restraint on the minor's freedom of choice even though it is perfectly obvious that such a 
yardstick is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in particular cases." Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
236. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441 (1973); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970 (10th ed. 1980). 
237. 428 U.S. 132, 144 (1976). 
238. The sources cited in the brief of the Massachusetts Attorney General discuss circum-
stances permitting a court to waive the normal requirement of parental consent to medical 
treatment, but the circumstances are limited to an "emergency" exception, a parental conflict 
of interest exception, and parental unwillingness to consent when therapeutic abortion is nee-
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terminations of maturity are hopelessly subjective, which means that 
a judge - rather than a minor or her parents - is the real deci-
sionmaker. This is especially true under Justice Powell's approach, 
which would have a judge first determine maturity, then, if the mi-
nor is deemed immature, decide if the abortion serves her best 
interests. 
The court's inclination toward subjective, case-by-case determi-
nations has also shown up in the unwed fathers cases and the illegiti-
macy cases, where Justice Powell has again taken the lead. He has 
seemed unusually preoccupied with wanting the Court to draw un-
manageable numbers of minute factual distinctions. Giving him, 
and the Court, the benefit of the doubt, their determination to en-
courage individualized determinations must stem from a desire to be 
supremely fair - and perhaps from a desire to seek for compromise 
grounds in difficult cases. The family law context is a tantalizingly 
inviting scene for a judge bent on individualized assessments of fair-
ness, for no matter whether the rules are described in constitutional 
or other terms, the rules will often have less to say about the outcome 
than the weighing of each factual circumstance. What such a legal 
environment calls for, of course, is not a system of laws, but a king 
- or a weatherbeaten domestic relations judge.239 
The Court has generally left the concept of minority status -
and even the notion of state support for parental authority - in its 
traditional place, except, for unique reasons, in the aJ:>ortion cases. 
Nonetheless, some, including the chairman of the ABA's Section on 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities, would "liberate" children 
from the ''captivity" of the family tradition. He has proposed "that 
we consider the logical and ultimate step - that all legal distinctions 
essary. See Baron, Botsford & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor J)onors in 
Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159, 166 (1975); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age 
of Con.s;ent, 11 OsGOODE HALL LJ. 115, 116, 121-22 (1973); see also Ballard v. Anderson, 4 
Cal. 3d 873,484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. I (1971). In fact, there is no "mature minor rule" in 
common law cases. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 59 comment a, at 111 (1934), advanced 
the idea of a subjective standard of competence in considering the legal sufficiency of consent 
to intentional invasions of personal interest. The widespread rejection of this approach led to 
the adoption of an objective age limit standard in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 
§§ 59, 892A(2) comment b (1977). On the general subject of exceptions to parental consent 
requirements, see R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 350-79 (1978), which summarizes 
other statutory exceptions where parental consent is not required for treatment of such 
problems as venereal disease and drug abuse. The interest of the state in facilitating needed 
care in these exceptional cases is obviously undermined when minors are deterred from ob• 
taining treatment by fear of disclosure to parents when seeking consent to treatment. This 
interest may also be involved when therapeutic abortions are necessary, but not in other 
abortions. 
239. On the general issue of marriage and minority status as sources of objective jurispru• 
dence, see Part I D supra. 
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between children and adults be abolished."240 Others have issued 
similar calls, perhaps drawing support from reading more than is 
warranted into the Court's children's rights cases.241 The Court's de-
cisions, however, fall a good deal short of supporting such a disman-
tling of our assumptions about the purposes of family life and 
minority status. The Court is willing to employ constitutional doc-
trines to extend protection to minors for the reasons the law has al-
ways given them special protection - indeed, discriminating in their 
favor. Beyond that, the choice rights cases have developed in a lim-
ited way that recognizes some liberty interests peculiarly related to 
parenthood and childbearing, but not a general right of autonomy 
for minors. 
F. The Broad Right of Privacy - The Intimate Association and 
Free Expression Cases 
This line of cases originally hinted that a wide-ranging right of 
personal privacy might emerge under the heading of the first amend-
ment's interest in association and expression. As the Court has re-
sponded to a variety of claims over the years, however, no such right 
has developed. 
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,242 the Court invali-
dated a state law regulating the use of contraceptives by married 
couples. Griswold thus became a leading case both in developing a 
constitutional right to marry and in developing constitutional protec-
tion for decisions related to childbearing. In addition, Justice Doug-
las seized the Griswold opportunity to introduce his unique theory of 
privacy, grounded not in the text of the Constitution, but in the 
"penumbras" emanating from a variety of explicitly guaranteed 
rights. Douglas' biographer described his Griswold opinion as "one 
of the most important constitutional decisions of the twentieth cen-
tury," because the right of privacy identifies "the most critical consti-
tutional battleground for human dignity in the modem age."243 
Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade 244 revealed the breadth 
of his view of privacy. In Roe, he wrote with sweeping strokes of 
240. Manahan, Editorial: Children's Lib, 3 A.B.A. Sec. on lndiv. Rts. & Resps. (Spring 
1976). 
241. Some of this literature is summarized in Hafen, supra note 49, at 631~32. 
242. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
243. J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY 348-49 (1980). Douglas began developing his view 
of privacy as early as 1952. "His beliefin the right to be let alone, nowhere expressly guaran-
teed in the Constitution, became . . . the overriding theme of Douglas's libertarian philosophy 
and represented his most significant contribution to constitutional law." Id. at 346. 
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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"the Blessings of Liberty," which included "autonomous control 
over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, 
tastes, and personality," as absolute first amendment rights.245 The 
philosophical premises for this view are very simple - every person 
has a capacity for autonomy and the right to equal concern and re-
spect in pursuit of his autonomy.246 Within a constitutional frame-
work, these premises lead to the "most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men": the right to be let alone.247 
The right of privacy has been a confusing, but lively, subject of de-
bate since the day it was born in 1965.248 Whether it has developed 
since then as a dwarf, totally changed its form, or died of malnutri-
tion remains unclear, though the number of post-Griswold cases does 
allow a better perspective now than was possible a few years ago. 
In Stanley v. Georgia,249 the Court overturned a criminal convic-
tion for possession of obscene films on the ground that the possession 
of admittedly obscene material in one's own home is protected by 
the first amendment, with supporting protection from Griswold's 
right of privacy. The Stanley Court's rejection of state attempts to 
"control the moral content of a person's thoughts"250 seemed to 
question the basis for any obscenity and other morals legislation af-
fecting only consenting adults. However, later cases narrowed Stan-
ley by strictly limiting the right to acquire obscene materials outside 
the home.251 Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton ,252 which refused to pro-
tect a theatre owner who showed obscene movies to consenting 
adults, also substantially curtailed Stanley's general freedom of ex-
pression overtones. 253 
245. 410 U.S. at 210-22 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
246. See Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 8, 34 n.160 (1980). 
247. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study In 
Human Rights and the lJnwrillen Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 974 (1979). The "right to 
be let alone" comes from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928), a fourth amendment search and seizure case. See also R. Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, in Is LAW DEAD? 168 (E. Rostow ed. 1971). 
248. For an analysis of the Griswold opinions, see Note, supra note 32, at 673-86. 
249. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
250. 394 U.S. at 565. 
251. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). 
252. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
253. "If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a 
'penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary 
to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home,' which was hardly more than 
a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" 413 U.S. at 66. Even the privacy of "the 
home" had previously been questioned in a fourth amendment context, since that amendment 
"protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). In addition, 
Justice Harlan made this telling distinction between "home" and "family": "Certainly the 
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Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Paris strongly repudi-
ated the premise from which much of the reasoning about individual 
autonomy254 and free expression of lifestyle preferences proceeds: 
namely, John Stuart Mill's libertarian principle that "the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community . . . is to prevent harm to others."255 Mill's 
position would require proof of actual harm before restrictions on 
personal autonomy would be allowed. But the Court, responding to 
the theatre owner's argument that "there are no specific data which 
conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene material ad-
versely affects men or women or their society,"256 vigorously upheld 
the right of legislatures to act on "various unprovable assump-
tions"257 in concluding that public exhibition of obscenity "has a ten-
dency to injure the community as a whole."258 In other words, in 
regulating obscenity (and in other morals legislation), the state may 
presume the existence of harm in the absence of verifiable evidence. 
This view is very similar to the position taken by Lord Devlin in the 
famous debates arising over homosexuality in England.259 
The question of where to place the burden of proof is the key 
legal issue in cases involving regulations such as those that deal with 
obscenity and sexual relations between consenting adults, because 
unequivocal proof of either the presence or absence of individual or 
social harm is so difficult to adduce.260 In the Paris case, as in its 
sexual privacy cases,261 the Supreme Court left that burden on those 
challenging traditional norms. 
The cases dealing with contraceptives for single persons and 
safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property rights. The 
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
254. Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris toyed with the idea of advancing Stanley, along 
with Griswold, as authority for the proposition that obscenity should be available to consenting 
adults on the basis of a general individual autonomy principle. He rejected this approach in 
favor of the "narrower basis" that obscenity is incapable of definition ''with sufficient clarity 
to withstand attack on vagueness grounds." 413 U.S. 49, 85-86 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
255. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (London 1859), reprinted in J. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 8 (R. Mccallum ed. 1946). "[S]urely 
the United States Constitution no more enacts On Liberty than it enacts Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
Social Statics." Perry, Substantive JJue Process Revisited· Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent 
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 434 (1976). 
256. 413 U.S. at 60. 
257. 413 U.S. at 61. 
258. 413 U.S. at 69. 
259. See generally Reynolds, The Enforcement of Morals and the Rule of the Law, 11 GA. L. 
REV. 1325, 1329 (1977). 
260. See notes 418-22 infra and accompanying text. 
261. For a more detailed discussion of the sexual privacy cases, see Part II H i,!fra. 
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abortions are treated separately,262 but deserve some mention here; 
these cases use the term "right of privacy," but restrict its meaning to 
decisions regarding childbearing. Roe v. Wade,263 for example, lo-
cated the privacy right within the meaning of due process "liberty," 
which implicitly rejected the broad Douglas view in favor of Justice 
Harlan's narrower approach to Griswold.264 Moreover, the Roe ma-
jority directly repudiated an "unlimited right" of privacy that would 
allow one "to do with one's body as one pleases."265 
The Court has consistently refused in recent cases to accept 
broadly based lifestyle and autonomy arguments, confirming Justice 
Blackmun's observation in Roe that, "The Court has refused to rec-
ognize an unlimited right of this kind .... "266 The Court has twice 
upheld state sodomy statutes against vagueness challenges.267 In 
1976, the Court summarily affirmed a federal district court's ruling 
that upheld the constitutionality of a state sodomy statute as it ap-
plied to consenting adult male homosexuals.268 Two years later, the 
Court declined to review another district court decision allowing the 
discharge of two employees of a public library for "living together in 
a state of 'open adultery.' "269 In these two summary actions, the 
Court acted despite vocal dissents. Justice Marshall's dissent in both 
cases echoed Justice Douglas' earlier choice-of-lifestyle theme as a 
matter of both personal privacy and intimate association. 
Cases in other contexts reflect the same pattern. One case re-
jected the argument that the "liberty" interest of the privacy cases 
protected a policeman's right to challenge a local hair length regula-
tion.270 Another case rejected the federal civil rights claim of a 
newspaper photographer whose name and photograph were in-
cluded in a police flyer listing active shoplifters.271 The photogra-
pher argued that his interest in reputation was protected by his right 
262. See Part II G infra. 
263. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
264. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), That may be one 
reason Justice Douglas felt obliged to enter the concurring opinion in Roe that contained his 
wide-ranging view of privacy. · 
265. 410 U.S. at 154. 
266. 410 U.S. at 154. 
267. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). In Rose, 
the Court indicated that no fundamental right was involved in the case. 423 U.S. at 50 n.3, 
268. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), qjfg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 
(E.D. Va. 1975). 
269. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978), denying cert. lo 578 F.2d 
1374 (3d Cir. 1978). 
270. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
271. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
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to privacy and liberty. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion ex-
pressed concern about those who want to read the fourteenth amend-
ment as "a font of tort law to be superimposed" on existing legal 
remedies.272 In Whalen v. Roe,273 a group of patients and physicians 
unsuccessfully invoked the privacy right in attacking a state law cre-
ating a computer file listing the names and addresses of patients who 
obtained certain prescription drugs. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Stevens placed the Court's prior privacy cases into three cate-
gories: (1) freedom from government surveillance as protected by 
the fourth amendment; (2) the interest in avoiding public disclosure 
of personal matters; and (3) the interest in making independent per-
sonal decisions in matters relating to marriage, procreation, and 
childrea~g.274 He also confirmed that the Court in Roe, "after 
carefully reviewing" the prior privacy cases, had determined to rec-
ognize the right of privacy as part of due process liberty rather than 
as "an independent source of constitutional protection" in the 
"shadows" or "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights.275 The thrust of 
this language and the recent cases is that no general right of privacy 
exists, and such privacy interests as do exist must meet the standards 
for inclusion within the meaning of due process liberty. The omis-
sion of any reference to an interest in sexual or lifestyle preferences 
in these categories was both conspicuous and significant. The Court 
has had numerous opportunities by now to give constitutional pro-
tection to that interest, but has refused to do so. 
In the related area of associational privacy, the Court has fol-
lowed a similar pattern of appearing to start on a broad base, then 
narrowing its position over time. In United States Department of Ag-
riculture v. Moreno,276 the Court struck down an amendment to the 
federal food stamp program that excluded from the program's cover-
age households containing any person who was unrelated to another 
household member. The plaintiffs in the case were three different 
indigent households, each of which consisted of a family plus one 
unrelated individual who lived with the family for various common- -
place reasons. The Court saw no rational connection between the 
household exclusion provision and the law's purpose in alleviating 
hunger among the poverty class. Justice Douglas, concurring, 
thought the case implicated associational rights protected by the first 
272. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
273. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
274. 429 U.S. at 599-90 & nn.24-26. 
275. 429 U.S. at 598 n.23. 
276. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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amendment.277 The Court's use of the rational basis test and the 
nature of the households involved278 made it doubtful that Moreno 
intended to extend the concept of familial privacy to associations of 
unrelated persons. In fact, the statute interfered with family privacy, 
because of its effect on families who merely invited another single 
person to share their home. Moreno also reflected an underlying de-
sire to aid economically disadvantaged classes - a concern that 
could well have motivated the Court in such other cases as Roe, Bod-
die v. Connecticut,279 and Zablocki v. Redhail.280 
A year later, Justice Douglas had nothing to say about associa-
tional rights in writing the majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas. 281 In Belle Terre, six college students unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the definition of "family" in a single-family dwelling ordi-
nance. Justice Brennan later described the Belle Terre plaintiffs as 
"a mere collection of unrelated individuals" whose ties did not rise 
to the level of the temporary relationships in a foster family.282 In 
dissent, Justice Marshall thought the ordinance violated the rights of 
associational freedom and privacy.283 Some factual distinctions 
between Moreno and Belle Terre may explain the difference in out-
come between the two cases,284 but more important than the differ-
ences may be what the cases have in common: neither was 
considered by the Court as an associational freedom or right of pri-
277. 413 U.S. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
278. None of the households involved intimate relationships. One of the unrelated persons 
was a "20-year-old girl" taken in by a couple and their three children because they "felt she 
had emotional problems." 413 U.S. at 532. Another involved a mother sharing an apartment 
with another woman in order to live in a more expensive area of town near a special school for 
her deaf daughter. 413 U.S. at 532. A third case involved an older diabetic woman who lived 
with a mother and three children. The mother helped care for the woman and shared expenses 
with her. 413 U.S. at 531. 
279. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
280. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
281. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
282. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977). 
283. "The choice of household companions ... involves deeply personal considerations as 
to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within die home." 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, 
J ., dissenting). 
284. Justice Douglas distinguished the cases by saying that in Moreno, "a household con-
taining anyone unrelated to the rest was denied food stamps." 416 U.S. at 8 n.6. That is a less 
than comprehensive distinction, except as it reflects on the seriousness of the economic loss, 
The economic factor is also noted in the Moreno Court's comment that the food stamp law 
excluded "only those . . . so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter 
their living arrangements so as to retain eligibility." 413 U.S. at 538 (Douglas, J,, concurring) 
(emphasis in original). Presumably, the students in Belle Terre would have found it easier to 
relocate. Further, the inherently transient nature of the Belle Terre students may have been a 
factor, as theirs was not an "enduring relationship," L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 990 n.30, or 
perhaps not really a "home." 
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vacy case justifying heightened scrutiny of the legislation. Some of 
the commentary about Belle Terre has nevertheless assumed the 
presence of significant associational interests.285 
The Court's most recent household zoning case, Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland,286 drew a very sharp distinction between unrelated 
persons and persons related by kinship. In Moore, the Court invali-
dated a single-family dwelling ordinance drawn in a way that ex-
cluded from its definition of "family" a household consisting of a 
grandmother, her son, his son, and another grandson. In the most 
explicit recognition of substantive due process the Court has under-
taken in its modem cases, Justice Powell's plurality opinion relied on 
a "tradition" test to find that due process liberty protects extended 
family ties.287 Justice Powell ignored doctrines concerning intimate 
association and individual expression protected by the first amend-
ment or the "penumbras" of other explicit guarantees. Instead, he 
traced the chain of title giving preferred recognition to family rela-
tionships back to Meyer v. Nebraska 288 and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters .289 These were the earliest cases establishing the constitutional 
right of parents to direct the education of their children. Because of 
this long lineage in a tradition of preference for family values, Pow-
ell described the place of family relationships in the world of sub-
stantive due process as simply outlasting the post-Lochner decline in 
cases involving economic interests.290 This perspective places Gris-
wold in the chronological middle of an established substantive due 
process tradition based on the liberty interest inherent in marriage 
and kinship, rather than seeing Griswold as the beginning of a stir-
ring new privacy philosophy laden with first amendment 
overtones. 291 
The dissenters in Moore further underscored the absence of a 
constitutional principle that would justify protection for intimate as-
sociations without family ties. Justice Stewart wrote that the first 
amendment's freedom of association was designed to protect such 
"ideological freedom" as "the promotion of speech, assembly, the 
press, or religion." It was never intended to protect associations 
based on "no interest other than the gratification, convenience, and 
285. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 974-90. 
286. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
287. 431 U.S. at 504 (plurality opinion). 
288. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
289. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
290. 431 U.S. at 502-03. 
291. 431 U.S. at 503 n.11. 
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economy of sharing the same residence."292 Stewart found Mrs. 
Moore "closer to the constitutional mark" in seeking protection 
within the realm of family life, but disagreed with the plurality that 
the interest in sharing the same home with blood relatives was a sig-
nifi.cant enough family interest to invoke the guarantees given to de-
cisions about childrearing.293 
The absence of decisions developing the broad overtones of the 
Douglas right of privacy, whether in freedom of association, expres-
sion, or personal autonomy, makes it clear that contemporary at-
tempts to link unconventional lifestyle preferences and associations 
to the family liberty cases are misplaced. Justice Marshall's lonely 
dissents in the recent cases, which seek to include a range of self-
expression and associational interests outside the family circle, have 
remained both lonely and dissenting because his views require doc-
trinal support beyond traditional due process liberty and such sup-
port has simply not developed. 
Laurence Tribe is disturbed that the Court has not recognized 
associational freedoms among unrelated persons.294 He foresees a 
coming liberation by the State of "the child - and the adult - from 
the shackles of such intermediate groups as family." Being "liber-
ated from domination by those closest to them" raises an urgent 
need for legal recognition of alternative relationships that "meet the 
human need for closeness, trust, and love" in the midst of "cultural 
disintegration and social transformation."295 Others express similar 
concerns. 296 Their disappointment seems to stem primarily from 
their conviction that a broadly based right of individual autonomy is 
the core value of the Constitution, a value which the Court has failed 
to accept, let alone build upon. Still they write, hopefully, as if con-
stitutional principles already in place make inevitable the ultimate 
movement of autonomy to the center of the constitutional stage. 
There are serious problems inherent in making autonomy the 
292. 431 U.S. at 535-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
293. 431 U.S. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart's view was shared by Justice 
Rehnquist and, in a separate dissent, by Justice White. 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). 
294. L. TRIBE, Sllpra note 91, at 974-80, 987-90. 
295. Id at 988-89. There has indeed been a gradual loosening of family bonds over the 
recent historical period, not because the "State" has consciously sought to "liberate" family 
members from one another, but because of far-reaching cultural and economic developments, 
Through this process "the rise in importance of status and security of an individual's own work 
and government-derived benefits, relative to traditional forms of property and relative to fam-
ily relationships" have acted as "a powerful solvent of the legal bonding that once formed part 
of the cultural reinforcement of [family] relationships .... " M. GLENDON, Sllpra note 77, at 
139. 
296. E.g., Karst, S11pra note I I; Richards, S11pra note 246. 
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core constitutional value, whether in the name of "privacy" or in 
some other way. The Court has sensed these problems, though its 
opinions may not yet have articulated a comprehensive response. 
For one thing, an unenumerated right as expansive as the "Blessings 
of Liberty" in the Preamble to the Constitution297 is so broad that 
nearly any phase of human conduct can logically claim to be within 
its protective scope.298 If the Court had really adopted the Douglas 
view of privacy, the Bill of Rights might well have become redun-
dant. Even advocates of an expanded right of privacy recognize that 
if the right "is to be a viable doctrine, there must be limits to its 
application .... "299 Without understandable limits, privacy sim-. 
ply becomes "the harbinger of another Lochner era."300 Moreover, 
true autonomy as a guiding principle is simply unrealistic about the 
need for law in an organized society. As Justice Holmes put it, 
"pretty much all law consists in forbidding men to do some things 
that they want to do .... "301 
More seriously and perhaps less obviously, the very term "pri-
vacy" as a description for substantive rights is an unfortunate source 
of confusion. The real source of this society's concern with the pro-
tection of personal privacy has been the explosion of electronic-age 
methodology that creates the capability of massive physical and psy-
chological intrusion and surveillance.302 This latest scientific revolu-
tion has come pouring in on a mega-society already quaking from 
deep-seated fears of everything from the Bomb to existential aliena-
tion. The political implications of this electronic revolution exacer-
bate our fears. We know all too well that "surveillance over privacy 
is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems . . . ."303 Thus we 
yearn for an environment that "ensures strong citadels of individual 
and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance," for 
"the democratic society relies on publicity as a control over govern-
297. See notes 244-45 supra and accompanying text. 
298. Professor Schauer has found a similar problem when First Amendment "speech" is 
viewed so broadly that it encompasses every other form of individual expression in addition to 
speech, from choice of hair length to choice of automobile. "A theory that does not function-
ally distinguish speech from this vast range of other conduct reduces free speech to a general 
principle of liberty," which is "little more than a platitude." Schauer, Speech and "Speech" -
Obscenity and "Obscenity'!· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 
GEO. L.J. 899, 912-13 (1979). 
299. Note, supra note 32, at 673. 
300. Id at 773. 
301. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
302. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
303. Id at 24. 
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ment, and on privacy as a shield for group and individual life."304 
With such a pervasive foundation, it is no wonder that a constitu-
tional right of Privacy could be perceived to touch so many interests, 
especially those that seem, well, private. 
Even though "privacy" would normally convey a concern with 
intrusive methods that let the State make ~nything very personal into 
its business, it has been all too easy to transfer the procedural fear 
into a substantive one. As a result, a number of lower court judges 
attempting to apply the privacy right in a variety of circumstances 
have begun their constitutional analysis by assessing the justification 
for state interest in regulating private behavior, regardless of the na-
ture of the .behavior a_nd whether it deserves extraordinary protec-
tion. If it is private conduct, they assume, the state carries the 
burden of justifying its interest.305 The difficulty with this approach, 
of course, is that criminal activity, for instance, flourishes in privacy 
just as does the most sacred and intimate personal activity.306 That 
an activity may be carried on in private tells us nothing about the 
nature of the activity, let alone whether it is of such a nature that 
substantive constitutional interests are implicated. 
It has been accurately noted that "what the Court has been talk-
ing about is not at all what most people mean by privacy."307 Except 
for the fourth amendment cases, the Court has looked not for official 
intrusion, but for certain kinds of official regulation. "Liberty" 
would have been a far better term than "privacy" to describe free-
dom from regulation, both because "privacy" had already taken on a 
secondary meaning in the context of surveillance and intrusion, and 
because "liberty" already had an established meaning as a legal term 
304. Id. 
305. One study oflower court privacy opinions found that "virtually all" of the judges who 
believed the right of privacy should protect the right of all adults to engage in private, consen-
sual sexual behavior "focused on what they viewed as the state's lack of interest in preventing 
private sexual behavior, rather than on the nature of the activity involved. The state's interest, 
or lack of interest, should not compel any conclusions about whether or not an affirmative 
constitutional right is at stake." Note, supra note 32, at 724. The dissenting opinion at the 
district court level in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (W.D. Va. 
1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting}, for example, took Griswold and Roe v. Wade to stand "for the 
principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern." 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., 
dissenting}. Because this beginning premise shifted the burden of proving social harm to the 
state, the judge concluded that "[p]rivate consensual sex acts between adults are matters, ab-
sent evidence that they are harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest." 403 F. Supp. 
at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting} (footnote omitted}. 
306. "[S]exual relations, to be sure, are usually conducted 'in private,' even today; but 
other activities are also generally secreted, done 'in private,' from burglary to espionage and 
conspiracies to overthrow governments." Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. Rev. 
1410, 1429 (1974). 
307. Id. at 1424. 
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of art within the historical context of the due process clause. As it 
turns out, ever since Roe the "privacy" cases really belong within the 
framework of substantive due process liberty. If the scaffolding of 
"privacy" was necessary to erect a structure of "liberty," the scaffold-
ing should now be removed. Perhaps Justice Douglas intentionally 
wanted to fashion a right of privacy in which the boundaries of the 
substantive legal interests were coterminous with the boundaries of 
the state's physical ability to intrude. But as the cases have devel-
oped, the instincts (more than the analytical tools) of most of the 
other justices yielded greater caution. 
The realization that the Court means "liberty" when it says "pri-
vacy" offers a ray of conceptual clarity heretofore unclear in some of 
the opinions. Knowing that the Court has been talking all along 
about protecting extraordinary aspects of personal "liberty" that 
should be shielded from official regulation because they are "so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental,"308 the first question should be, what is the nature of 
the liberty interest at stake, and does it meet the established test for 
preferred constitutional status. The weight of the interest would not 
be relevant at that stage of analysis,309 even if the interest appeared 
weighty in terms of the degree of seclusion involved. A broad view 
of either privacy or autonomy escapes this absolutely essential first 
step of analysis. Without this methodology, autonomy or privacy, 
even in the best sense, stands to become meaningless by becoming 
limitless. Moreover, by first assessing the nature of the substantive 
interest involved, it is possible to weigh both the individual and so-
cial interests at stake (''the public goods that compete with 'pri-
vacy' ") before concluding that the nature of the interest calls for 
heightened scrutiny.310 If the activity, regardless of what it is, is pre-
sumed to be within the "right of privacy" simply because it was car-
ried out in seclusion or in "intimate" circumstances, a strong 
presumption against any social or state interest is created before any 
real analysis ever takes place. 
G. The Contraception and Abortion Cases 
The abortion and contraception cases come closer than do the 
Court's other cases to departing from the traditional blood-marriage-
adoption criteria, because these cases give constitutional protection 
308. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
309. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform {OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 841 (1977). 
310. See Part III A iefra. 
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to unmarried persons whose prospective children are unborn. The 
task of reconciling these cases with the others is aided by the preced-
ing sections, however, for the massive weight of the Court's other 
family-related decisions indicates no necessary implication that the 
Court will protect unmarried sexual privacy or the relational interest 
between unmarried persons. 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 311 the Court struck down on equal pro-
tection grounds a state law providing for the sterilization of "habit-
ual criminals." Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas 
described the legislation as involving "one of the basic civil rights of 
man. Marriage and procreation," he wrote, "are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race."312 Some twenty-three years 
later, Douglas again spoke about marriage as well as privacy in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,313 in which Connecticut's prohibition against 
the use of contraceptives by married persons was held 
unconstitutional. 
Up to this point, procreation and marriage were obviously 
linked. But in Eisenstadt v. Baird,314 the Court extended the Gris-
wold rule on contraception to unmarried persons on an equal protec-
tion theory. Justice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt probably 
generated more confusion about sexual privacy for the unmarried 
than any other Supreme Court opinion,315 largely because he did not 
make it clear whether Eisenstadt extended to single persons the asso-
ciational intimacy implicit in Griswold's recognition of the marriage 
relationship, or merely the right of access to contraceptives. 
The central issue (for our purposes) in analyzing the contracep-
tion and abortion cases is whether they are based on definitions of 
privacy or liberty broad enough to include sexual relations - as dis-
tinguished from decisions to prevent or terminate pregnancies -
outside marriage. The Court's attitude toward sex outside marriage 
is not that difficult to detect, even in the language and reasoning em-
ployed in Eisenstadt and Griswold. In his concurring opinion in Gris-
wold, for example, Justice Goldberg wrote that the constitutionality 
of Connecticut's laws against adultery and fornication was "beyond 
doubt," and that the Griswold holding "in no way interferes with a 
311. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
312. 316 U.S. at 541. 
313. 381 U.S. 497 (1961); see note 242 supra and accompanying text. 
314. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
315. See Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual Liber-
ties, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 327 (V. Tufte & B. Myerholfeds. 1979) (In Eisen-
stadt, the Court reflected "a profound shift in public attitudes toward sexual behavior" among 
the unmarried); see also note 382 iefra and accompanying text. 
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State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."316 
The opinion that has emerged over time as the most respected treat-
ment of the Griswold case ( especially as the Court has relocated the 
right of privacy in due process liberty)317 is Justice Harlan's dissent 
in Poe v. Ullman ,318 a predecessor to Griswold. On the issue of extra-
marital sex, Harlan wrote: 
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual pow-
ers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children 
are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornica-
tion, and homosexual practices ... [confine] sexuality to lawful mar-
riage, [and] form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our 
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon 
that basis.319 
Even in Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan's opinion conceded the legisla-
ture "a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent 
fornication,"320 but he did not believe it was the purpose of the con-
traception statute at issue to regulate sexual relations.321 Rather, he 
saw the law only as prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives. 
The relationship between sexual privacy and contraception be-
came even more focused in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional.322 In Carey the Court found unconstitutional a New York 
statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives to married or unmarried 
persons under age sixteen. Though based on the right of privacy, 
Carey conveyed an unmistakable concern with protecting teenagers 
against venereal disease and unwanted pregnancies.323 The Court 
had no objection to the state's policy of reducing the incidence of 
premarital sex, but could see no evidence that withholding the avail-
ability of contraceptives accomplished that goal. Several of the Jus-
tices went out of their way to explain that they did not see Carey as 
establishing a constitutional right of sexual privacy for minors. In-
316. 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
317. See note 263 supra and accompanying text. 
318. 367 U.S. at 497 (1961). 
319. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
320. 405 U.S. at 449. 
321. 405 U.S. at 448. In Justice Brennan's subsequent opinion in Carey v. Population 
Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), he wrote (quoting, in part, from Justice Blackmun's opinion in 
Roe v. Wade) that "no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously" that laws 
limiting contraceptives and abortions were passed for the primary purpose of discouraging 
illicit sex. "The reason for this unanimous rejection was stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird: 'It 
would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the State] has prescribed pregnancy and the 
birth of an unwanted child [or the physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as pun-
ishment for fornication.' ... We remain reluctant to attribute any such 'scheme of values' to 
the State.'' 431 U.S. at 694-95 (citations omitted). 
322. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
323. See notes 221-25 supra and accompanying text. 
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deed, Justices White and Stevens both regarded that inference as 
"frivolous."324 Justice Rehnquist cited Doe v. Commonwealth's At-
torney325 for the proposition that, "[w]hile we have not ruled on 
every conceivable regulation affecting [sexual] conduct[,] the facial 
constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain con-
sensual acts has been 'definitively' established."326 In the majority 
opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that "the Court has not definitively 
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Con-
stitution prohibits state statutes regulating [sexual] behavior among 
adults."327 This difference of opinion about the "definitive" status of 
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney between Justices Rehnquist and 
Brennan is attributable to the ambiguous status of a summary af-
firmance. 328 Yet neither interpretation grants authority to conclude 
that the Court has protected sex outside marriage. The Court later 
denied certiorari from a decision upholding the discharge of two em-
ployees of a public library for adulterous cohabitation, which has no 
significance as a precedent; something about the Court's attitudes, 
however, is revealed by noting that the decision not to hear the case 
was made over the recorded - and, in one case, vigorous - dissents 
of Justices Marshall and Brennan.329 It appears that most of the Jus-
tices have consciously been unwilling to extend a right of sexual pri-
vacy to unmarried persons. 
Some people nevertheless assume there is no material distinction 
between the decision to have sexual relations and the decision to use 
a contraceptive. They assume that if there is a constitutional right to 
prevent conception, there must be a right to cause conception; and 
324. 431 U.S. at 703 (White, J., concurring); 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Powell added, "Neither our precedents nor sound principles of constitutional analysis re-
quire state legislation to meet the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard whenever it 
implicates sexual freedom." 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring). 
325. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see note 268 supra and accompanying text. 
326. 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
327. 431 U.S. at 694 n.17. 
328. In .Doe the Court had summarily affirmed a three-judge federal district court. 425 
U.S. 901 (1976). Justice Rehnquist's citation of .Doe in Carey was followed by a citation to 
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), which discussed a number of authorities holding 
that a summary affirmance by the Court is to be considered a disposition on the merits. The 
academic community had also taken .Doe seriously enough that it caused "surprise and dis• 
may" among those who had read "Griswold and its progeny . . . as leading toward a constitu-
tional right of sexual freedom." Grey, supra note 10, at 85. Some of that reaction may have 
stemmed from criticism of the Court for disposing of .Doe without hearing arguments or writ-
ing an opinion, even if affirmance of the result was on the merits. See G. GUNTHER, supra 
note 236, at 641. 
329. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1052-58 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari); see notes 268-69 supra and accompanying text; see also 
text following note 293 supra. 
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hence, the freedom to have sexual relations must be implied, since 
otherwise no conception is possible. However, these steps in reason-
ing do not logically flow from the premises of the contraception 
cases. Justice Brennan did cloud the issue somewhat when he said in 
Eisenstadt that the right of privacy protects "the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child."330 This broad language has led some to char-
acterize the Skinner-Griswold-Eisenstadt line of cases as protecting a 
"right of procreative autonomy."331 
The contraception cases do not stretch that far. Justice Brennan 
later spoke more precisely of the "individual's right to decide to pre-
vent conception."332 The actual holding of the contraceptive cases 
can hardly mean otherwise, since the only laws addressed by the 
Court have been those that interfered with one's right to prevent con-
ception. Skinner earlier dealt with the ability to cause conception, 
but only in the context of state action that would have resulted in 
permanent sterilization. Thus, the Court's decision preserved Skin-
ner's reproductive capacity333 until such time as he could exercise it 
according to the laws that specify, in Justice Harlan's phrase, "when 
the sexual powers may be used."334 
Contraception and sexual relations are simply two different 
things, one of which can be given legal protection without protecting 
the other. The teenage promiscuity problem reflected in Carey 
makes the distinction clear: 
Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual 
activity regardless of what the New York Legislature does .... 
. . . It is as though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of 
motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets. One need not 
posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize such a 
330. 405 U.S. at 453. 
331. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 944; IJevelopments, supra note 10, at 1184. 
332. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688. 
333. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). One federal appellate court has observed that 
it may seem logical to infer a right of sexual privacy from the Court's decisions protecting 
procreative liberty, since "the [procreative] right becomes meaningless in the absence of a will-
mg partner." Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1975). However, a case like Skinner 
does "not guarantee the individual a procreative opportunity," it merely safeguards "his pro-
creative potential from state infringement." 517 F.2d at 797. 
334. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This language echoes Justice Marshall's ob-
servation in Zablocki, that since marriage is "the only relationship in which the State . . . 
allows sexual relations to take place," one's ability to marry should not be unduly restricted. 
The Court's language is fully quoted at note 205 supra. Yet, laws specifying age limits as a 
condition of marriage do not interfere with the constitutional right to marry. "A minor not 
permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She 
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later marriage should they continue 
to desire it." Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
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restriction as irrational and perverse.335 
Pursuing an analogy to this reasoning, it is quite possible that the 
availability of procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights creates a 
greater incidence of criminal activity than if there were no such 
guarantees. This does not mean that allowing criminals constitu-
tional rights makes their crimes lawful.336 
The separate nature of contraception and sexual relations ap-
pears in other contexts, as well. For example, some groups in society 
have long regarded contraception, within or outside marriage, as an 
evil totally separate from the act of sexual relations. Some who hold 
this view would compare the use of certain contraceptives more to 
abortion than to anything else, because they see in such contracep-
tion a violation of natural processes or a self-induced abortion. Ad-
ditionally, were a state to enact a law requiring contraception by 
women who had borne, say, two children, the Court's contraception 
cases would probably prohibit such regulation, as noted in Justice 
Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold.331 These instances illustrate 
that the subject of contraception does raise serious issues of its own, 
quite without regard to sexual privacy. 
The abortion cases provide no greater recognition of a general 
right of sexual liberty outside marriage. Roe v. Wade 338 applied to 
single as well as married women, and most of the abortion decisions, 
including those involving minors, have relied explicitly on the right 
of privacy. However,Roe rejected a broad right of individual auton-
omy allowing one to "do with one's body as one pleases."339 More-
over, since Roe, the Court has clearly placed abortion and 
contraception together as decisions "whether or not to beget or bear 
a child," which are "at the very heart of [the] cluster of constitution-
ally protected choices" involved in "marriage," "family relation-
ships," and "child rearing."340 It should also be noted that the 
constitutional right developed in the contraception cases (which pre-
ceded the abortion cases) did not necessarily require the results 
335. 431 U.S. 714-15 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
336. See Grey, supra note 10, at 88 n.31. 
337. While it may shock some ofmy Brethren that the Court today holds that the Con-
stitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe 
that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection 
against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our 
constitutional concepts. 
381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
338. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
339. See notes 263-65 supra and accompanying text. 
340. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
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achieved in the abortion cases.341 
The minors' abortion cases have also developed in a way that 
suggests that the right of privacy developed by the Court is intended 
to protect specific liberty interests related to marriage and childbear-
ing more than it is to authorize a general right of personal autonomy. 
These cases brought to the Supreme Court, for the first time, a con-
frontation between the alleged constitutional rights of parents and 
the rights of their child, with both claims arising from the same line 
of cases. The assumptions one makes about the cast of characters 
involved in these cases are crucial. When the minor is seen as herself 
a potential parent, the situation becomes unique - which is how the 
Court has treated minors' rights to abortions as distinguished from 
other choice rights to which minors might arguably be entitled.342 
The Court's contraception and abortion cases do not depart from 
the touchstones of marriage and kinship as the criteria for determin-
ing the relational and sexual interests protected by the Constitution, 
even though the cases include single, unmarried persons. In a broad 
sense, these are "simply family planning cases" which represent "two 
standard conservative views": 
that social stability is threatened by excessive population growth; and 
that family stability is threatened by unwanted pregnancies, with their 
accompanying fragile marriages, single-parent families, irresponsible 
youthful parents, and abandoned or neglected children. 343 
The cases speak in terms of individual privacy because "[t]he con-
ventions of constitutional adjudication of course demanded that the 
decisions be justified, not on the basis of social stability, but in the 
language of individual rights."344 In addition, the interests given 
protection in these cases really are different from sexual activity per 
341. The arguably countervailing interest of the fetus in an abortion case poses an obstacle 
to a negative decision about childbearing not present in the case of contraception. Indeed, the 
Roe Court could logically have concluded that the state interest in protecting the unborn was 
strong enough to override a pregnant woman's right of privacy, without seriously challenging 
the parental and other family rights established in the line of cases stretching from Meyer v. 
Nebraska to Eisenstadt. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 775. In a sense, a pregnant 
woman and an unborn child each has her own kind of claim on the interests of life and liberty 
in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The proposition that a pregnant woman 
may unilaterally determine the fate of an unborn child is no easier to defend than the proposi-
tion that a state may unilaterally require a pregnant woman to carry an unborn child to its 
birth, especially when doing so poses no serious risk to her. How the matter is determined 
turns entirely on the choice one makes, a priori, about the nature of an unborn child. Given 
the Court's implicit assumption that a fetus is not close enough to being either "life" or a 
"person" to warrant its own constitutional protection, Roe is consistent with the constitutional 
interest in advancing the private sanctity of childbearing decisions. Without that assumption, 
Roe must simply be rejected. 
342. See note 234 supra and accompanying text. 
343. Grey, supra note 10, at 88. 
344. Id 
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se, because sex unrelated to childbearing "does not produce the same 
kind of nearly irrevocable effects, nor spring from the same deep 
well of cultural values as do decisions about marriage, procreation, 
or child rearing."345 
These cases can also be seen as arising from kinship interests. 
The decision whether to use a contraceptive may be seen as the earli-
est manifestation of a potential child-parent relationship.346 If the 
contraceptive is not used and conception occurs, a very serious com-
mitment arises. The abortion right allows one more opportunity to 
make the childbearing choice. For unmarried persons, contracep-
tion and abortion are not decisions concerning long-term commit-
ments to one's sexual partner; they are decisions concerning long-
term commitments to one's own potential offspring. Similarly, a sin-
gle woman's relational interest with her sexual partner does not give 
rise to constitutional protection for her decision; rather, it is her po-
tential relational interest with her child. In this sense, her decision 
involves, in Hawthorne's words, "a quality of awful sacredness in the 
relation between this mother and this child."347 Such decisions affect 
the earliest possible creation of kinship. This aspect of contraception 
and abortion reflects the overtones of relational - as distinguished 
from individual - interests in the family privacy cases. To see the 
cases totally as reflections of individual privacy is to miss that point. 
Family means relationships, permanent relationships; and perma-
nent relationships are established by marriage and kinship.348 
345. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 774. 
346. Marriage, contraception, and abortion "clearly delineate a sphere of interests. • • . 
At the core of this sphere is the right of the individual to make for himself ... the fundamen-
tal decisions that shape family life: whom to marry; whether and when to have children; and 
with what values to rear those children." Id at 772. 
341. See note 127 supra and accompanying text. 
348. Marriage and kinship are relational interests. They are not individual interests that 
exist separate and apart from a relationship with another person. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court said "the constitutionally protected privacy of family, 
marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular 
place, but with a protected intimate relationship." 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (emphasis added). The 
categorizing of relational interests as a distinct category from interests in property and personal• 
ity is largely attributable to the work of Dean Leon Green in the field of tort law. See gener-
ally L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J. TREECE, 
ADVANCED TORTS: INJURIES TO BUSINESS, POLITICAL AND FAMILY INTERESTS (1977); L. 
GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 413-507 (1965). This category recognizes 
family, trade, political, professional, and general social relationships. Injuries to these rela-
tionships may result in damage actions for such torts as wrongful death, loss of consortium, 
interference with contractual relations, and defamation. In each case, the injury is to the rela-
tional interest between two or more parties, as distinguished from an injury to one's person or 
one's property. It is, by definition, not possible for a compensable injury to occur in the ab-
sence of a legally protected relationship. Roscoe Pound had written earlier about "interests in 
domestic relations." See Pound, supra note 21, at 177. With relational interests of the family 
in mind, Henry Foster has observed that "there has been a historical evolution from the group 
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It is not my purpose to defend the results of the abortion and 
contraception cases, especially since many of the results were not 
compelled by the principles on which the Court relied. I have only 
sought to show that these cases are consistent with those previously 
discussed in not protecting sexual privacy for the unmarried and in 
not disturbing the preferred legal status given to formal marriage 
and kinship. At the same time, it is only fair to observe that Eisen-
stadt, Roe, Carey, and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 349 - even 
though they do not pierce the veil of marriage and kinship - may 
not seriously further the purposes of giving extraordinary legal pref-
erence to the family. It is arguably a complete perversion of the lib-
erty of parenthood to believe that a woman may terminate a 
pregnancy because of some variation on the theme of a "parental" 
right. If the fetus she carries is significant enough to give rise to such 
a lofty claim, it is significant enough to bar an abortion as the earliest 
form of child abuse. And if these really are rights pertaining to kin-
ship, why does the father of an unborn child have nothing to say 
about the decision to continue or terminate the pregnancy?350 Surely 
it is not because the state "cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power 
interests of the family presided over by the paterfamilias, to an increased recognition of individ-
ual interests of family members and the social interest in both individuals and the family 
group." Foster, supra note 20, at 494. Thus, the interests of family members in their relation-
ships with one another are individual, not group, interests; however, the individual interest 
involved is best understood as a relational interest with one or more other persons. Further-
more, the permanent character and the inherent obligations of the relational family interest 
make the interest one of "status and its incidents." Id. at 494; see Conclusion iefra. 
These observations have several implications for analyzing the nature of legally protected 
family interests. For example, "the family" is not to be regarded (as it was in earlier centuries) 
as a group entity consisting of husband and wife as one person (the husband) and their chil-
dren as their chattels. Under modern concepts, the family consists of persons having impor-
tant relational interests in their ties to one another, with those interests enforceable by 
individual parties to the relationship. Thus, while the use of individual rights doctrines may 
be clumsy in some family contexts, the use of those doctrines by no means signifies "changes in 
the structure of American family life." L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 987. Moreover, an unmar-
ried individual's personality right to sexual privacy or sexual gratification is not logically infer-
able from the protections the Court has confined to certain relational interests. Asserted rights 
to adult companionships outside marriage may stand on a different footing because the nature 
of the asserted right is relational; however, without marriage or kinship, the impermanent 
nature of the relationship would still disqualify it. It is, therefore, not as puzzling as it may 
seem that the Court has located a series of constitutionally protectable values "principally . . . 
in the 'area' (at least the Court sees it as an area) of sex-marriage-childbearing-childrearing 
... ," even though it may have appeared that "[t]he Court has offered little assistance to one's 
understanding of what it is that makes all this a unit." Ely, The Supreme .Court, 1977 Term -
Foreword.· On /Jiscovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 & n.40 (1978). The 
conceptual "unit" that binds these family-related decisions is the notion of a permanent, rela-
tional interest. Only interests relating to marriage and kinship comprise such a conceptual 
unit. 
349. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
350. See 428 U.S. 52. 
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which the state itself'" does not possess,351 because the liberty inter-
est of biological kinship originates "not in state law, but in intrinsic 
human rights" that are "entirely apart from the power of the 
State."352 Justice Blackmun tells us further that "when the wife and 
the husband disagree" about having an abortion, "the view of only 
one of the two marriage partners can prevail."353 Yet if that same 
unborn child were carried to term, both parents would have the au-
thority to withhold consent to placing the child for adoption. 
Neither would have a "veto power" over the interests of the other, 
because each literally has a kinship interest. How is "potential life" 
any different, when it has been created by the most equal of joint 
ventures? The difference, we are told, is that "the woman . . . physi-
cally bears the child" and is "more directly and immediately affected 
by the pregnancy."354 If the direct effects of pregnancy are the 
source of her interest, it is difficult to see how those effects - except 
in the case of a therapeutic abortion - could outweigh the tradi-
tional interest of the Constitution in family relationships and child-
rearing, an interest the father has and will continue to have if the 
child is born and raised - no matter which parent then carries the 
heavier physical burdens of childrearing. 
The Court also tells us, on the one hand, that "the guiding role of 
parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the 
freedoms of minors," and that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of 
the State."355 But, on the other hand, it tells us that the State "does 
not have the constitutional authority" to delegate to a "third party" 
(like a father and mother) the right to control their minor child's 
decision about an abortion, because the State cannot give authority it 
does not have.356 Elsewhere the Court destroys its own nondelega-
tion argument by acknowledging that parental authority derives not 
from the State, but from "intrinsic human rights."357 
In another context, the Court rejects the historic jurisprudential 
concept for objectively determining mature capacity in favor of a 
"mature minor'' rule it seems to have discovered, but which does not 
351. 428 U.S. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 
(E.D. Mo. 1975)). 
352. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
353. 428 U.S. at 71. 
354. 428 U.S. at 71. 
355. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
356. 428 U.S. at 74. 
357. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 845 (1977). 
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exist in a common law tradition full of cases and standards for pa-
rental consent to medical treatments on minors.358 Then, ironically, 
the Court decides that if a minor woman is not mature enough to 
make her own choice, she should look - not to her parents, for they 
might have a bias - but to a trial judge (who is presumably without 
biases) for a determination of whether an abortion is in her best in-
terests. Thus the Court rejects still another fundamental principle of 
family law, that parents should supervise the medical choices of mi-
nors lacking capacity, unless the parents are incompetent - then 
and only then, the State should step in as parent. 
In the contraception cases, it is one thing to respect the privacy, 
the sexual intimacy, and the procreation choices of a married couple, 
as Griswold does. It is one thing to protect permanent procreative 
capacity, as Skinner does. But it is.quite another to speak of "procre-
ation choices" for unmarried persons and promiscuous teenagers. 
They do not live in recognized intimate relationships, nor do they 
face the permanent deprivations of sterilization. If some single per-
son is so concerned about not entering into a child-parent relation-
ship, let her abstain from sexual relations - the State has not 
foreclosed that alternative, nor does the Constitution prize her sexual 
relations independent of childbearing issues. If teenagers threaten 
themselves and each other with the risks of venereal disease and un-
wanted pregnancies, they need protection. Finding that protection is 
a difficult issue of social policy; it is not necessarily the duty of a 
constitutional right whose purpose is to sustain serious family rela-
tionships of a kind implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
Perhaps John Noonan is right in believing that the rationale of 
Eisenstadt was created with Roe in mind, since Roe was argued 
before Eisenstadt was handed down. 359 Perhaps he is even right that 
these two cases can be read as implicitly rejecting the family unit so 
carefully nourished through Meyer and Pierce and Griswold in favor 
of "a society of isolated individuals."360 The close timing between 
Eisenstadt and Roe may tell us that the Court was simply committed 
to invalidating state abortion laws because it was convinced they 
were wrong, and Eisenstadt would broaden the theoretical base. 
And perhaps it has all turned out to be the Supreme Court's own 
kind of Vietnam. Somehow, with good intentions, the Justices may 
have gotten mired into an abortion land war, carried away by the 
358. See note 238 supra and accompanying text. 
359. J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 21 
(1979). 
360. Id 
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mysterious charisma of "privacy.'' Even if all that is true, they seem 
now to have begun their disengagement before it is too late. The 
experience since Roe shows a tendency to pull back, a desire to fix a 
mistake by calling substantive due process what it is, and a determi-
nation not to cross into the never-never land of sexual privacy for 
unmarried couples. 
H. Sexual Privacy for the Unmarried? 
Even though, as Thomas Grey correctly observed, "the Court has 
given no support to the notion that the right of privacy protects sex-
ual freedom,"361 many commentators362 and a few lower courts363 
have assumed otherwise. The foregoing summary demonstrates that 
a right of sexual freedom cannot reasonably be inf erred from the 
procreative rights recognized by the Court,364 nor has the Court de-
veloped a general right of personal privacy or autonomy broad 
enough to include sex outside marriage.365 Still, some have read into 
the cases a basis for sexual liberty on slightly different grounds. 
One approach puts Stanley v. Georgia366 together with Eisenstadt 
and finds that the right of privacy protects "decisions" to "seek sex-
ual gratification," - including gratification from ''what at least once 
was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct"367 - made voluntar-
ily by adults in a "noncommercial, private setting."368 Putting the 
361. Grey, supra note 10, at 86. 
362. See note 10 supra. 
363. E.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy statute unconstitutional 
as applied to unmarried consenting heterosexual couple); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 
A.2d 333 (1977) (fornication statute violates right of privacy); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 
415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) (statute prohibiting consensual sodomy violates right 
of privacy and equal protection), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (statute prohibiting voluntary deviate sex between unmarried 
persons has no rational basis and violates equal protection). Contra, State v. Bateman, 113 
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 864 (1976); State v. Elliot, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 
1352 (1976); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I., 1980). In general, "only a very few decisions 
have led to the invalidation or narrowing" of criminal sex laws, partly because "most courts 
[have] managed to circumvent the issue." Note, supra note 32, at 720. For a summary of these 
cases, see id; see also Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636 (1974). 
364. See Part II G supra. 
365. See Part II F supra. 
366. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Any reliance on Stanley's libertarian overtones - even among 
"consenting adults" -is probably misplaced since Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
(1973). See text at notes 251-58 supra. 
367. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
368. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). The "private settings" in Onofre included "an auto-
mobile parked on a street in the City of Buffalo in the early morning hours," and a "truck 
parked on a street in a residential area of the city about 1:30 a.m." 51 N.Y.2d at 484, 415 
N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
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right of sexual freedom in "gratification" terms gives rise to an im-
portant issue about the whole theory of determining what is meant 
by "liberty" in the due process clause. An analogy to the relation-
ship between obscenity and the first amendment will make the point. 
Since the question first arose in 1942, the Court has regarded ob-
scenity as expression outside of first amendment protection. 369 The 
basis for this categorization has been the Court's view that obscenity 
has not "the slightest redeeming social importance" because its only 
purpose is to appeal "to prurient interest."370 In Miller v. Cal!for-
nia,311 the Court's most recent attempt to state a comprehensive test 
for defining obscenity, the Court reiterated the basis for distinguish-
ing between protected and obscene speech: 
[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate 
with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand 
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the his-
toric struggle for freedom . . . . The First Amendment protects works 
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the 
people approve of the ideas these works represent. "The protection 
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange 
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired 
by the people," . . . But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual con-
duct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a differ-
ent matter.372 
Free speech has thus enjoyed a preferred constitutional status in 
large part because of the relationship of unrestrained discourse to the 
underlying political theory of democracy. Some social interest or 
public good has been served by the first amendment - it does not 
exist solely to protect immediate individual liberty without regard to 
larger interests. As the obscenity category illustrates, "[t]he scope of 
First Amendment protection is determined by the rationale underly-
ing freedom of speech."373 Similarly, the scope of privacy as part of 
due process liberty should be determined by the rationale that un-
derlies its protected status.374 
369. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
370. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 487 (1957). 
371. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
372. 413 U.S. at 34-35 (citations omitted). Consider also Justice Stevens's illustration: 
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise 
what is said, every school child can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak 
remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to pre-
serve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theatre of our 
choice. 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
373. Schauer, supra note 298, at 909. 
374. See Part III infra. 
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With this background, a comparison of obscenity and "gratifica-
tion" will lead to a comparison of the proper analytical approaches 
to both free speech and privacy. Frederick Schauer has written that 
the key to understanding the Court's treatment of hard-core pornog-
raphy as nonspeech (for first amendment purposes) is in realizing 
that the primary purpose of pornography is to produce sexual excite-
ment - it does not intend to communicate intellectual content. 
"The pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual surrogate. It takes 
pictorial or linguistic form only because some individuals achieve 
sexual gratification by those means."375 Thus, "[t]he concept funda-
mental to the Miller test is that material appealing to the prurient 
interest is sex, and not merely describing or advocating sex."376 But 
if one now, in the name of privacy, extends constitutional protection 
to the right to seek sexual gratification, there would obviously be a 
right to pursue anything that responds only to the prurient interest. 
A fortiori, the Court would be forced to change its entire approach to 
obscenity - not because of new light on the first amendment, but 
because under this approach, privacy includes the pure gratification 
that speech excludes. In addition, problems nearly as vexing as de-
fining obscenity could arise in attempting to define a "noncommer-
cial, private setting."377 
If obscenity "demeans the grand conception of the first amend-
ment and its high purposes in the struggle for freedom," mere gratifi-
cation, apart from any reference to relationships or procreation (let 
alone marriage or kinship), 378 is likely to demean the grand concep-
tion of due process liberty and its high purposes. That proposition 
can best be tested by reference to the conceptual origins and the pur-
poses of the family privacy cases. When that is done,379 it is not 
difficult to see that a gratification test for constitutional liberty is just 
as demeaning when applied to the fourteenth amendment as it is 
375. Schauer, supra note 298, at 922. 
376. Id at 928. 
377. The New York Court of Appeals considered vehicles parked on residential streets to 
be "private" settings. See note 368 supra. As for defining "commercial," consider State v. 
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found a 
fornication statute to violate the "fundamental right of privacy" of two men who engaged in 
sexual relations with two women in a parked car. The women, both of whom had been ar-
rested in the past for prostitution, agreed to have sexual relations with the men in exchange for 
"reefers." When the men admitted they had no reefers, the women "indignantly demanded 
$10 for each act of sexual intercourse," which the men refused "and the argument became 
more heated." 75 NJ. at 205, 381 A.2d at 335. Noncommercial? This entire misguided ap-
proach derives from the tendency to equate "privateness" with substantive values deserving 
constitutional recognition. See notes 302-08 supra and accompanying text. 
378. See note 348 supra. 
379. See Part I supra. 
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when applied to the first amendment.380 
Another argued justification for extending sexual liberty to the 
unmarried is the idea, derived from Eisenstadt's equal protection ori-
gins, that discrimination regarding private or intimate decisions on 
the basis of marital status is impermissible.381 
This equal protection theory offers little help to those seeking 
protection for informal relationships. Amid the "nearly incompre-
hensible muddle"382 of the Eisenstadt opinion, it is clear that Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the majority of four relied on the rational ba-
sis test, making no attempt to identify a fundamental right or to im-
ply the need for any degree of heightened scrutiny with 
classifications based on marital status.383 Moreover, since Eisen-
stadt, the Court has unanimously upheld a classification explicitly 
based on marital status, even though the classification arguably im-
pinged on the right to marry,384 because "[c]lassification based on 
marital status has been an accepted classification" in a large variety 
of regulatory contexts.385 Indeed, the maintenance of legal discrimi-
nation between the married and the unmarried not only literally de-
termines a state's ability to regulate marriage as a social institution, 
but also governs important individual relational interests that have 
long since inhered in the marriage relationship, from property inter-
ests to taxes and torts. 
By going outside marriage to protect the rights of illegitimate 
380. Even some who are persuaded by certain aspects of a proposed expansion of constitu-
tionally protected "lifestyles" are "wary of creating, in the high name of constitutional right, 
nothing more than a regime of self gratification and indulgence." Wilkinson & White, Consti-
tutional Protection far Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 625 (1977). 
381. This was an alternate basis for the decision in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 491-
92, 415 N.E.2d 936, 942-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
See notes 367-68 and accompanying text. It was also relied on by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited "deviate" sex between persons who 
were not husband and wife. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 90, 98-99, 415 A.2d 47, 51-52 
(1980). The defendants in the case were the owner and several employees of an adult theatre 
in which the dancers engaged in acts prohibited by the statute with members of the audience 
who had paid admission fees. 490 Pa. at 101,415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting). The Court 
also quoted Mill's On Liberty at length, 490 Pa. at 96-98, 415 A.2d at 50-51, even though no 
right of privacy was mentioned in the case, presumably because of the commercial setting. 
Relying on state power to regulate liquor consumption under the twenty-first amendment, the 
Supreme Court had upheld a regulation prohibiting almost identical conduct in a live en-
tertainment bar. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
382. Grey, supra note 10, at 88. Dean Wellington observed that Eisenstadt "abandoned" 
"any effort at analysis." Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional .Double Standards: 
Some Notes on At(judication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297 (1973). 
383. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) ("The question for our determination in 
this case is whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different 
treatment accorded married and unmarried persons .... "). 
384. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
385. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 403 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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children, the rights of unwed parents in their children, and the right 
of unmarried women to prevent or terminate a pregnancy, the Court 
has obviously established that marriage is not the sole criterion for 
locating constitutional rights related to family interests. We have al-
ready seen, however, that the rights of illegitimate children do not 
give constitutional sanction to the relation.ship between their parents. 
The interests that have been recognized in the child-parent relation-
ship outside marriage are based on the biological kinship tie that has 
so long been acknowledged as a source of extraordinary protection. 
There is no such tie between the parents of an illegitimate child, or 
between other cohabiting couples. Only marriage creates a tie of 
that character between unrelated adults. Similarly, rights to prevent 
or terminate a pregnancy, as noted previously,386 arise from such 
factors as the law's unwillingness to force the creation of an un-
wanted child-parent kinship tie - again out of respect for the 
profound nature of kinship. 
If these distinctions seem to quibble over metaphysical technical-
ities, a broader substantive justification emerges from the underlying 
policies that have led to constitutional protection for the exclusive 
"cluster of constitutionally protected choices" deliberately limited to 
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, and child 
rearing and education."387 These underlying policies, discussed pre-
viously, 388 have no primary interest in sex per se. The Constitution 
does not protect marriage simply because there is "gratification" 
there, or because marriages exist in such "property" as a home, or 
because the regulation of any intimacy is akin to an unreasonable 
search and seizure.389 Rather, as Justice Harlan put it, marriage and 
the home derive their preeminence from being "the seat of family 
/!fe. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that 
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more 
than one explicitly granted constitutional right."390 The sexual rela-
tionship that is part of marriage is "necessarily an essential and ac-
cepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the 
State . . . always and in every age . . . has fostered and pro-
tected."391 Stated another way by Dean Harry Wellington: 
Love and sexual gratification can and do exist outside of marriage and 
386. See Part II G supra. 
387. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citations omitted). 
388. See Part I supra. 
389. See Part II F supra. 
390. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
391. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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they can and do fail to exist in marriage, but this is not the point. The 
point is that the state has undertaken to sponsor one institution that 
has at its core the love-sex relationship. That relationship demands lib-
erty in the practice of the sexual act. 392 
The sexual relationship alone, then, commands no protection outside 
marriage. 
This society's normative and legal tradition of maintaining laws 
that "provide ... when the sexual powers may be used ... [and 
confine] sexuality to lawful marriage"393 is not a trivial basis for dis-
crimination. It is, rather, in Justice Harlan's words, a very deliberate 
"pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that 
any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that ba-
sis."394 To extend constitutionally sanctioned sexual privacy beyond 
marriage would not only depart from that pattern, it would seriously 
undermine it. Indeed, "not to discriminate" between fornication and 
sex within marriage ''would entirely misconceive" the point of giving 
marriage a preferred constitutional status.395 We saw in Part I, 
supra, some portion of the policy basis for the constitutional protec-
tion given to marriage. If, in deference to sexual liberty for unmar-
ried persons, discrimination on the basis of marital status were 
made, say, a suspect classification, we would put at risk the entire 
foundation of those concepts. 396 
There is at least a rational basis for distinguishing between sex 
within marriage and sex outside marriage. More than that, there is 
ample justification for the conclusion Justice Harlan said had been 
reached by "every society in civilized times," for "confining sexuality 
392. Wellington, supra note 382, at 292 (emphasis added). Karl Llewellyn has also noted 
that the functions of marriage include 
[r]egulation, then, of sex contacts; above all, an astounding reduction of conflict between 
men over women. Without permanency of relation this seems difficult for our civilization 
to achieve. An evening in a sailor's dive will prove persuasive . . . . A partner who can 
leave at will is still in the market. 
A proper sailor's prostitute can offer comfort but hardly such a foothold. Con-
cubinate, that may be gone tomorrow, is more; it sometimes suffices; as an institution it is 
not enough. 
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1288, 1294 n.31 (1932) 
(citation omitted). 
393. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
394. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
395. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
396. "Democracy began by freeing the desires, and whether it lives or dies depends on its 
ability somehow to domesticate them; not to suppress them, but to so arrange matters as to 
ensure that the freed desires are made compatible with civil society." W. BERNS, supra note 
57, at 223. Berns derives some authority for his view from De Tocqueville's observation that, 
''No free communities ever existed without morals .... " A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 233 (R. Heffner ed. 1956). 
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to lawful marriage."397 Sexual privacy outside marriage is not war-
ranted by an unlimited, grand view of personal autonomy; it is not 
part of "procreative" freedom; "gratification" holds no special place 
in the constitutional scheme; and discrimination between the mar-
ried and the unmarried is not only supportable, but is essential to the 
historical position of preference this society has so long assigned to 
the institution of marriage.398 
397. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
398. Others have also observed that it has been widely characteristic of modern civilization 
to confine sexual expression to marriage. The social importance of this channeling process "is 
a view that has been central to modern thought and far more widely accepted in our time than 
contemporary versions of the liberalism of John Stuart Mill." Grey, supra note 10, at 91. 
Thomas Grey has summarized the writings of Freud, Durkheim, and Weber, documenting 
their shared judgment that "communal life, whether in the family or the larger society, de-
pends directly on sexual repression." Id. at 91-93. Not only these writers, but "every thinker 
of the great central tradition of the last century's social thought has seen repressed sexuality 
and the authoritarian family structure as close to the core of our civilization. Conservative 
theorists have defended repression as necessary; revolutionaries have urged that society would 
have to be overthrown to free us from its tyranny." Id. at 92. Freud was concerned not only 
with civilization's need to "use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive 
instincts," s. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 59 (J. Strachey trans. 1961), but 
also with occasional harm to the individual psyche by repression. Others, such as Max Weber 
and some leading Marxist writers, linked sexual repression to the needs of capitalism, Some 
capitalists have understood this link to be based upon the need to maintain order for the sake 
of productivity. The Marxists, by contrast, have "argued that the humane goal of sexual liber-
ation could only come with the destruction of capitalism." Grey, supra note 10, at 94. 
Contemporary writers such as Christopher Lasch and George Gilder believe the traditional 
American sexual ethic serves cultural needs that are more affirmative and far-reaching. For 
Lasch, a value transmission system based on the authoritarian family structure has enormous 
implications for the development of both individual conscience and public virtue - issues that 
bear directly on the underlying purpose for the constitutional preference given to family life. 
See C. LASCH, supra note 45; notes 52-63 supra and accompanying text. Gilder deals more 
specifically with American sexual attitudes, finding that the country's recent interest in uncon-
ventional sexual arrangements promotes "a form of erotic suicide. For it is destroying the 
cultural preconditions of profound love and sexuality: the durable heterosexual relationships 
necessary to a community of emotional investments and continuities in which children can 
find a secure place." G. GILDER, supra note 28, at 5. Gilder argues that female sexuality has a 
way of contributing to - perhaps even controlling - the domesticating and civilizing aspects 
of life, both for families and for society at large. This civilized domestic realm permits the 
moral, aesthetic, religious, social, sexual, and other nurturing values of the community to take 
root and flourish; and "(i]n these values consist the ultimate goals of human life." Id. at 245. 
The relationship between all this and confining sex to marriage begins with a man's con-
scious or unconscious desire to identify and keep his offspring. To do this 
[h]e must choose a particular woman and submit to her sexual rhythms if he is to have 
offspring of his own. His love defines his choice. His need to choose evokes his love. His 
sexual drive lends energy to his love and gives shape, meaning, and continuity to his 
sexuality. When he selects a specific woman, he in essence defines himself both to himself 
and in society. Every sex act thereafter celebrates that definition and social engagement, 
Id. at 35. 
However, when sexual expression becomes separated from the psychological commitments 
of enduring love, it "leads to emotional fragmentation in time rather than to a sense of con-
tinuity with nature and society." Id. at 39. As a result, to view sexual experiences "as if they 
were optional indulgences rather than the definitive processes of our lives," id. at 7, is to 
threaten in a grave sense "a civilization dependent on long-term commitments and sexual 
patterns." Id. at 41. 
Consider also the observation of D.H. Lawrence: 
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Ill. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR FAMILY LIBERTY 
A. .Due Process "Liberty," Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, and the 
Burden of Proof 
In adjudicating constitutionality, a major distinction exists be-
tween legislation that should be subjected to minimal judicial scru-
tiny and legislation that should be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny.399 The Supreme Court generally defers to state legislative 
judgments by giving them only minimal scrutiny, except when fun-
damental liberties or suspect classifications are involved. Prior to the 
Great Depression, individual economic interests were sometimes 
protected by heightened scrutiny as part of due process liberty under 
the much debated doctrine of substantive due process.400 During 
this same era, the Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska,401 also recognized 
the liberty of parents to direct the rearing of their children as a sub-
stantive due process liberty interest, perhaps in part because the 
Constitution contains no explicit guarantee for freedoms related to 
family interests.402 In 1937,403 the Court made its historic shift to the 
present doctrine that legislation regulating economic interests will be 
upheld under minimal scrutiny tests so long as the regulation bears 
"a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose" and is 
"neither arbitrary nor discriminatory."404 With this decline of sub-
stantive due process as an accepted source of authority, the Court 
based some of its subsequent decisions dealing with protected family 
interest on such other heightened scrutiny sources as the equal pro-
tection clause,405 the free exercise of religion,406 and the right of pri-
The instinct of fidelity is perhaps the deepest instinct in the great complex we call sex. 
Where there is real sex there is the underlying passion for fidelity. And the prostitute 
knows this, because she is up against it. She can only keep men who have no real sex, the 
counterfeits: and these she despises. The men with real sex leave her inevitably, as un-
able to satisfy their real desire. 
D. LAWRENCE, supra note 88, at 31. 
399. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 236. 
400. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. l 
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
401. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); accord, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
402. The reason for this omission may be attributable to the Constitution's original interest 
in political legislation as distinguished from civil legislation. See Conclusion i'!fra. 
403. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). However, it was 1955 before 
the Court could state unanimously that "(t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business 
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought" Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
404. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
405. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942). 
406. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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vacy.407 In its most recent family cases, however, the Court has 
candidly brought due process liberty out of mothballs.408 This in-
creasing reliance on substantive due process has been recognized in 
one comprehensive survey as "t~e ultimate basis of protection" in 
the family cases, which "itself is a constitutional development of ma-
jor importance."409 
Judicial recognition of a substantive due process liberty interest 
gives extraordinary constitutional protection to the activity involved. 
Such judicial recognition, however, differs substantially from legisla-
tive action to accomplish the same result, no matter how similar the 
specific decrees may be. To put this difference in perspective, con-
sider the distinctions between these categories of conduct: 
(1) protected conduct (such as political speech), which is protected by 
a preferred constitutional right; 
(2) permitted conduct (such as driving a car), which is the subject 
neither of constitutional protection nor of unusual prohibitions; 
and 
(3) prohibited conduct (such as robbery) which is forbidden by a 
criminal sanction or by a classificatory scheme that (sometimes 
.harshly) excludes persons in certain categories. 
The law creates a natural spectrum with protected activity on one 
extreme, prohibited activity on the other extreme, and a broad range 
of permitted activity in the middle. We may say that sexual intimacy 
between married persons is protected by a constitutional right which 
recognizes not only a freedom of procreative choice, but recognizes 
that the marriage relationship itself is protected as "intimate to the 
degree of being sacred."410 State criminal laws against adultery and 
fornication place sexual relationships between the unmarried in the 
prohibited category. If a legislature removes such crimes from its 
statutory scheme, however, as some states have done,411 sexual con-
duct between the unmarried moves from category (3) to category (2) . 
- it becomes permitted, even though it is not yet protected. Simi-
407. See Part II F supra. 
408. See Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
409 . .Developments, supra note 10, at 1161-62. It would unduly broaden the scope of this 
Article to plunge fully into the controversial thicket of substantive due process. For present 
purposes, I will simply agree with Archibald Cox that: 
The Court's persistent resort to notions of substantive due process for almost a century 
attests the strength of our natural law inheritance in constitutional adjudication, and I 
think it unwise as well as hopeless to resist it. 
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976). 
410. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
411. See Grey, supra note 10, at 95; Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 
77 MICH. L. REV. 252,254 (1978). ("[Fornication] remains a crime in [only] fifteen states and 
the District of Columbia." (footnote omitted)). 
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larly, in a custody proceeding, a trial judge may elect to place a child 
in the custody of a parent living in unmarried cohabitation. The 
judge's action gives the cohabitation a permitted status, but it does 
not give it constitutional protection. 
The practical difference between permitted and protected con-
duct is that the state may more easily interfere with permitted con-
duct than with protected conduct. For example, a cohabiting 
custodial parent's moral conduct, considered along with the parent's 
overall characteristics in comparison with the other parent's, could 
reach levels suggesting that a child's best interests would be served 
by a change in custody - and such could be accomplished without 
ever implicating a constitutional right. 
On the other hand, if a court finds a state's adultery and fornica-
tion laws unconstitutional, sexual conduct between consenting adults 
takes on a protected status. As a result, the state's interest in promot-
ing traditional sexual morality would be more difficult to sustain in 
noncriminal contexts. For instance, New York's highest court re-
cently struck down that state's anti-sodomy law on constitutional 
privacy grounds.412 Shortly thereafter, a lower New York court per-
mitted one adult homosexual to adopt another adult homosexual. 
The lower court noted that prior New York case law would have 
barred such adoptions as being "against public policy," but that the 
more recent privacy case was "dispositive of the public policy issue," 
conveying "eloquent pronouncements [having] considerable import 
for the wider public policy consideration of public morality."413 
These cases illustrate that judicial action in removing criminal 
penalties against sexual conduct can achieve a very different result 
from legislative action toward the same end. Since the justification 
for judicial action of this kind must ordinarily be grounded in a con-
stitutional right, decriminalization decisions by the judiciary are 
likely to move conduct from category (3) all the way across the spec-
trum to category (1 ). Legislative decisions to decriminalize are far 
less significant, because they move a given kind of conduct only from 
category (3) to category (2). 
This characteristic of judicial action is often the result of a court's 
use of heightened scrutiny in reviewing legislation. For instance, the 
412. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
413. in re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 798, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 
(1981). Contra in re Adoption of Adult Anonymous II, 111 Misc. 2d 320,443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 
(1981) (Family court in different New York county from Adult Anonymous I disallows adop-
tion between adult males because no child-parent relationship would be created). 
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effect of locating a constitutional protection within the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment (as with finding that a constitu-
tional right is "fundamental" for equal protection purposes) is to 
place the liberty so recognized almost beyond the reach of legislative 
regulation. This result follows from the analytical tests the Court 
has applied when legislation invades interests classified among the 
most basic of civil liberties. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,414 a 
criminal statute providing for the involuntary sterilization of certain 
recidivist offenders was subjected to "strict scrutiny" because the 
power of procreation was held to be "one of the basic civil rights of 
man," involving matters "fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race."415 Once such a right is recognized, the Court ordi-
narily requires the State to show something like a compelling state 
interest before allowing the legislation to stand. This has proved in 
most cases to be impossible; hence, a finding of unconstitutionality 
has usually followed from a finding that strict scrutiny is required. 
In Roe v. Wade ,416 the compelling state interest test previously used 
only in equal protection cases was applied to state abortion legisla-
tion under a due process analysis that categorized "a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" within a right of 
privacy protected by "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty."417 Thus, the state's burden under either due process 
or equal protection versions of heightened scrutiny may be much the 
same. 
Without delving into the various levels of higher judicial scrutiny 
that have been required throughout the lore of equal protection and 
substantive due process cases, it is sufficient to observe that most of 
the Court's opinions recognizing constitutional rights in the adjudi-
cation of family interests have subjected the legislation involved to 
more than minimal scrutiny. It is largely for that reason that these 
rights can be described as protected to an unusual degree, rather 
than being merely permitted when authorized by state or federal 
law. · 
Before exploring the tests to be employed in determining whether 
a particular interest should be classified in one of these highly pro-
tected categories, it is important to observe the procedural effect of 
the classification, because that effect shifts the burden of proof. 
Often, the burden of proof has thereby been shifted as a beginning 
414. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
415. 316 U.S. at 541. 
416. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . 
. 417. 410 U.S. at 153. 
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assumption prior to any serious analysis of the interests involved. 
Roe v. Wade illustrates the effect of the heightened scrutiny tests on 
difficult issues of social policy. An overriding issue in Roe was when 
life begins. If fetal life were thought to begin in the early stages of 
pregnancy, the obvious interests of an unborn child would have pre-
vented the legalizing of nontherapeutic abortions. If, on the other 
hand, life were thought to begin at some later stage, a pregnant wo-
man's choice about abortion could be constitutionally protected. 
Unfortunately, no one knew in 1973 and no one has since known -
at least not in any demonstrable, objective sense - exactly when life 
begins. In the absence of empirical proof, an assumption had to be 
made about the nature of life and when it begins. The state legisla-
tures enacting the statutes at issue in Roe had obviously made their 
own factual assumptions in favor of something close enough to life 
to warrant the protection of criminal laws. Under traditional mini-
mal scrutiny tests of constitutional law, the Supreme Court would 
have deferred to this legislative finding of fact. In the abortion cases, 
however, the Court began with the premise, that a pregnant woman 
has a constitutional right of privacy. It also assumed that the com-
pelling state interest test applied to privacy cases. In thus classifying 
abortion as a privacy issue, the Court essentially shifted to the state 
the burden of proving the fetus was alive.418 This the state could not 
prove, just as opposing counsel could not prove the fetus was not 
alive. The Court thereby made a factual assumption - in the ab-
sence of concrete evidence - that a fetus is not life. Ironically, the 
Court's majority opinion modestly stated it was not determining 
when life begins. This statement was technically correct. But letting 
the compelling state interest test shift the burden of proof had pre-
cisely the same practical effect as if the Court had determined there 
is in fact no life prior to the third trimester of pregnancy. 
There are enormous implications in shifting the burden of proof 
from those who challenge an existing factual assumption to those 
who -y,rould sustain it. For one thing, it is simply not possible either 
418. The Court did not expressly shift the burden to the State. An analysis of its reason-
ing, however, shows how such a shift took place. The Court recognized that if a fetus is a 
person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, "the appellant's case, of course, col-
lapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." 
410 U.S. at 156-57. Texas further contended that, even if the fourteenth amendment did not 
specifically apply to fetuses, "(L]ife begins at conception ... and ... therefore, the State has 
a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception." 410 U.S. at 159. The 
Court dismissed the State's claim because of the ''wide divergence of thinking on this most 
sensitive and difficult question." 410 U.S. at 160. Uncertainty could allow a woman's decision 
to abort only if the burden to prove that life begins at conception fell upon the State. The 
Court's recognition of the State's interest in protecting potential life, 410 U.S. at 162, does not 
obscure the location of the burden to prove when life begins. 
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to prove or to disprove conclusively the individual and social risks at 
stake in many normative presuppositions that underlie our cul-
ture.419 As a result, the placing of the burden of proof in such cases 
will usually determine the outcome. If that burden is placed on the 
state in cases that effectively define the personal relationships receiv-
ing constitutional protection, the legal meaning of "family" can be 
defined, just as "life" was defined in the abortion cases, not by evi-
dence or even by analysis, but by a simple shift of theoretical as-
sumptions that happens, somehow, automatically. 
By shifting the burden of proof, the judiciary can change the 
most fundamental patterns of our social character with no real proof 
that the change will be for the better - or, in the long run, even 
tolerable. Changes of this kind may not only fail to follow the stan-
dard due process test of drawing upon the traditions and collective 
conscience of the people, but they also can completely overturn long 
established traditions. 
[W]henever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to 
produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we 
have taken the wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavors to 
show that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its 
defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really em-
body the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal 
attack "Why?" - "What good does it do?" - "Who said so?" is never 
permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values 
at all can justify themselves on that level. If you persist in that kind of 
trial you will destroy all values, and so destroy the bases,of your own 
criticism as well as the thing criticized.420 
A presumption in favor of traditional values at least ensures that 
they will endure until demonstrably better alternatives can take their 
place. 
The civil rights era gave birth to an iconoclastic mind set which 
419. For example, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reached the 
general conclusion that the available data are simply inconclusive about the link between ob-
scenity and criminal behavior. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 & n.8 
(1973). 
420. C. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 60-61 (1947) (emphasis in original). Similarly, 
James Hitchcock has said: 
A traditional way of life is one which takes its practical authority from custom itself, from 
the instinctive sense of the rightness of things which a genuinely traditional community 
inculcates in its members. The tree can grow because its roots are not being constantly 
yanked out of the ground for examination. . . . 
But this settled way of life is, because of the very conditions which make it possible, 
highly vulnerable to attack. Skepticism ... can dissolve existing bonds with relative 
ease, even when it is powerless to create new ones. . . . If objections to a novel position 
(for example, homosexuality as merely an "alternative lifestyle") cannot be easily stated 
and concretely demonstrated, then it is assumed that mere prejudice governs the 
objectors. 
Hitchcock, Is L!fe a Spec/a/or Sport, 33 NATL. REV. 96 (1981). 
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demands the abandonment of traditional practices as mere prejudice 
unless specifiable justification is forthcoming. This attitude was ex-
panded by the anti-authoritarianism of the late 1960's. It has found 
its greatest expression in the courts, because basic constitutional the-
ory permits the judiciary to discard majoritarian traditions reflected 
in legislation when they threaten basic civil rights. 
Given the current egalitarian momentum, the Supreme Court 
could, though it has thus far declined to do so,421 adopt John Stuart 
Mill's principle that the state may not regulate individual conduct 
unless the state carries the burden of showing the conduct is demon-
strably harmful. A few state courts have already done just that, 
often in the name of "privacy."422 In that event, laws discriminating 
between married and unmarried persons, or laws restricting the sex-
ual privacy of adults, could become unconstitutional simply because 
compelling evidence that moral permissiveness is either beneficial or 
harmful is so difficult to adduce. Thus, the a priori decision of where 
to place the burden of proof- not the level of evidence or even the 
level of theoretical analysis - will determine the outcome. 
If I were to illustrate my point by drawing a cartoon, I would 
show a bloody and tattered lawyer standing in rags before a judge 
whose desk and chambers were a pile of rubble. Holding up a few 
shreds of paper, the lawyer would say, "Now I think I can show, 
your Honor, that those practices were harmful to society." 
Of course, if our elected representatives were to change our le-
gally defined norms through the democratic process, that would be 
quite another matter. The issues of proof would be no less difficult 
before a legislative committee than before a court. But at least the 
normative assumptions expressed through the legal system would be 
considered by a deliberative process that inherently leaves the bur-
den of proof with those challenging the status quo. In addition, leg-
islative change can move prohibited conduct to a permitted status 
without moving it all the way to a protected status. For example, a 
state legislature could decriminalize private fornication without giv-
ing it the hallowed status of a constitutional protection. In declaring 
a criminal fornication statute unconstitutional, by contrast, a court 
would probably rely on the right of privacy. Judicial action is, for 
this reason, more likely than legislative action to blur the distinction 
between the married and the unmarried statuses - and, hence, to 
blur society's definition of the family. 
421. See notes 254-61 supra and accompanying text. 
422. See note 305 supra and accompanying text. 
552 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:463 
This tendency of interventionist judicial action to sidestep both 
traditional values and normal processes of proof is a major risk in 
the position some take, that the judiciary should intervene when the 
moral consensus of society is in flux in order to permit a new moral 
consensus to evolve,423 or to act as the determiner of "conventional 
morality."424 It may be more than judicial flattery (though not much 
more) to argue that "[t]he Supreme Court is insulated from the bar-
tering and pressures of the legislative process," which gives it the 
ability "to look beyond the demands of self-interested minority lob-
bies in an effort to discern the attitudes . . . of the moral culture at 
large";425 or that "[w]hat distinguishes courts and makes judicial 
protection indispensable is an institutional commitment to consis-
tency, reason, and principle . . . ."426 
But these assessments are as dangerous as they are naive. First of 
all, they assign to the Court the role of a majoritarian institution, 
which simply reflects the contemporary tendency to see the Court 
not as a "remembering or conserving" or even as a counter-
majoritarian institution, but as "an innovator or pathfinder. Liti-
gants representing today's fashionable causes know this very well in-
deed, which is why they are litigants in the courts rather than 
lobbyists before the legislatures."427 Furthermore, seeing the Court 
too easily in this role merely sings once again the sad substantive due 
process song of Lochner v. New York,428 because it forgets the stir-
ring caution of Justice Holmes that 
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it 
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that 
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they 
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.429 
It is, therefore, not the place of the Court - especially when there is 
no constitutional text to guide it - to be constantly seeking a 'judg-
mental balance of shifting evidence or values"; rather, it must pro-
ceed from ''virtually absolute and enduring principle[s],"430 that are 
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
423. See Tribe, Structural .Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). 
424. Perry,supra note 255, at 417; Perry,Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: 
The Ethical Function of Substantive .Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Perry, Abortion]. 
425. Perry, Abortion, supra note 424, at 728. 
426 . .Developments, supra note 10, at 1176. 
427. W. BERNS, supra note 57, at 233. 
428. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
429. 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
430. A. Cox, supra note 409, at 114. 
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ranked as fundamental."431 In that way, the Court is the guardian of 
tradition, not its enemy. The following section considers criteria use-
ful in identifying - as due process "liberty" - when such funda-
mental and enduring principles are truly at stake. 
B. Defining "Liberty'~· Balancing the Individual 
and Social Interests 
As noted at the outset of this Article, the central conflict in the 
constitutional family cases occurs between individual and social in-
terests in intimate relationships. A balance must be struck between 
these two sets of interests if we are to reach sound decisions in this 
area. Once heightened scrutiny is invoked, however, the analysis of_ 
compelling or other state or social interests is not very meaningful as 
a practical matter. The procedural consequences of heightened scru-
tiny in effect "decide the question in advance in our very way of 
putting it."432 Thus a far more crucial stage of analysis is involved in 
the process of determining what individual interests should be in-
cluded within such conceptual sanctuaries as liberty or privacy. 
Several approaches have been suggested in addressing this task. 
Justice Black's "total incorporation" view433 was never adopted by a 
majority of the Justices. The approach of Justice Douglas to privacy, 
first espoused in Griswold v. Connecticut ,434 which rejected substan-
tive due process in favor of an even more vague notion of unenumer-
ated rights, was replaced within a few years by approaches to privacy 
essentially synonymous with the due process liberty approach. The 
term "right of privacy" has nonetheless lingered, despite the similar-
ity of its present contours to "liberty."435 
The Court has seldom been explicit about the tests it uses in de-
fining the limits of privacy or liberty, nor has it provided many com-
prehensive and consistent statements that would identify a 
supporting rationale for the interests it has included in the protected 
sphere. This mixture of silence and ambiguity is due, in part, to the 
Court's reluctance to resurrect earlier criticisms of substantive due 
process.436 It is also due, unfortunately, to a decline, ever since Gris-
431. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
432. Pound, supra note 23, at 2. 
433. Black maintained that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorpo-
rated all of the Bill of Rights, but only those rights. For a full expression of this theory, see 
Adamson v. California, 32 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
434. 381 us. 479 (1965). 
435. See Part II F supra. 
436. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
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wold, in the Court's felt need to justify its reliance on unenumerated 
constitutional rights. The Griswold opinions, including Justice 
Harlan's respected dissent in the related case of Poe v. Ullman ,437 
showed the Court struggling through a vivid demonstration of judi-
cial restraint and painstaking analysis. In Roe v. Wade, by contrast, 
the Court's failure to articulate a reasoned justification for its resort 
to substantive due process unleashed a barrage of criticism - even 
from scholars who personally favored the results of the abortion 
cases - from which the Court may yet be reeling.438 By now, how-
ever, existing bits of reasoning can be pulled together to reach the 
conclusion that "[i]n the family cases, the Court has consistently 
turned to tradition as a source of previously unrecognized aspects of 
the liberty protected by the due process clauses."439 This is, essen-
tially, the Cardozo-Frankfurter-Harlan approach to substantive due 
process. It has also been common for the Court's more recent cases 
to speak in terms of a "cluster of constitutionally protected choices" 
related to marriage and childrearing440 that seems to draw its justifi-
cation from the similarity of this subject matter to the "family" due 
process cases of the 1920's. 
Justice Harlan formulated the best known statement of the tradi-
tion test in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman .441 A recent student analysis 
437. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Though Harlan was dissenting, his 
view of the statute in question was adopted by a majority a few years later in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
438. Much of the commentary is summarized in J. NooNAN, supra note 359 at 20-32, 
439 . .Developments, supra note 10, at 1177 (footnote omitted). 
440. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
441. Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined 
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this 
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates 
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the de-
mands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has 
of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt 
free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak 
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition 
is a living t,hlng. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long 
survive, wliile a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), after quoting Justice Harlan's lan-
guage, Justice Powell added, "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanc-
tity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our 
most cherished values, moral and cultural." 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(footnotes omitted). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a stroni; tradition of parental con-
cern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This pnmary role of the parents in 
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring Ameri-
can tradition. 
406 U.S. at 232. One of the most widely cited earlier tests for defining "liberty" came from the 
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of the test illustrates some of the problems of interpreting it.442 The 
analysis suggests, for instance, that "the Court will not recognize . . . 
traditional values" the continued viability of which "has been seri-
ously questioned."443 The contemporary attitude of "seriously ques-
tioning" virtually all traditional values is sufficiently widespread that 
this qualification should not be taken too seriously until it has been 
identified, much less relied upon, by the Court. The notion of con-
tinued viability does point _to the limitations of a tradition-oriented 
approach, however, since the Court is not likely to find ultimate val-
ues in a tradition as objectionable as, say, racial prejudice. 
There are also inherent difficulties in knowing just what is tradi-
tional about a tradition. One commentator has said that: "The 
Court must determine what characteristics of a traditional value 
render it of constitutional import; it may then adopt a functional ap-
proach to the right letting its rationale dictate its scope."444 This 
description leaves considerable latitude, however, for defining both 
"value" and "functional" approaches. One might conclude from the 
marriage and family cases, for instance, that intimate human associ-
ation is the traditional value, and that such functional equivalents445 
as cohabitation or communal marriage should therefore be pro-
tected. Illustrating further, many would today assume that the core 
value protected by the Constitution and our traditions is individual 
autonomy. Thus, any infringement on personal autonomy could be 
viewed as invading a traditionally protected value. The obvious 
weakness of this approach is that it neglects the need to weigh social 
or other competing interests - even if they have also been tradition-
ally recognized - until a nearly irrebuttable presumption has al-
ready been created against any interest competing with individual 
autonomy. 
Louis Henkin identified the glaring need for the privacy cases to 
adopt a test that weighs "the public goods that compete with 'pri-
debates on whether the fourteenth amendment incorporated all, or only the most preferred, of 
the Bill of Rights guarantees. Defending the "selective incorporation" approach, Justice Car-
dozo said that "liberty" should include only those safeguards that are 
of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is ... to violate a 
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusells, [291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)] .... 
• . . If the fourteenth amendment has absorbed [these liberties], the process of absorp-
tion has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed. 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted). 
442. See .Developments, supra note 10, at 1177-87. 
443. Id. at 1179, ·1180 & n.134. 
444. Id. at 1181 (footnotes omitted). 
445. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
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vacy' in these cases."446 This is the same analytical step sought by 
P.ound's attempt to place the individual and social interests on "the 
same plane" during at least some stage of the inquiry.447 Such a 
weighing process 
has never received refined scrutiny . . . in applying the Bill of Rights; 
in the Privacy cases, it has had hardly any scrutiny at all. . . . 
Especially now that we have added a new, expandable zone of au-
tonomy, fundamental but not absolute, a jurisprudence of balancing of 
rights and goods cries for thinking about public goods.448 
While such comparisons may prove difficult, this difficulty does not 
justify ignoring the public goods that compete with privacy. The 
Court's primary business, after all, is making difficult choices be-
tween conflicting values. 
Indeed, the Court's work in such other contexts as the Bill of 
Rights has developed a sufficient methodology to weigh individual 
and social interests that the analogy to those cases produces an ex-
tremely helpful insight in understanding the unarticulated analytical 
premises for defining "liberty" in the Court's family cases. For ex-
ample, in determining which elements of the Bill of Rights should be 
binding on the states by incorporation into the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, the Court has in recent years "displayed 
a preference for justifying its actions in terms of explicit provisions 
of the Constitution or plain implications of a democratic form of gov-
ernment ."449 Thus, in Duncan v. Louisiana,450 the right of trial by 
jury in criminal cases was held to be within the meaning of due pro-
cess "liberty" because it is among those "fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions";451 but more specifically, trial by jury contributes to the 
ends of a free society because peer determinations "prevent oppres-
sion by the Government."452 If a judge has "plenary power," gov-
ernmental authority is "unchecked."453 
The history of first amendment adjudication also makes it very 
clear that more is at stake in identifying the root policies of preferred 
constitutional freedoms than merely minimizing governmental inter-
446. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430. 
447. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
448. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430. 
449. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 781 (emphasis added). 
450. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
451. 391 U.S. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Herbert 
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))). 
452. 391 U.S. at 155 (footnote omitted). 
453. 391 U.S. at 156. 
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ference with individual autonomy. Free speech has enjoyed a spe-
cial status in large part because of the relationship of unrestrained 
discourse to the underlying political theory of democracy. Some sig-
nificant aggregate end in an open society is preserved by making the 
boundaries of permissible speech and association in the ideological 
marketplace as wide as possible. For example, the freedom of asso-
ciation is important enough to be binding on the states through the 
fourteenth amendment in part because association is important to 
effective advocacy of public and private points of view, whether 
political, economic, religious, or cultural.454 Justice Stewart has also 
noted that the exalted status of freedom of association was designed 
only to protect such "ideological freedom" as "the promotion of 
speech, assembly, the press, or religion";455 it was never intended to 
protect associations based on "no interest other than the gratifica-
tion, convenience, and economy of sharing the same residence."456 
An even more vivid illustration may be found in the Court's well 
established approach to obscenity, which has not been entitled to 
first amendment protection because obscenity does not contribute to 
the ultimate ends of a democratic society, despite its obvious charac-
ter as a form of speech. "[T)o equate the free and robust exchange of 
ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene 
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and 
its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom."457 To say that 
obscenity has not "the slightest redeeming social importance"458 is, 
therefore, not only a way oftrying to define obscenity; perhaps more 
importantly, it is a way of saying that extraordinary constitutional 
freedoms are preferred in no small part because they promote mat-
ters of social value as well as promoting individual liberty. 
The elimination of racial discrimination has taken on the highest 
possible priority not only because discriminatory laws have the effect 
of reducing individual liberty, but also because an overall pattern of 
racial discrimination impairs full participation by disadvantaged 
classes in the nation's economic, social, and political processes. The 
Court's historic concern with school desegregation, for example, re-
flected a strongly held belief about the relationship between educa;. 
454. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
455. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 535 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
456. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
457. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). See also notes 369-80 supra and accom-
panying text, which address the relationship between the Court's rejection of first amendment 
protection for obscenity and the Court's failure to extend the right of privacy to sex outside 
marriage. 
458. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
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tion and participation in American society.459 A democratic society 
seeks equality among its citizens as the standard in providing oppor-
tunity for economic and political participation, social contribution, 
and individual growth. Those affirmative opportunities go well be-
yond a concern with negative restrictions on personal autonomy. In-
deed, the constitutionally approved remedies often restrict autonomy 
as severely as did the discriminatory practice itself. 
The relationship between the individual and social interests is re-
flected in Roscoe Pound's view that: 
When the legal system recognizes certain individual rights, it does so 
because it has been decided that society as a whole will benefit by satis-
fying the individual claims in question; for example, when the legal 
system guarantees the individual freedom of speech, it advances soci-
ety's interest in facilitating social, political, and cultural progress. This 
interest ... is more important than society's interest in preserving ex-
isting institutions.460 
This same relationship underlies Louis Henkin's concern that in the 
privacy cases, the balance between private rights and public goods 
"has had hardly any scrutiny at all."461 The Court's failure explicitly 
to articulate this balance in its analysis of the family cases is unfortu-
nate, because only in thoughtful.Jy assessing "the public goods that 
compete with 'privacy' in these cases" will the Court find any 
rational way of distinguishing which private conduct should be 
within and which should be beyond the reach of constitutional 
protection. 462 
This Article submits that the "family" relationships deserving 
constitutional protection as substantive liberty interests under the 
due process clause may be identified by the same view of social inter-
est as that used in the doctrine of selective incorporation, in defining 
the scope of first amendment freedoms in obscenity cases, and in 
other siplilar contexts: the extent to which protection of the interest 
furthers the ends of a democratic society. It is assumed, of course, 
that a highly significant individual liberty interest would also be 
459. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern• 
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It 
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru• 
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
460. Auerbach, supra note 24, at 208. 
461. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430. 
462. See id. at 1429-33. For a discussion of misconceptions that have arisen from viewing 
"privacy" in a broad sense as a source of constitutional rights in a day of space-age technology, 
see notes 302-07 supra and accompanying text. 
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identified. When the legal system thus protects such relationships as 
kinship and formal marriage, it advances not only the immediate 
individual interests involved, but society's interest in social and 
political structures that sustain long-term individual liberty. As de-
veloped more fully in Part I, supra, the structure of marriage and 
kinship responds to that social interest by maximizing the interest of 
children and society in a stable family environment; by ensuring a 
socialization process and an attitude toward personal obligation that 
maximizes democracy's interest in the voluntary "public virtue" of 
its citizens; by maintaining marriage and kinship as legally recogniz-
able structures that mediate between the individual and the State, 
thereby limiting governmental power; and by maintaining sources of 
objective jurisprudence that will ensure stable personal expectations 
and encourage generality of laws, thereby minimizing the arbitrary 
power of the State. In these ways, the structure of formal family life 
emphasizes that sense of "ordered liberty"463 necessary to achieve 
individual liberty as a long-range objective. Anarchy maximizes in-
dividual liberty in the extreme, but only in the short run. It has been 
correctly observed that "the greatest failure of the individualistic ap-
proach to human rights has been the inability to recognize how an 
ardent concern for freedom, understood in a particular way, can it-
self contribute in the long run, to the undermining of freedom."464 
The formal family aids our quest for long-run liberty. That is why 
the Constitution does, and should, protect it. 
The extent to which an asserted legal interest may further the 
ends of a democratic society should be weighed, in the process of 
constitutional analysis, at the time the Court is determining whether 
the nature of the interest qualifies it for the protection of heightened 
scrutiny. At this stage, the Court is neither deferring to nor doubting 
a legislative judgment; rather, it seeks only to identify the nature of 
the interest at stake. Once that step has been taken, and if height-
ened scrutiny is thereby invoked, consideration can then be given the 
State's interest in regulating the protected interest in the manner em-
ployed by the legislative enactment in question. That process of rea-
soning has underlain the Court's approach to defining the scope of 
first amendment protection and the scope of the incorporation doc-
trine under the fourteenth amendment. The Court's approach to de-
fining privacy as part of due process liberty ( or, preferably, leaving 
463. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
464. Hitchcock, Beyond 1984: Big Brother Versus the Family, HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 
1980, at 54, 56. 
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aside confusing references to privacy465 and speaking simply of lib-
erty interests in the family) should follow the same pattern. When 
this is done, the individual and social interests can initially be com-
pared "on the same plane" so that the very decision to categorize one 
claim as "individual" and the other as "social" or as a "state inter-
est" does not cause the Court to "decide the question in advance" by 
its "very way of putting it."466 
This method of analysis is dictated not only by analogy to other 
contexts of constitutional adjudication, but also by the inherent pro-
cess of defining due process liberty. Thus, Justice Harlan's under-
standing of the "purposes" and "traditions" behind the preferred 
legal status of marriage led him to include marriage within due pro-
cess liberty just as that same understanding led him to exclude 
"adultery, homosexuality, [and] fornication ... however privately 
practiced."467 This analytical step was taken in defining the nature 
of "liberty" interests. The next analytical step would consider 
whether the specific State interest at issue in the case justifies any 
invasion of the preferred form of "liberty." 
C. Policies That Compete with Family Liberty: A Perspective on 
"Protected" and "Permitted" Interests 
Explicit use of the analytical model suggested in the preceding 
section would not have altered the outcome of most of the Supreme 
Court's family cases. For the most part, the Court has reacted intui-
tively to the limits on personal autonomy naturally intimated by 
deeply rooted social interests. Still, more explicit analysis is vital to 
the articulation of a coherent rationale that will guide future cases 
and lower courts. The number of cases in which social and individ-
ual interests conflict in family-related cases is likely to increase, 
given the existing social and legal momentum. 
Many courts and legislatures have begun to recognize compelling 
claims that would once have been denied by rigid policies that fa-
vored formal marriage above all competing interests. These devel-
opments are not generally the result of deliberate antipathy toward 
marriage or family values. Rather, in each circumstance, decisions 
have been made to advance important policy interests deserving le-
gal protection, despite the conflict between those interests and the 
policy favoring formal family ties. As recognition of such interests 
465. See notes 307-08 supra and accompanying text. 
466. Pound, supra note 23, at 2. 
467. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
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has increased, the policy preference for marriage has inevitably ap-
peared to diminish and even "wither."468 Marriage cannot realisti-
cally be expected to take such priority that all competing interests 
must forever go unrecognized, even though the law continues to rec-
ognize marriage as the "foundation of society." Thus, many of the 
recent developments may be long overdue. 
At the same time, a proper perspective is needed to make clear 
that even as other interests make relative gains, the interest in mar-
riage and kinship can have its own ultimate priority as represented 
by constitutional protection. To develop such a perspective, consider 
once again the distinctions between "protected," "permitted," and 
"prohibited" conduct.469 Uncertainty about the meaning of the con-
stitutionally protected category is created when claims in the middle 
category of permitted conduct must be balanced against claims in 
the protected category. Increasingly common - and increasingly 
important - cases of this kind arise when permitted rights such as 
welfare entitlements or employment rights are affected by policies 
that express the state's preferred desire to support formal marriage. 
If the protected status of marriage were always given preference, 
many just claims would remain unsatisfied. Ignoring compelling 
claims can be understandably troublesome, when, for example, the 
state has tried indirectly to prohibit extramarital sexual behavior us-
ing methods that have only a tenuous relationship (or less) to the 
state objective.470 As a result of such trade-offs, without any direct 
change in the constitutional status of either marriage or material en-
titlements, "both marriage and the legitimacy of parentage have de-
clined in importance as determinates of material benefits."471 
468. Glendon, supra note 119, at 663. Such changes in legal policy in the United States in 
many cases reflect "a long historical process" throughout the Western democracies "that has 
effected a fundamental alteration in the relative social and economic importance of family, 
work and government as determinants of wealth, standing, self-esteem and economic secur-
ity." M. GLENDON, supra note 77, at 2. 
469. See text at notes 409-10 supra. 
470. A court decidine; that private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected might 
hold a sex law unconstitutional but condone discriminatory hiring practices, or vice versa, 
because different ranges of government interests are involved. The court might find, for 
example, that there is a legitimate and sufficient state interest in promoting marriage or 
discouraging immorality to justify a law criminalizing private sexual behavior. But if that 
court viewed a refusal to hire a homosexual as nothing but a punishment for the same 
behavior, the court might conclude that the civil disability was not sufficiently related to 
the state's goal, since that goal is adequately and more directly served by the criminal law. 
Conversely, the court might hold the criminal law unconstitutional as not sufficiently re-
lated to any legitimate state interest but condone a refusal to hire a homosexual as a 
teacher, since the state's interest in the latter context could be viewed as permissible and 
more substantial. 
Note, supra note 32, at 727. 
471. Karst, supra note 11, at 648. See generally Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: 
A .D!!ferent Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (1981); Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns 
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A number of permitted interests may cause courts to limit the 
protection traditionally afforded to the formal family. It is instruc-
tive to observe the effects of this phenomenon in situations where a 
particular legal policy has demanded - and sometimes taken -
something from the status of marriage as the price for upholding its 
own valid interest. In the illegitimacy cases, for example, the Court 
has tended to find that children born out of wedlock should not be 
punished by state policies designed to discourage illicit sex - not 
because such policies are beyond the state's authority, but because 
the punishment of innocent children is both an ineffective and unfair 
means of pursuing the state policy. The interests of illegitimate chil-
dren have been deemed significant enough in these cases to rise to 
the status of their own specially protected constitutional position.472 
For reasons also related to the economic welfare of illegitimate 
children, the Court has - without giving protected constitutional 
status to the right to receive welfare aid - invalidated state regula-
tions that denied welfare assistance to the children of cohabiting par-
ents.473 In response to state claims that regulations of this kind were 
justified by an interest in discouraging illicit sexual relationships and 
illegitimate births, the Court acknowledged that the state could regu-
late illicit sex and illegitimacy, but not by the device of absolutely 
disqualifying needy children. The Court found that protection of 
dependent children was the paramount goal of the welfare assist-
ance, accepting as inevitable the reality that "there is no existing 
means by which Alabama can assist the children while ensuring that 
the mother does not benefit."474 The Supreme Court's intervention 
in these cases has clearly resulted from its concern about the urgent 
economic dependency of illegitimate children in poverty-class 
households, not from judicial indifference to marital status. 
There has been a growing policy interest in tort law in compen-
sating the victims of tortiously caused injuries. This interest com-
petes both with the common law's historic fear of unlimited liability 
and with the law's traditional preference for protecting only the clos-
est relational interests. The restricting of many tort claims to persons 
related by marriage or kinship has been one important way of 
resolving the policy tensions. However, at least one federal court has 
of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275; Glendon, supra 
note 119. 
472. See Part II A supra. 
473. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Both cases were decided by using the rational basis test. 
474. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335 n.4 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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recently expanded the action for loss of consortium to include the 
claim of an unmarried cohabitant,475 even though similar consor-
tium claims have not been allowed elsewhere,476 nor have the courts 
generally recognized the claims of nonmarital partners in wrongful 
death actions.477 The court was moved by its acceptance of an over-
riding policy of extending tort actions to compensate injured parties, 
and was not deterred by the subjectivity of evaluating the nature of a 
consortium interest between unmarried cohabitants.478 
The celebrated Marvin v. Marvin case479 is the result of empha-
sizing the contractual rights of cohabiting couples, not of equating 
cohabitation with marriage. Michelle Marvin was held to enjoy 
none of the rights of marital partners under California community 
property laws, because the court did not regard Lee and Michelle as 
a "family" within the meaning of California's Family Law Act. The 
Marvin court took pains to point out that, "Lest we be misunder-
stood, . . . the structure of society itself largely depends upon the 
institution of marriage, and nothing we have said . . . should be 
taken to derogate from that institution."480 Moreover, the court may 
well have intended to encourage formal marriage by removing the 
financial incentives for cohabiting without marriage.481 Other courts 
have reached an even more cautious conclusion about Marvin-like 
fact situations, not because they believe the policy preference for 
marriage prevents cohabitants from entering into any contracts,482 
but because they believe a strong ( category 1) preference for mar-
riage could be undermined if the courts allow implied contractual 
claims (category 2) to arise from merely living together.483 The 
question of allocating policy priorities between upholding the insti-
475. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); see also Comment, Ex-
tending Consortium Rights lo Unmarried Cohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 911 (1981); Com-
ment, Loss of Consortium and the Unmarried Cohabitant, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 437. 
476. See, e.g., Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 
A.2d 165 (Me. 1980). 
477. See, e.g., Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
478. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). The facts were espe-
cially compelling- the couple had been previously married and divorced. They had intended 
to remarry, but believed they could not do so in view of the injury which became the subject of 
the lawsuit. Ordinarily, the very lack of a long-term commitment that characterizes cohabita-
tion would make the valuation of a loss of consortium claim impossible to fix. 
479. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977), modified, 122 Cal. App. 3d 
871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981) (deleting rehabilitative award to plaintiff). 
480. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122. 
481. See Beck, Nontraditional L!festyles and the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 685, 690 (1978-79). 
482. Contracts are generally permitted when they concern "independent" matters and sex-
ual relations are not part of the consideration. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 587, 597 
(1932); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1476 (1962). 
483. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979) ("Of substantially 
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tution of marriage and recognizing freedom of contract is - as with 
so many other policy conflicts - a judgment question. As the Mar-
vin case illustrates, the contemporary climate has allowed contrac-
tual interests to gain somewhat in that process.484 It is not accurate 
to infer, however, that, as a result, cohabitation has moved from a 
"permitted" to a "protected" status by the recognition of contractual 
rights. 
The law of evidence has also established, over the years, certain 
rules designed to protect and uphold the confidential relationship of 
husband and wife. Competing against that interest has been an in-
terest in securing all relevant testimony in litigation. Both interests 
were recently weighed by the Supreme Court in reaching the conclu-
sion that a spousal privilege should not bar the voluntary testimony 
of one spouse against the other concerning non.confidential mat-
ters.485 The broad sweep of the prior testimony rule (requiring both 
spouses to consent and covering non.confidential subjects)486 was 
narrowed on the grounds that it impinged unnecessarily on the pub-
lic's "right to every man's evidence"487 and that the ancient idea jus-
tifying the privilege (notions of self-incrimination arising from the 
common law's view of legal unity between husband and wife) was 
long since outmoded. The court did stress the importance of "mar-
riage, home, and family relationships - already subject to much 
erosion in our day,"488 but concluded that no other testimonial privi-
lege covers non.confidential communication and that "when one 
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding 
. . . there is. probably little in the way of marital harmony for the 
privilege to preserve."489 Predictably, even before this case, the cur-
rent climate had provoked consideration of whether the spousal evi-
greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such recognition 
upon our society and the institution of marriage."). 
484. A federal district court recently held that, because a Marvin-type suit between unmar-
ried cohabitants was strictly a contract action, federal jurisdiction over the suit was not barred 
by the recognized domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Anastasi v, 
Anastasi, 532 F. Supp. 720, 725 (D.N.J. 1982). On the other hand, the California Supreme 
Court is not willing to allow a prison inmate to receive overnight visits from a woman not 
recognized as his lawful wife, because the state law authorizing such visits by persons related 
through blood, marriage, or adoption intends only to preserve "family unity." In re Cum-
mings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 873, 640 P.2d 1101, 1102, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827 (1982). 
485. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
486. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
487. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). 
488. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980). 
489. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). However, the purpose of the privi-
lege is to protect confidentiality at the time of the conversation, when there may be more to 
preserve than at the time of the testimony. 
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dentiary privilege should be extended to unmarried cohabitants.490 
The whole range of divorce-related issues, such as alimony, prop-
erty settlement, and child custody presents another fertile field for 
conflict over the legal preference that should be given to formal mar-
riage. The conflict has arisen most pointedly when the custodial 
spouse is found to be cohabiting with another person, sometimes 
homosexually. The issue also arises when one spouse claims the 
other should no longer receive alimony because the other spouse is 
cohabiting with another person.491 The movement in recent years 
has been away from rigid assumptions and toward a more pragmatic 
approach that does not automatically equate cohabitation with either 
marriage or "immoral" conduct. As in the illegitimacy cases, legal 
and social policy would obviously prefer that the custody of children 
could always be assigned to two stable, married parents. Support for 
the marital institution would dictate a similar preference. However, 
the choices more frequently focus on the "least detrimental available 
altemative"492 among two or more unattractive possibilities. Under 
those circumstances, cohabitation is only one of a number of factors. 
Some courts have judged its relative importance to be very high,493 
while others have declined to adjust custody on "moral climate" 
grounds without clear proof of harm to the children.494 
Society's current interest in sex discrimination has also led to 
considerable reexamination of statutes and common law rules based 
on sex-role stereotypes. Even the changes that have occurred, how-
ever, do not warrant the uncritical assumption that all sex-discrimi-
nation legislation is designed to remove all distinctions based on 
marital status. Some judges have missed that point. For example, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held recently that a federal equal 
credit opportunity law gave an engaged - but unmarried - couple 
490. See Comment, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privilege: Is Marriage Really Neces-
sary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411. 
491. E.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Me. 1980); Myhre v. Myhre, 296 
N.S.2d 905, 907-09 (S.D. 1980). 
492. The phrase is from J. GOLDSTEIN, A. SOLNIT & A. FREUD, supra ~ote 39, at 53. 
493. E.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979) (cohabiting divorcee loses 
custody because of potential injury to moral well-being and development of children), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1980) (potential-not actual-harm 
to child from mother's lesbianism sufficient to warrant change of custody), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 911 (1981); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982) (psychiatrist's testimony 
that child in custody of cohabiting lesbian mother would face inevitable and serious trauma 
persuaded court to change custody to father). See generally Case Note, Modffication of Child 
Custody Predicated on Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 169 (analysis 
of the Jarrell case.) 
494. See In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St. 2d 37, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979); Schuster v. Schuster, 90 
Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978). 
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the right to aggregate their incomes in determining creditworthiness 
in a joint mortgage application.495 By basing its decision on the no-
tion that the subject federal law forbade any discrimination on the 
basis of marital status, the court may have established a precedent 
for requiring financial institutions to aggregate the claims of all un-
married couples, whether communal, homosexual, or otherwise. It 
has been observed that if the two plaintiffs in the case had been mar-
ried - but not to each other - the defendant firm would still have 
refused to aggregate their incomes, because there was no marital re-
lationship between the two ofthem.496 The legislative history reveals 
that the law's entire intent was only to remove discrimination against 
individual women in obtaining credit.497 Logic also suggests that the 
likely duration of a relationship should be a factor in determining 
the creditworthiness of an association between two people. The 
court ignored both of these factors, and also failed to see in its deci-
sion any implications for the institution of marriage. This case illus-
trates that concerns with sex discrimination can be uncritically 
translated into a broad mandate for equating the statuses of married 
and unmarried couples - a problem very different from sex discrim-
ination. When Congress or state legislatures wish to begin treating 
unmarried couples as a disadvantaged class for purposes peculiar to 
that class, that will be soon enough to challenge the protected status 
of marriage. In the meantime, the potent legal weapons of anti-sex 
discrimination laws are best reserved for their intended purposes. 
There is also a large category of problems that would fit under 
such headings as decriminalization and victimless crimes. Without 
attempting to address that large subject, it should at least be noted in 
passing that in the last fifteen years, twenty-one states have alto-
gether repealed their laws prohibiting homosexual activity by con-
senting adults. Another thirteen states have reduced the crime from 
a felony to a misdemeanor.498 Fornication is a crime today in only 
fifteen states and the District of Columbia.499 Of equal importance, 
even the states that have fornication laws rarely enforce them. At 
the same time, some states have "fiercely resisted" decriminalization 
and "stringent penalties for sodomy are the rule rather than the ex-
495. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
496. Note, Protection of Unmarried Couples Against Discrimination in Lending Under l/1e 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 93 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1979). 
497. See kl. at 434. 
498. Grey, supra note 10, at 95 n.67; H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE· 
TATION 1156 (1979), 
499. The statutes are summarized in Note, supra note 411, at 254. 
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ception" when enforcement is undertaken. 500 In general, much of 
the support for decriminalization of sex crimes "has been based on 
practical concerns" relating to enforcement difficulties, "not on any 
notion that sexual freedom is a human right."501 Thus, relaxed atti-
tudes toward the enforcement of sex crimes do not mean that sexual 
privacy outside marriage is in a protected position. And even if leg-
islative decriminalization were to take place on a larger scale, that 
would only move nonmarital sex to a permitted category, not a pro-
tected one. 
Other movements in the law have also tended to diminish the 
place of formal marriage as the price of upholding other competing 
interests.502 For instance, the divorce reform movement, which be-
gan by distinguishing between' personal fault and actual breakdown 
of a marriage, has now created in some states the practical right of 
unilateral marriage termination. In unilateral action, the interests of 
the marital partner and the interests of children are likely to receive 
reduced levels of consideration. 
This abbreviated sketch has summarized a number of important 
legal policies that have been the subjects of increased judicial, and 
sometimes legislative, attention in recent years: policies favoring 
welfare entitlements for the needy - especially children; the interest 
of tort law in compensating the victims of actual losses; the interest 
of contract law in maximizing freedom of contract; the policy favor-
ing maximum information in evidentiary rules; the preserving of ex-
isting child-parent relationships in deciding between imperfect 
custodial parents; increased emphasis in eradicating sex discrimina-
tion; movements to decriminalize sex crimes; and the divorce reform 
movement. It is significant that, except for the equal protection issue 
in the illegitimacy cases, none of the policy interests mentioned here 
draws its strength from a position of preferred constitutional status. 
500. Note, supra note 32, at 738. 
501. Grey, supra note 10, at 95. Lord Patrick Devlin, one of the best-known defenders of 
society's right to enforce its collective moral judgments, is inclined to agree: ','Adultery of the 
sort that breaks up marriage seems to me to be just as harmful to the social fabric as homosex-
uality or bigamy. The only ground for putting it outside the criminal law is that a law which 
made it a crime would be too difficult to enforce; it is too generally regarded as a human 
weakness not suitably punished by imprisonment." P. DEVLIN, supra note 194, at 22. The 
privacy concerns affecting enforcement of sex crimes are discussed more fully in Part II F 
supra. 
The repeal of an anti-sodomy statute while a teacher dismissal case was still pending was 
held not to "relieve the conduct of its immoral status" in Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 
10, 88 Wash. 2d 286,297,559 P.2d 1340, 1346, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). The existence 
of sex crime statutes has generally not been a prerequisite to the dismissal of public school 
teachers for lewd or immoral conduct. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 19 (1977). 
502. See generally Glendon, supra note 119. 
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Similarly, few of these interests are in the "prohibited" category. 
Most are simply "permitted" interests that compete in an infinite va-
riety of circumstances with other interests. The constitutionally 
"protected" status of marriage and kinship still remains in a 
uniquely favored position. As has been demonstrated, the preserva-
tion of that protected status is based on policies applicable to formal 
family interests that do not apply to other interests, even though for 
more limited "permitted" purposes such other interests may be valid. 
Nevertheless, the recent growth of interests that compete with 
marriage may be regarded as a threat to the continued existence of 
marriage as a preferred status. The policies of social interest that 
seek to uphold formal family ties are having increasing difficulty de-
fending themselves against an emerging set of legal concepts whose 
most potent powers are now reserved for the enforcement of equal 
individual rights. Furthermore, the legal system has always had dif-
ficulty enforcing affirmative duties, the discharge of which is vital to 
the maintenance of family relationships. Thus the formal family's 
chief source of protection may be the willingness of the judiciary to 
restrain itself in creating even more exceptions to the policies that 
support a general sense of obligation in family relationships. There 
is otherwise no single institution in our system responsible to deter-
mine when the cumulative effect of so many exceptions to a pro-
tected marriage preference policy finally becomes so dominant that 
the marriage policy is, for most practical purposes, overwhelmed. 
When the law relaxes enough indirect supports for the formal fam-
ily, formally based family life is left unprotected and vulnerable to 
the eroding momentum of an incessant individualism. When that 
happens, even those sympathetic to the removal of arbitrary limits 
on personal liberty register concern: 
U.S. law, from its beginnings, has favored the traditional family for its 
critical role in the nurture of future generations. Even those who op-
pose discrimination against homosexuals may question the wisdom of 
giving gay families the same support.503 
The Supreme Court's extension of constitutional protection to mar-
riage and kinship, while denying that protection to sexual privacy 
among the unmarried, is consistent with a general posture of support 
for the formal family. A clearer understanding of that position and 
the policies that sustain it, as suggested in Parts I and II, could clar-
ify the meaning of family ties and the social purposes served by 
them. Such understanding might encourage the judicial self-re-
straint necessary to sustain marriage as the "foundation of society." 
503. And Now Gay Family Rights'! TIME, Dec. 13, 1982, at 74. 
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The individual tradition and the family tradition, both histori-
cally at the heart of American culture, are the products of two very 
different heritages, both conceptually and historically. In the past, 
the two traditions have been mutually reinforcing; now, however, 
they may be on such a collision course as to become mutually exclu-
sive. A comment on the origins and intentions of the two traditions 
may provide some perspective in seeking to restore the necessary 
compatibility between them. 
Sir Henry Maine's celebrated generalization about the long 
sweep of history from Status to Contract offers one way of compar-
ing the roots of the two traditions. Reaching back to the earliest 
stirrings of recorded history, Maine wrote that the family antedated 
the individual as the primary unit of which both the law and society 
took account: 
[S]ociety in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be at present, 
a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men who 
composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be 
most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society 
was the Family, of a modem society the Individual.504 
Since that time, "The movement of the progressive societies has . . 
been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency 
and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The individual 
is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws 
take account." And as the law has reflected this development, the tie 
which replaces the "reciprocity in rights and duties" of the family 
has come to be "Contract." Hence, "we may say that the movement 
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Sta-
tus to Contract."505 
Nevertheless, some vestiges of the ancient concept of Status have 
continued, as both the law and society still assume that people who 
enter "the order of matrimony" or become mothers and fathers take 
upon themselves a form of Status that confers a set of rights and 
obligations having an almost timeless kind of meaning.506 Nobody 
needed to explain to the worldwide television audience just what 
Prince Charles and Lady Diana were doing in 1981 on that summer 
day at St. Paul's, exchanging vows in a ritual older than their royal 
504. H. MAINE, supra note 52 (emphasis in original). 
505. Id at 163-65 (emphasis omitted). 
506. For a discussion of marriage as a status construct, in the context of various interpreta-
tions, see Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious 
Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1067-76 (1978). 
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pedigree. Nobody needed to explain, or hire a lawyer to draft a 
careful agreement to cover the details, when a dying man said to his 
mother while gesturing to his friend, "Woman, behold thy son;" and 
to his friend, "Behold thy Mother." The ancient concept of Status 
told them what to do. "And from that hour," the friend "took her 
unto his own home."507 
Because Status, with its origins in the Family, predated the Revo-
lutionary Era, it is not surprising that local American laws governing 
the family "predated not only the writing of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence," but also predated the statement of 
the "new political principles" by the likes of Locke and Hobbes on 
which our constitutional theory was based. 508 Those "new political 
principles" were, of course, grounded fully in concepts of Contract, 
including the right of revolution for "breach of contract" and the 
right of society to enter into yet a new Social Contract in the form of 
a Constitution. 
At the time the Constitution was created, there was a clear dis-
tinction between the individual tradition and the family tradition. 
Drawing on terms first used by De Tocqueville, Walter Berns has 
written that the individual tradition was in the realm of "political 
legislation," which was embodied in the Constitution and was in-
formed by the democratic political rights expressed in the Declara-
tion of Independence. Political legislation stressed the natural 
equality of all men "so far as political right is concerned."509 Thus, 
the new political principles rejected centuries of abuse of aristocratic 
Status as a political and economic construct. In this state of individ-
ualistic equality, it was assumed that men would be "calculating, 
fear-motivated ... individuals, not directed toward others .... "510 
"Vigorous pursuit of individual self-interest turned out to be the 
"'guiding and energizing principles of the community."511 
Meanwhile, however, the domestic realm had not been included 
in the political legislation. It remained, rather, in what De Toc-
queville called the "civil legislation," which comprised the law en-
forced in state courts, including the laws governing the family. 
These laws, which predated the creation of the Constitution, contin-
ued to regulate the duty of family members to support one another; 
507. John 19:26-27. 
508. Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society 12 (Apr. 11, 1981) (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review). 
509. Id at 11. 
510. Id at 13 (quoting Alan Bloom). 
511. Horwitz, supra note 54, at 133. 
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the right of a father to an action against one who, by debauching his 
daughter, brought disgrace upon the family; and the rule providing 
that one spouse could not testify against the other, in the interest of 
domestic harmony.512 Many of the duties imposed by the civil law 
upon family members derived from a "law of morality," which also 
had obvious links to a social interest that sought to provide for the 
protection of dependent persons, and to secure "to all individuals a 
moral and social life" as well as to ensure the "rearing and training 
of sound ... citizens for the future."513 Clearly, the family law doc-
trines that evolved through custom and the common law, prior to the 
Constitution both in time and in theory, were concerned with mar-
riage not only as "the most important relation in life," but also as 
"the foundation of the family and of society."514 Hence, society's 
right to concern itself with the social interest in marriage may be 
among the most obvious and the most important of the rights and 
powers retained by "the people" and "the States" under the ninth 
and tenth amendments. The silence of the Constitution on the entire 
subject of the family does not tell us that marriage and family were 
unimportant to the founders; it tells us, rather, that the Founders 
consciously accepted the regulation of family life embodied in the 
civil legislation. They did not view individual rights arising from 
family relationships - though there were many - as political liber-
ties needing protection by the Bill of Rights. 
The customary and common law, traditions of Status on which 
domestic relations law rested did not derive from the same premises 
of self-interest inherent in the natural rights doctrines that fueled the 
political and economic individualism of the nineteenth century. 
Rather, in abrupt contrast, the civil legislation reflected an "anxious 
solicitude of the law for domestic tranquility." It sought to protect 
"the family as the place oflove," based not on the ruthless self-inter-
est of the political legislation, but on "self-forgetting" and the "ca-
pacity to care for another which produces a willingness to care for 
others."515 The great strength of Status in the civil legislation was 
that it maintained the inseparable link between liberty and duty, de-
veloping in children and other family members the public virtue that 
made the family tradition an essential prerequisite not only of the 
512. See generally T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (3d ed. 1862), quoted in 
Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society, supra note 508, at 12. 
513. Pound, supra note 21, at 182. 
514. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). 
515. Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society, supra note 508, at 12-13. 
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individual tradition, but of a stable democratic society.516 Thus it 
could be said by the Supreme Court in 1979: "Properly understood, 
then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our 
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic 
presuppositions of the latter."517 
When the Court in 1923 first recognized that the right of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children was part of the substantive 
liberty protected by the due process clause,518 it did not create a new 
legal right out of whole constitutional cloth. It merely acknowledged 
in constitutional language the traditions of Status and the civil legis-
lation that predated the Constitution.519 In that sense, Meyer v. Ne-
braska520 is a clear example of substantive due process as a search 
only for "fundamental principles as they have been understood by 
the traditions of our people and our law."521 
But somehow, in the last twenty years, our concepts have become 
all confused. Perhaps the confusion began with the passion and the 
power of the Civil Rights movement, which arose from such bitter 
ashes that jt understandably looked to the potent individualistic con-
stitutional doctrines of the political legislation to resolve problems 
that were at least as much social as they were political, economic, 
and governmental. Then the feminist movement, with equal fervor, 
sought economic and other forms of equality for women in ways that 
had never been considered by previous women's rights movements 
in the United States: by pursuing not only economic and political 
rights per se, but also by going "right to the heart of the matter, 
which is the historic nature of the role of the sexes."522 These move-
ments were joined by an endless variety of other social revolutions so 
all-encompassing that they had a way of politicizing everything. 
Each movement sought to discard some objectionable aspect of our 
traditions. Each viewed with disdain any doctrine which would limit 
the definition of due process liberty to the very traditions they sought 
to change. 
Amid such turmoil, our settled concepts have become hazy: not 
abandoned, just hazy. It could be that the traditions of Status and 
516. See Part I B supra. 
517. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
518. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
519. For a summary of the common law development of parental rights, see Hafen, supra 
note 49, at 613-19. 
520. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
52.1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
522. R. NISBET, supra note 42, at 83 (emphasis in original). 
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the civil legislation, based on self-forgetting and a link between duty 
and liberty, have now been thrown out as so much archaic baggage. 
If so, marriage, kinship, and the domestic relations should arguably 
be understood as having joined the individual tradition and Con-
tract, and thus rest upon self-interest, political power, and a concept 
of liberty that will accept duty only when the power of the State can 
enforce it. 
If all that is true, it is also ironic. The doctrine of economic self-
interest, once so much at the center of the individual tradition, has 
been forthrightly transferred from the protected position of substan-
tive due process to a merely permitted constitutional category.523 
The result is that economic self-interest is now enormously moder-
ated by a potent social interest in the economic welfare of society. 
Conversely, the family tradition, once so wisely protected from the 
corrosive influences of self-centered individualism, has been dragged 
into conceptual alliance with the most politically based individual 
liberties. One wonders if it has all been done consciously. 
The opinions of the Supreme Court discussed earlier suggest that 
despite all the individual rights rhetoric, most of the Justices still tac-
itly believe they are maintaining a family tradition based on kinship 
and marriage, designed to contribute ultimately to a productive, but 
separate, individual tradition. Whether the historic relationship be-
tween the two traditions can continue to be mutually productive is a 
more open question now than it has ever been before. The enor-
mous influence of the judiciary on the resolution of that question 
depends, among other things, on its ability to recognize and remain 
conscious of the very different conceptual and historical purposes of 
the two traditions, on its ability to use a constitutional test that per-
mits a weighing of the social and the individual interests before shift-
ing the burden of proof, and on its ability to keep watch over the 
law's general preference for marriage in the face of increasing pres-
sures to ignore it in favor of some specific competing inequity. 
In the meantime, we must avoid the naive expectation that the 
law will magically deliver to individuals an "autonomy that social 
conditions make it increasingly difficult for them to achieve."524 The 
search for autonomy, divorced as it now is in the public mind from a 
search for commitment and duty, is a search that will compound our 
sense of alienation, not eliminate it. Nietzsche knew the feeling: 
" 'Where is - my home?' For it do I ask and seek, and have sought, 
523. See notes 400-04 supra. 
524. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 150. 
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but have not found it. 0 eternal everywhere, 0 eternal nowhere, 0 
eternal - in-vain."525 De Tocqueville also understood it: "[N]ot 
only does [the self-interest of] democracy make every man forget his 
ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contempo-
raries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone, and 
threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his 
own heart."526 To divorce liberty from duty is to impair the search 
for freedom, no matter which extreme we pursue. The totalitarian 
state has divorced the two, as duty to the collective has become 
everything. The anarchistic libertarian would divorce the two, as the 
unrestrained and se!(-fulfilling pursuit of personal liberty becomes 
everything. 
The reality is that liberty and duty are two poles on a single con-
struct. Neither is meaningful without the other. When the link be-
tween them is severed, alienation is the only result, whether through 
the oppression of the State or of existential despair. One of the most 
productive sources of maintaining the dynamic link between liberty 
and duty in our own culture has been our understanding of mutual 
reciprocity between the family tradition and the individual tradition, 
between Status and Contract. In the long run, the maintenance of 
that reciprocal link is a critical need for those who seek to "establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, ... and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty" not only "to ourselves," but also to "our Posterity." 
525. F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 306 (T. Common trans. 1951). 
526. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 396, at 194. 
